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Abstract
The three papers in this thesis reflect original microdata collection and linking that im-
prove how research can be done with historical labour data. In the first paper Zach Ward
and I estimate the e↵ect of age at arrival for immigrant outcomes with a new dataset of
Ellis Island arrivals linked to the 1940 U.S. Census. Using within-family variation, we
find that arriving at an older age, or having more childhood exposure to the European
environment, led to a more negative wage gap relative to the native born. Infant arrivals
had a positive wage gap relative to natives, in contrast to a negative gap for teenage
arrivals. Therefore, a key determinant of immigrant outcomes during the Age of Mass
Migration was the country of residence during critical periods of childhood development.
In the second paper Tim Hatton and I examine the votes that led to six British colonies
federating to become the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. We analyse support for
Federation using a new dataset of district-level voting records that we associate with a
new dataset of district-level census characteristics. We find little support for the view
that sectoral interests were important. On the other hand, we find greater support for
Federation in districts with a greater share of migrants from outside the colony, among
those further from the seats of colonial government, and with a greater share of females.
Therefore, support for Federation seems to have been associated more with migration,
distance, and possibly female su↵rage, than with trade.
In the final, and sole-authored, paper I find that surname analysis suggests a low level
of social mobility in Tasmania over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Specifically,
newly constructed microdata records suggest that the levels of various markers of status
between generations are persistent. Surnames are drawn from birth records, while status
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is signalled by membership of certain groups, such as being a parliamentarian or attending
a certain school in the nineteenth century, and being awarded an Order of Australia or
in the legal profession in the late twentieth century. Therefore, social status in Tasmania
appears to be correlated over multiple generations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The papers in this thesis are about various topics in applied historical labour economics
and each of them reflect original microdata collection and linking that improve how re-
search can be done with historical labour data. Each paper is independent, but they share
common themes and methods. In the first paper a new dataset of Ellis Island arrivals is
constructed and then linked to the 1940 U.S. Census. In the second paper, a new dataset
is constructed of district-level support for Australia’s Federation in 1901, and this is linked
to a new dataset that is constructed of district-level census variables. Finally, in the third
paper, various historical and modern individual-level datasets are created and then linked
using surnames. In this introduction we summarise each paper, and then discuss their
shared themes and methods.
In Chapter 2, Zach Ward and I examine the factors influencing the economic outcomes
of immigrants to the United States during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850
through to 1914). We first gather and clean a dataset of Ellis Island arrivals between 1892
and 1924 to identify brothers who arrived at the same time. We then link this dataset to
the 1940 U.S. Census to examine the outcomes of more than 50,000 brothers. We focus on
brothers because they tend to be subject to the same household-invariant unobservable
characteristics and are less likely to change their surname at marriage allowing higher
matching rates.
We examine the ages of immigrating brothers when they arrived at Ellis Island, and
then we exploit the di↵erence in the ages of these brothers to find that arriving at an
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older age led to a more negative wage gap relative to those born in the United States.
The gap for a 16-year-old arrival is equivalent to two fewer years of education. We then
consider the channels for the e↵ect, and find that while education itself was important
other aspects such as imperfect transfer of pre-migration human capital, and reduced
social assimilation also matter. The re-emergence of nationalism in the past few years
reinforces the relevance of this paper. Our work suggests that the integration of migrants
into the receiving country at earlier ages will result in better outcomes regardless of
nativist opinions as to their ‘quality’.
In Chapter 3, Tim Hatton and I examine why the Australian colonies voted to federate.
In 1898 and again in 1899/1900, the six separate colonies conducted referendums on
whether to join the proposed federation. We create datasets of votes and census variables,
and then link these two datasets by changing the geography of the voting data to match
the census records using maps that we digitised.
We analyse the votes at a district level and associate support with a range of district-
level census characteristics. We find little support for the view that sectoral interests were
important, as would be suggested by the theory of customs unions. Instead we find that
the share of people born in a di↵erent Australian colony or overseas is a key explanatory
variable. Another is the share of females in a district. As those shares increase, support
for federating also increases.
In Chapter 4, I examine how social status is passed through generations in Tasma-
nia, one of Australia’s oldest states. I first gather and compile a dataset of Tasmanian
surnames in the 1800s through to today and some associated memberships, elite school
attendance, and occupations. I then follow Clark (2014) and compare the prevalence of
certain surnames in certain ‘high-status’ professions in the nineteenth century, with the
prevalence of those surnames today.
I find that ‘high-status’ prevalence has a high level of persistence over time. The
extent to which status is found to be an inheritance in this paper motivates the analysis
of modern data such as tax records that could inform appropriate types of policies, and
could adjust for some of the weaknesses of the approach. Even if social mobility has
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dramatically improved in recent years, there is still a strong cumulative e↵ect across
generations.
The main theme of this thesis is the use and linking of larger historical datasets. For
instance, in Chapter 2, linking Ellis Island records from between 1892 and 1924 with 1940
U.S. Census records allow us to examine individuals at two points in time. By linking two
historical datasets we are able to broaden the types of questions that can be examined,
compared with relying on a single time series. Similarly, in Chapter 4, where I examine
social mobility in Tasmania, there is no single time series that would allow this to be
examined and it is only by linking datasets that this can be explored.
In Chapters 2 and 4 the most important variable for the linking an individual’s name.
However Chapter 3 uses voting data, for which datasets that include a person’s name
are rarely available, and historical Australian census records, for which individual level
responses are not available. Instead we link the two datasets using geographies. After
digitising maps of census areas we are able to identify the census area of each voting booth
and then construct voting outcomes for census areas.
This thesis illustrates the benefit of constructing linked datasets. This allows the
examination of phenomena that take decades or centuries to evolve without needing un-
broken time series. As digitisation technologies continue to improve the methods used in
this thesis will able to used in an increasingly large number of areas.
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Chapter 2
Age at Arrival and Assimilation
During the Age of Mass Migration
2.1 Introduction
It is increasingly apparent that where one was born and the quality of one’s childhood
environment are key determinants of life-long outcomes.1 By definition, immigrants are
born in a di↵erent environment than natives; therefore, immigrants are exposed to a
di↵erent educational, cultural, and health setting during critical periods of development.
How much of the economic gaps between immigrants and natives during the Age of Mass
Migration can be attributed to growing up in di↵erent environments? There are many
other factors that may explain the gaps between immigrants and natives besides where one
grew up, such as the direction of selection into immigration, the degree of discrimination
from natives, or the extent of sorting into di↵erent enclaves (Biavaschi et al. (2017); Borjas
(1987); Cutler et al. (2008)).
To estimate the importance of growing up abroad we exploit variation in the length
of childhood exposure to source country conditions, as measured by the migrant’s age at
arrival. By comparing the adult outcomes of older child arrivals to younger child arrivals,
1The e↵ect of childhood environment on economic outcomes is a long-standing question in the eco-
nomics literature. For recent literature reviews, see Almond et al. (2017) and Cunha et al. (2006) on
the importance of environment during early stages of childhood. Also see the work on the importance
of childhood environment past age eight (Chetty and Hendren (2017a); Chetty and Hendren (2017b);
Chetty et al. (2016)).
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we can uncover the extent to which outcomes in the United States depended on where
one spent his infancy or adolescence (Chetty and Hendren (2017a); Chetty and Hendren
(2017b)). This method also allows us to identify critical ages for when a move improved
migrant outcomes the most; prior research on child arrivals misses variation within the
group by treating all children as a single category (Hatton (1997); Minns (2000)).
We take advantage of the complete digitisation of immigration records to construct
a sample of brothers arriving at Ellis Island between 1892 and 1924, which we then link
forward to the full-count 1940 Census. With a linked dataset of more than 50,000 brothers,
we then estimate the e↵ect of age at arrival by comparing brothers who immigrated at
di↵erent ages. This strategy controls for household-invariant unobservable characteristics
such as parental income and education that may be correlated with both age at arrival
and migrant outcomes (Bo¨hlmark (2008); Van den Berg et al. (2014); Clarke (2016)).
We find that an older age at arrival, and thus longer exposure to the childhood en-
vironment in Europe, had a large and negative e↵ect on the native-immigrant gap in
outcomes such as wage income and occupational status. For 16-year-old arrivals, the
native-immigrant wage gap was 17 log points more negative compared with the gap for
those who arrived at age one—an e↵ect that is equal in size to two fewer years of educa-
tion. The size of this e↵ect is larger than the overall wage gap between teenage arrivals
and white natives; therefore, we show that infant arrivals had a positive wage gap relative
to natives, in contrast to a negative gap for teenage arrivals.
After establishing that arriving at an older age had a large negative e↵ect on the
native-immigrant gap in economic outcomes, we explore potential channels for this e↵ect.
One mechanism is through educational attainment: 16-year-old arrivals acquired one less
year of schooling than infant arrivals. However, a one-year di↵erence in education does
not explain the entire income e↵ect, suggesting that other mechanisms besides educational
attainment were important. We show that older arrivals were also penalised because po-
tential foreign labour market experience was not rewarded in the United States, implying
that pre-migration human capital did not transfer perfectly across borders. Older arrivals
were also less socially assimilated, as measured by their rate of marriage to a native-born
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spouse, which may have penalised them in the labour market (Abramitzky et al. (2016);
Biavaschi et al. (2017)). While we cannot pinpoint which channel was most important,
we consistently show that longer exposure to the European environment during critical
periods of development was strongly correlated with a variety of migrant outcomes during
the Age of Mass Migration.
Our study contributes to the growing literature on immigrant assimilation during
the Age of Mass Migration using newly digitised records (Abramitzky et al. (2014);
Abramitzky et al. (2016); Biavaschi et al. (2017); Ward (2018)). The current under-
standing in the literature is that the average immigrant’s position in the occupational
distribution was fixed and did not change relative to natives throughout the life cycle;
note that this does not imply income convergence did not occur, but incomes are un-
observed prior to 1940. We show that a male immigrant’s position in the occupational
distribution depended strongly on his age at arrival. These results suggest that while hu-
man capital acquired during adulthood, such as English fluency post arrival, had a smaller
impact on the native-immigrant gap in occupations, human capital acquired during child-
hood had a larger impact (Ward, 2018). Our results also add to the growing literature
on age-at-arrival e↵ects by showing that they were large and important during the Age
of Mass Migration, a time period when the economic gap between source countries and
the United States was smaller than the economic gap between source countries and the
United States today (Abramitzky and Boustan (2017); Bo¨hlmark (2008); Van den Berg
et al. (2014)).
Our study also complements the literature on the intergenerational assimilation of
immigrants (Abramitzky et al. (2014); Borjas (1994); Card et al. (2000)). Child im-
migrants are sometimes called the “1.5” generation since they bridge the gap between
adult arrivals in the first generation and native-born individuals in the second genera-
tion. Our results suggest that the second generation should have improved on the first
generation’s relative position with natives since the second generation spent their entire
childhood within the United States. Yet the intergenerational assimilation literature also
documents that convergence of occupational status for descendants from di↵erent source
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countries was not complete for the children and grandchildren of European migrants, even
though these generations were raised in the same country. A lack of convergence across
generations from di↵erent sources is consistent with there being large di↵erences in the
quality of childhood environment across areas within the United States where immigrants
from di↵erent sources settled, a potential topic for future research.
2.2 Historical Setting And Related Literature
The Age of Mass Migration (1850–1913) is often split into two sub-eras based on the
geographical shift of flows from Northern andWestern Europe (“Old” sources) to Southern
and Eastern Europe (“New” sources) in the late 1880s. At around the same time there
was also a shift in family composition from intact households (including many children)
to unattached males, lowering the fraction of child arrivals (Baines (1995); Hatton and
Williamson (1998)). Illustrating this shift in the late nineteenth century, Greenwood
(2007) reports that the percentage of those under 14 in the inflow from major European
sources dropped from a high of 25 per cent in 1884 to a low of 11 per cent in 1895.
This shift away from family and child migration is associated with younger males taking
advantage of the decreasing costs of travel due to the di↵usion of steam technology and
migration networks (Cohn (2009); Gould (1980)).
Our data cover migrants who entered through Ellis Island between 1892 and 1924, a
period when child arrivals were slowly making up a larger share of arrivals (see Figure
2.1).2 Children were still a small, but increasingly important, part of the inflow: overall,
the fraction of child arrivals increased from 10 to 14 per cent before WWI to slightly
above 15 per cent in the following decade. Some of this increase is due to several shocks
2The data in the series are from the Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration
(1899–1932). One caveat to Figure 2.1 is that both the definition of an immigrant and a child arrival
changed during the early twentieth century (Hutchinson, 1958). Prior to 1903, any entrant, excluding
the cabin class, was counted as an immigrant. For the following two years (1904 and 1905), the definition
changed to include the cabin class. From 1906 onward immigrants were those who intended to stay for
more than one year and had been outside of the United States for more than one year. Besides the
definition of immigrant, the definition of a child arrival also changed from those under the age of 14
prior to the 1917 literacy test to those under the age of 16 afterwards. A final caveat is that the Annual
Reports may have underestimated the number of arrivals due to careless compiling of ship manifests by
the Bureau of Immigration (Bandiera et al., 2013). However, since undercounting is mostly due to entire
ships missing from the totals, it is unclear how it would bias the fraction of children in the arrival flow.
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to the immigration system, such as the cut-o↵ of flows during WWI, the Literacy Act of
1917, and the immigration quotas laws of 1921 and 1924. While U.S. policy significantly
restricted the overall flow, child arrivals were favoured under these policies since those
under 16 were not subject to the literacy test, and children joining a naturalised family
member were given preference under the quota system.3 Consistent with policies favouring
children more than single adults, the countries that were more restricted under the quotas
and literacy test (in Southern and Eastern Europe) had a relative increase of children in
their flow.
Figure 2.1: Child Share Of Immigrant Inflows To The United States, 1899–1932
Notes: Fiscal years are between 1 July and 30 June. Child arrivals are those under the
age of 14 between 1899 and 1916 and under the age of 16 between 1917 and 1932. See
Footnote 3 for definition of arrival.
Sources: Annual Reports of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1899–1932.
While child arrivals were less than 20 per cent of arrivals in the early twentieth century,
they were about 30 per cent of the migrant stock, partially because they were more likely
3Both the 1921 and 1924 immigration quotas allowed child immigrants to join naturalised family
members even if the quota for the country was full.
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to remain rather than return home.4 This can be directly seen in return flow records
where children were underrepresented on out-going ships relative to the migrant stock;
moreover, arrival records show that families with children were more likely to plan to stay
in the United States permanently than single arrivals (Ward, 2017). Yet not all young
migrants arrived with family members; this is indirectly seen in the distribution of age at
arrival in the migrant stock in Figure 2.2.5 While there were about the same proportion
of arrivals at age one as for age 12, there were much more arrivals aged 13 and above,
perhaps because teenagers were more likely to migrate by themselves. If older arrivals
came individually while younger arrivals came as part of a family, then older teenagers
could be selected from a di↵erent part of the source country human capital distribution;
therefore, it will be important to estimate the e↵ect of age at arrival with an empirical
strategy that accounts for changing unobservables across the arrival age distribution.
Early twentieth century o cials recognised the importance of age at arrival for suc-
cessful assimilation; of special concern was whether older arrivals were falling behind in
school. The 1910 Dillingham Commission Reports on The Children of Immigrants in
Schools showed that 43 per cent of children who arrived under age six were behind their
grade level, compared with 92 per cent of those who arrived at ten years or older. The
authors argued that “the child who comes to this country before he reaches school age
often has an opportunity to adjust himself to his new surroundings and in some cases
learn the language through contact with other children before entering school” (US Im-
migration Commission (1910), p. 51). In response to this trend of child arrivals being
poorly educated, states passed compulsory schooling laws to educate immigrant children
who arrived from countries without a compulsory educational system (Bandiera et al.,
2016).
Despite early twentieth century o cials’ interest in age at arrival, the Congressional
4This 30 per cent number is based on 1899 to 1930 arrivals in the 1900–1930 IPUMS samples (Ruggles
et al., 2017).
5This figure is created using the 1900-1930 IPUMS samples (Ruggles et al., 2017) and keeping those
who arrived between 1899 and 1930 to match Figure 2.1. A random sample of ships to Ellis Island from
(Ward, 2017) confirms that older arrivals tended to travel alone, where about 20.5 per cent of 14-year-
olds, 23.6 per cent of 15 year-olds, and 52.9 per cent of 16 year olds entered the United States without a
family member (defined by same surname) on the ship.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of immigrant age-at-arrival in the 1900-1930 U.S. censuses
Notes: The sample is limited to those who arrived between 1899 and 1930 to match with
Figure 2.1. Distribution is estimated after applying the person weight available from
IPUMS.
Sources: 1 per cent samples of the 1900–1920 Censuses, 5 per cent sample of the 1930
Census (Ruggles et al., 2017).
Report is one of the only studies that separates historical migrant outcomes by arrival
age.6 Others that account for age at arrival often group all child arrivals into a single
category. Both Minns (2000) and Hatton (1997) show that those who arrived under
the age of 16 had higher income levels and better-paid occupations than adult arrivals,
consistent with a negative e↵ect of age at arrival and longer exposure to the European
environment. On the other hand, Abramitzky et al. (2014) show that assimilation rates
were similar whether one keeps or drops those who arrived under the age of ten, but since
they do not isolate the sample to only child arrivals, the di↵erence in assimilation for child
6Ward (2018) estimates the e↵ects of age at arrival on English proficiency using the 1900 to 1930
U.S. cross sections, and indicator variables for each arrival age. Ward is primarily interested in using
the estimates to verify the quality of the English proficiency variable rather than to directly analyse the
e↵ect of age of arrival on occupational outcomes.
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arrivals is unclear. We improve on this limited literature by estimating the e↵ect of age
at arrival across all ages, rather than grouping all child arrivals together. We also use an
empirical strategy that controls for household-invariant unobservables that are correlated
with age at arrival and with economic outcomes, which is important in today’s studies on
age at arrival (Clarke, 2016).
In contrast to the scarcity of historical studies, several modern-day studies estimate
the e↵ect of age at arrival on adult outcomes with high-quality data.7 The most credible
method to identify the age-at-arrival profile uses sibling fixed e↵ects. This requires a
large amount of data and therefore has been primarily studied using Swedish and Nor-
wegian administrative records (Bo¨hlmark (2008); Van den Berg et al. (2014)). Outside
of Northern Europe, there are few studies that identify the e↵ect of age at arrival with
siblings. (Chetty and Hendren, 2017a) and (Chetty and Hendren, 2017b) use U.S. tax
records to show that variation in age at migration across counties has a large e↵ect on
adult outcomes, implying that childhood environment varies widely across counties in the
United States. We follow this sibling fixed e↵ects approach to estimate the importance of
childhood environment for immigrants from the past.
2.3 Linking Ellis Island Records To The 1940 Census
The main dataset used for estimation comes from linking two large data sources: Ellis
Island records from 1892 and 1924 and the preliminary full-count 1940 Census available
at IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2017). The Ellis Island records have been digitised and are
searchable online; note that this source is the same one used by Bandiera et al. (2013)
and Spitzer and Zimran (2017).8 While the clear advantage of the Ellis Island records is
that they include millions of observations, there are a few disadvantages. One is that not
every variable in the arrival records is digitised, such as occupation, relationship status, or
7Friedberg (1992) is the seminal study of age at arrival on adult outcomes. Several outcomes besides
income have been explored, including human capital outcomes such as language acquisition and edu-
cational attainment (Bleakley and Chin (2004); Bo¨hlmark (2008); Schoellman (2016)), social outcomes
such as intermarriage or living in an ethnic enclave (A˚slund et al. (2015); Bleakley and Chin (2010)), and
health outcomes such as height (Van den Berg et al., 2014).
8Many arrival records prior to 1897 were lost in a fire, so coverage prior to 1897 is not complete
(Spitzer and Zimran, 2017).
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height. Moreover, the Ellis Island records include both immigrants and non-immigrants;
non-immigrants are other entrants such as business travellers, tourists, or those traveling
through to another country. However, we are only interested in those who we can locate
in the 1940 Census, and thus those who have stayed permanently (and survived) until
1940.
Our population of interest in the Ellis Island records is brothers who are single and
arrived between the ages of zero and 20. For this population (who are primarily Euro-
pean), we collect first name, last name, age, date of arrival, place of last residence, and
ethnicity. We identify brothers as immigrants who are listed next to each other with the
same last name and are less than ten years apart in age, although we do not have their
relationship listed in the data.9 The key variable of interest from these records is age,
which we wish to attach to their adult observation in the 1940 Census. For a discussion of
the assumptions we made in cleaning the data, please see Appendix A.2. After cleaning,
we have 397,003 brothers who can be linked to the 1940 Census.
We link these brothers to the 1940 U.S. Census using a match on first name, last name,
country of birth, and year of birth in a 3-year range.10 We find potential matches based
on having an exact NYSIIS match on first and last name; however, we choose the best
match based on the smallest sum of the absolute di↵erence in year of birth, Jaro-Winkler
distance in first name and Jaro-Winkler distance in last name.11 (Massey, 2017) shows
that this method of ranking matches is reasonable for improved match rates and reduced
false positives. For more detail on the linking process, see Appendix A.3.
It is possible that our linking methodology incorrectly links some people, which would
induce measurement error and bias our sibling fixed e↵ects estimates toward OLS esti-
9The two people must have also arrived at the same time.
10We access the 1940 Census on the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) server due to
restrictions on observing the first name and last name in the public-use dataset. Some of the data files
created in this study are available online (Alexander and Ward, 2018). However, the linked records have
not been made available since the 1940 Census is restricted access.
11NYSIIS, or the New York State Identification and Intelligence System, is a phonetic algorithm to
standardise similar sounding names. The Jaro-Winkler algorithm measures the distance between strings
based on the number of matching characters. Using the actual first and last name strings to gauge
the quality of match is recommended by Bailey et al. (2017), rather than treating all matches with the
same NYSIIS code as of equal quality. We show that results are robust to using a method related to
Feigenbaum (2016) in Appendix A.5.
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mates (Bailey et al., 2017). However, as we will show in robustness checks, our results do
not change when limiting our sample to higher-quality links in terms of closer matches in
first and last name strings and year of birth. The results are also robust in an alternative
sample where links are chosen based on a predicted match score calculated from a hand-
linked sample of immigrants, a method that is related to the linking strategy described
by Feigenbaum (2016).12 Overall, we are confident that our results are not driven by link
quality.
We take one extra step when linking the datasets because we start with arrival records
unlike others who link from census to census. We are concerned that some immigrants
may have changed their first name to be more “American” after arrival; for example,
from Giuseppe to Joseph or Pietro to Peter. Biavaschi et al. (2017) show that name
changes occur for 32 per cent of their sample of naturalisation records in New York and
that name changes were more common for Southern and Eastern Europeans. To account
for this possibility, we Americanise the first names in our dataset of arrival records and
the first names in the census records. This will allow us to match Giovanni at arrival
to John in the census, but also to match Giovanni (Americanised to John) at arrival to
Giovanni (Americanised to John) in the census in case Americanisation did not occur.
We do this with a list of more than 28,000 variants of first names based on information
at behindthename.com.13 The Americanisation process improves our linking rates by
about 35 per cent, but, as we will show in a later robustness check, our results do not
substantially change if we do not Americanise first names.
The starting sample of 397,137 brothers is successfully linked for 103,005 individuals
in the 1940 Census using our main linking approach, or 25.9 per cent of arrivals. Since
the main empirical strategy exploits variation within brothers, we drop individuals where
one brother was linked and another was not. This restriction gives us a final sample of
12We use the hand-linked samples from Ward (2018) to predict the best link among the set of potential
links. While this method is related to Feigenbaum (2016), it is not exactly the same since our “training
sample” is from immigrants linked between 1920–1930 U.S. Censuses rather than Ellis Island records to
the 1940 Census.
13For some names, there are multiple American-sounding variants. We choose the variant that is most
popular for years of birth prior to 1930, data which is available from the Social Security Administration
at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/names.zip.
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53,129, or 13.4 per cent of our original set of brothers.
Table 2.1 shows the linking rates by country of birth and demonstrates a common
pattern in the literature where we are less likely to link Southern and Eastern Europeans
relative to Northern and Western Europeans (Abramitzky et al. (2014); Ward (2018)).
Clearly, our linked sample is not a random sample of foreign-born brothers. We are not
able to test for the representativeness of the sample on occupation or literacy compared
to all Ellis Island arrivals since these variables are not digitised. Yet we would rather test
for representativeness according to the 1940 Census since the Ellis Island records include
many non-immigrants and thus any di↵erence between our linked sample and those in
the Ellis Island data would reflect both selection into permanent migration and selection
into the linked sample. However, we also cannot test for representativeness according to
the 1940 Census because it does not separate immigrants by cohort or age of arrival, once
again making it unclear whether any di↵erences are due to biases from the linking process
or because the linked data has younger arrivals.14
Most linked samples that use a similar linking methodology are found to be slightly
higher skilled than the underlying population and only show a strong bias in country of
birth (Abramitzky et al., 2014). New source countries are less likely to be linked to the
1940 Census than Old sources because of common names, return migration, misspelled
names, or names that are not captured in our list of Americanised names. To account for
this bias, we reweight the sample to reflect the migrant stock by country of birth in 1940,
although this reweighting does not drive our results.15
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the linked sample of brothers and the 1
per cent sample of white natives in the 1940 census, illustrating the gaps in economic
and social outcomes between immigrants and natives. We compare our immigrants to
white natives on several outcomes, including years of completed education, occupation,
14We can compare our sample to the 1940 migrant stock, which we do in Appendix A.2. Our linked
sample is higher skilled, more highly educated, and less likely to be from a new source country.
15Reweighting to match the 1940 stock is done with males who were born between 1872 and 1924 to
reflect our sample of zero to 20-year-old brothers who arrived between 1892 and 1924. We alternatively
reweighted to match the 1930 Census distribution of country of birth, a census which includes year of
arrival and thus we can reweight to match those who arrived between 1892 and 1924. Either weighting
to match the 1930 or 1940 migration distribution yields the same results.
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Table 2.1: Birthplace composition in Ellis Island data linked to the 1940 census
Country of Birth Brothers at Linked to 2+ Brothers 2+ Brothers
Arrival Census Linked Link Rate
Old source countries: 96,790 34,877 21,421 22.1
Denmark 3,876 1,558 961 24.8
Finland 3,807 677 269 7.1
Norway 7,468 2,363 1,306 17.5
Sweden 8,621 3,226 1,816 21.1
England 23,695 9,601 6,091 25.7
Scotland 9,739 5,109 3,512 36.1
Ireland 8,154 4,433 3,130 38.4
Belgium 3,694 653 272 7.4
France 5,668 843 332 5.9
Netherlands 11,752 2,680 1,369 11.6
Switzerland 2,848 898 528 18.5
Germany 7,468 2,836 1,835 24.6
New source countries: 275,205 65,952 30,799 11.2
Greece 9,411 1,139 298 3.2
Italy 150,476 49,183 24,224 16.1
Portugal 2,376 740 445 18.7
Spain 2,812 590 291 10.3
Austria 14,789 2,251 895 6.1
Czechoslovakia 9,835 2,309 1,157 11.8
Hungary 8,736 1,204 450 5.2
Poland 16,717 2,204 794 4.7
Romania 6,757 665 197 2.9
Yugoslavia 3,309 572 205 6.2
Lithuania 2,759 122 22 0.8
Russia 47,228 4,973 1,821 3.9
Other (Asia, Canada, Mexico) 25,142 2,176 909 3.6
Total 397,137 103,005 53,129 13.4
Notes: The empirical strategy uses sibling fixed e↵ects, so we only keep sets of brothers
where at least two are successfully linked (2+ Brother Linked column). For context, the
resident population of the United States at the 1940 US Census 132 million people.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
and wage income. Note that whenever we use wage income, in this table or in later
regressions, we exclude self-employed workers since business and farm income are not
included in the 1940 Census.
The migrants in our sample have been in the United States for an average of about
31 years. Therefore, those who arrived between age zero and five are on average 34 years
old in 1940, while those who arrived between ages 16 and 20 are on average 49 years old
in 1940. Considering these di↵erences in age, it will be important to adjust for age when
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of linked sample of brothers
Age at arrival
Native-born 0–5 6–10 11–15 16–20
Age 35.76 34.80 39.50 43.52 48.58
(14.58) (7.815) (7.752) (7.815) (7.161)
Years in the United States 31.91 31.47 30.76 30.85
(7.654) (7.652) (7.755) (6.983)
Southern and Eastern 0.544 0.601 0.625 0.623
European (New source) (0.498) (0.490) (0.484) (0.485)
Years of U.S. education 9.286 8.169 5.615 1.565 0.165
(3.280) (3.392) (3.616) (2.378) (0.789)
Years of foreign education 0 1.861 5.157 5.987
(0) (1.389) (2.327) (3.369)
Potential U.S. labour 20.49 20.60 25.83 29.17 30.66
market experience (15.50) (9.515) (9.363) (8.405) (7.078)
Potential foreign labour 0 0.163 1.605 5.741
market experience (0) (0.652) (2.418) (3.570)
Age-adjusted di↵erence from white native-born
Log (income), if wage 6.712 0.0945 0.0344 –0.00257 –0.0792
worker (0.960) (0.686) (0.697) (0.683) (0.722)
Log (income), if wage 6.905 –0.0428 –0.108 –0.153 –0.225
worker and urban (0.878) (0.677) (0.687) (0.671) (0.704)
Self employed 0.226 –0.0587 –0.0585 –0.0631 –0.0870
(0.418) (0.359) (0.389) (0.410) (0.418)
White collar 0.291 –0.0437 –0.0472 –0.0786 –0.107
(0.454) (0.444) (0.447) (0.430) (0.408)
Farmer 0.129 –0.0832 –0.102 –0.109 –0.123
(0.336) (0.180) (0.182) (0.210) (0.231)
Unskilled 0.418 0.0822 0.105 0.137 0.187
(0.493) (0.501) (0.502) (0.502) (0.502)
Semi-skilled 0.162 0.0447 0.0444 0.0504 0.0432
(0.368) (0.411) (0.418) (0.426) (0.423)
Urban area 0.532 0.255 0.256 0.261 0.255
(0.499) (0.395) (0.396) (0.399) (0.413)
Native-born spouse, 0.960 –0.317 –0.391 –0.483 –0.628
if married (0.196) (0.477) (0.494) (0.498) (0.468)
Fraction of HH in county 0.838 –0.145 0.148 –0.148 –0.149
which are native born (0.162) (0.141) (0.138) (0.137) (0.137)
Observations 372,870 14,979 15,693 11,367 11,090
Notes: Native born are white males restricted to the same birth cohorts are the immigrant
sample. Total education and potential labour market experience is split under the
assumption that individuals enter school at age six and continuously attend for their full
years of schooling (see Footnote 19). The outcomes are age-adjusted residuals after
predicting life-cycle variation with the native born (see Equation 2.1 in text). There is
missing information for some of these variables. Specifically, 17,152 do not have a positive
log income, 1,538 have missing education, 5,226 have missing self-employment, and 3,225
have a blank occupation. HH stands for household heads.
Source: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census and a 1
per cent sample of 1940 Census.
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examining di↵erences between immigrants and natives, which we show in the bottom half
of the table. After adjusting outcomes based on white natives’ life-cycle profile, Table
2.2 shows that there is a strong negative gradient to age at arrival for many variables.16
For example, zero-year-old arrivals earned 9.5 per cent more than natives, while 16–20
year old arrivals earned 7.9 per cent less. Note that children arriving early enough have
earnings that are higher than natives of the same age, perhaps implying that childhood
environment may explain the entire native-immigrant wage gap for older arrivals. Yet part
of the reason why younger arrivals earned more than white natives overall was because
they located in urban areas. Table 2.2 shows that when limiting the sample to those
only in urban areas, then zero-year-old arrivals earned 4.3 per cent less than natives.
Nevertheless, when limiting the sample to urban areas, the same pattern holds where
older arrivals had a larger wage gap with natives compared with younger arrivals.
One explanation for the change in income gap across age at arrival is that older arrivals
were exposed to source country conditions for a longer period. On the other hand, the
change may be due to selection bias such that older arrivals had worse outcomes because
they came from lower income or educated families; the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors may have
changed. Instead of estimating the age-at-arrival profile using variation across families,
we will estimate the profile using variation within family to control for unobserved family-
invariant variables (such as parental education and income) as described in more detail
in the next section.
2.4 Empirical Strategy And Identification
The first challenge when estimating the e↵ect of age at arrival on immigrant outcomes
is a standard one of collinearity: it is not possible to simultaneously estimate the e↵ect
of age at arrival, age, and years in the United States because they are linearly depen-
dent.17 We follow the standard practice of using natives to identify the life-cycle profile
16To adjust for age, we use the standard method in the assimilation literature and run a first regression
of the outcome on the full-range of age fixed e↵ects with our sample of white natives, and then calculate
the residuals for the sample of immigrants based on predicted values from natives. See Equation 2.1 and
the dependent variable of Equation 2.2 in the next section.
17That is Age at Arrival = Age – Years in the United States.
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(or aging e↵ect), and then estimate whether age at arrival influences deviations from this
profile (Borjas, 1985).18 We take the two-step approach used by Schaafsma and Sweetman
(2001): first, we estimate an auxiliary regression to identify the age-earnings profile using
only white native-born individuals (superscript nb) from the same birth cohorts as our
immigrant sample:
ln(income) =  nba + ✏i. (2.1)
The income-age profile is modelled using a full-range of age fixed e↵ects. We then
estimate whether deviations from the native age-earnings profile are related to the im-
migrant’s age at arrival, while controlling for other factors such as years in the United
States:
ln(income)   ˆnba = g(Age At Arrivali) + h(Years in USi) +  i. (2.2)
Therefore, this equation shows that the estimated e↵ect of age at arrival on outcomes
is the e↵ect of age at arrival on the native-immigrant gap.19 The method essentially
estimates the e↵ect of di↵erences in age at arrival on the di↵erence between natives’ and
immigrants’ log income by age.
The second problem with estimating the e↵ect of age at arrival is selection bias: im-
migrants who arrive at older ages may di↵er from those who arrive at younger ages in
unobservable ways. For example, families with a strong preference for improving their
child’s education may have immigrated to the United States with children at younger
ages prior to school entry. In this case, an estimated age-at-arrival e↵ect may capture
family preferences for investment into children and lead to a negative age-at-arrival pro-
file if families with younger children are positively selected relative to families with older
children. Indeed, in present-day data, those immigrating with younger children also tend
to have higher education levels than those migrating with older children (Clarke, 2016).
To address issues of selection bias when comparing immigrants across families, we com-
pare immigrants within the family (i.e., we compare brothers). The regression therefore
18We use the preliminary full-count 1940 Census to estimate the life-cycle profile. We use male white
native-born who are aged 15 to 69 to match the immigrant sample. Wage income is top coded at 5,000.
19Note that when estimating this equation, the years in the United States function is a mix of assimi-
lation and cohort e↵ects since we only have a cross section (Borjas, 1985).
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changes to
ln(incomeih)   ˆnba = g(Age At Arrivalih) +  h +  ih.
where the key addition is the sibling fixed e↵ect  h. Therefore, we relate the variation
of native-immigrant income gap within siblings to the variation in age at arrival within
siblings. Including household fixed e↵ects controls for many household-invariant factors
such as parental preferences for education or childhood investment, parental wealth, father
and mother’s education, culture, family structure, and country of origin. Note that this
strategy compares individuals from the same arrival cohort with the same number of years
in the United States, so these other variables of interest in the assimilation literature are
dropped from the equation.
We use a non-parametric approach and code age at arrival into two-year bins (arrived
between zero and one, between two and three, etc.) up until arrival at age 18.20 This
specification allows us to capture a variety of slopes in the profile such as the age-at-arrival
profile being flat until ages eight to ten and decreasing afterwards, reflecting language
acquisition or other e↵ects of this critical period (Bleakley and Chin (2004); Van den
Berg et al. (2014)). Alternatively, the slope could be steepest for arrival ages under five,
reflecting the importance of human capital development at very young ages (Almond
et al., 2017). Note that we do not control for any post-arrival outcome, such as geography
or marital status, because location could be an outcome of age at arrival (Bleakley and
Chin, 2010).
For the regression to estimate a causal relationship, the identifying assumption is that
age at arrival is not correlated with unobservables that vary within the family and also
a↵ect income. Unfortunately, we are unable to include other control variables that may
bias our estimates due to the limited information in arrival records. The primary concern
is birth order: birth order may a↵ect adult outcomes through general birth order e↵ects,
and birth order is also correlated with age at immigration. It is also possible that parents
20We code the bins to the floor of the two ages such that ages zero to one are bin zero, two and three
are in bin two, up to bin 18, which includes 18, 19, and 20 year olds. We include 20-year-old arrivals in
this bin due to a small number of observations. We show in a robustness check that excluding ages 16
and up from our sample does not change the results. Moreover, using one-year bins does not change the
qualitative conclusions, but increases the noisiness of estimates.
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may time immigration to be optimal for the younger child (e.g., immigrate just prior to
school entry) such that younger arrivals would have better outcomes due to unobservable
parental investment into younger children. Unfortunately, we only observe birth order
according to the arrival records, which ignores older siblings who may have stayed in the
source country (Abramitzky et al., 2013). Since birth order is not exactly observed, we do
not control for it in our main specification; nevertheless, we show in a robustness check
that the results are robust to controlling for birth order.
There are a few threats to the external validity of our estimates, where they may not
apply to all child immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration. First, we only identify
the age-at-arrival profile with brothers rather than single arrivals; these estimates may
di↵er if there is an extra disruptive e↵ect for older brothers who have to take care of their
younger brothers, though the sizes of our e↵ects are likely too large for this to be driving
our result. Another possible bias is that we mismeasure the e↵ect of age at arrival for
the entire population due to selective return migration (Abramitzky et al. (2014); Ward
(2017)). Our sample only consists of brothers who remained in the United States; however,
if one brother stayed and another returned home, then they would not be included in our
sample. If older arrivals were more likely to return home and older arrivals also earned
less income, then we would understate the negative e↵ect of age at arrival. A similar
story and bias would apply in the case of selective mortality. Our method for identifying
brothers means that we also do not identify brothers who arrive separately. Finally, our
estimates do not apply to all arrivals since we only link those who arrived through Ellis
Island, which primarily misses entrants from Asia, Canada, or Mexico.21 Therefore, the
reader should keep in mind that our results come from brothers who arrived at Ellis Island
between 1892 and 1924 and survived until the 1940 Census.
21The 1907 Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration lists that about 80 per cent of
immigrant arrivals were to New York. This may have decreased following the immigration quotas when
more immigrants entered via land borders.
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2.5 The E↵ect Of Age At Arrival On Economic Out-
comes
We estimate the e↵ect of age at arrival with the brothers fixed e↵ects specification and
plot the coe cients in Figure 2.3.22 The plotted coe cients estimate the di↵erence in
native-immigrant wage gap relative to the native-immigrant wage gap for zero- to one-
year-old arrivals. The results show a strong negative slope for age at arrival such that
the native-immigrant wage gap was 17 log points (or 15.6 per cent) more negative for a
16-year-old arrival compared with the wage gap for an infant arrival. If one assumes that
the return to education was 6.5 to 7.9 per cent in 1940 (Clay et al., 2016), then having a
full childhood in the United States was equivalent to receiving more than two additional
years of schooling.
This result is consistent with the U.S. childhood environment yielding a higher return
than the childhood environment in the source country in general, with the specific result
depending on the source country. The pattern could be due to a higher-quality education
or health environment in the United States; yet at the same time, the quality of the health
environment may not have been higher in the United States. For example, Eriksson
and Niemesh (2016) show that children of black migrants during the Great Migration
had higher infant mortality rates relative to children of non-migrants due to poor health
conditions in northern cities. However, for states for which we have data at the turn of the
twentieth century, infant mortality rates for foreign-born mothers were less than those for
African Americans and similar to the rates in many European sources (Preston and Haines
(1991), Tables 2.3 and 3.1). Ultimately, it is unclear whether migrating from Europe led
to a lower quality health environment in the United States. Another possibility is that
the U.S. environment was not better objectively, but rather that its education system
trained individuals specifically for the U.S. labour market.
Despite the creation of the new linked sample of brothers, the age-at-arrival profile es-
timated without sibling fixed e↵ects is within the standard errors of the profile estimated
22Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
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Figure 2.3: The negative e↵ect of age at arrival on the native-immigrant gap in wage
income in 1940
Notes: The dependent variable is the age-adjusted gap in years of education between
immigrants and natives. The figure shows the estimated fixed e↵ects for age at arrival
with age at arrival of zero and one being the excluded group. The shaded area is the 95
per cent confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
with sibling fixed e↵ects.23 This result suggests that family-invariant unobservables such
as parental preferences and education do not strongly bias the age-at-arrival profile esti-
mated with OLS. However, it is also possible that we do not detect a di↵erence in profiles
between the methodologies due to errors in the linking process, which would bias the
sibling fixed e↵ects result towards the OLS result. This is likely not the case since we
find the same result when limiting the sample to higher-quality links. In Appendix Table
A.2, we keep the top 50 per cent of links in terms of quality of match based on closeness
of name and year of birth and show that even with higher quality links, the sibling fixed
e↵ects method estimates a profile that is within the 95 per cent confidence interval of
23When not using sibling fixed e↵ects, we control for country of birth and years in the United States.
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the profile estimated with our main sample. We also show that if one links immigrants
in a method related to Feigenbaum (2016), then the estimated profile is also within the
confidence interval of the profile estimated with our main sample (see Appendix A.5 for
more detail).
The negatively-sloped age-at-arrival profile appears to be linear; however, standard
errors are wide so the profile may not truly be linear. Nevertheless, if one models the
age-at-arrival e↵ect to be constant across ages, then the e↵ect of arriving one year later
leads to a 1.1 per cent more negative wage gap with white natives. A linear age-at-arrival
profile would go against expectations in two ways: first, others have found a steepening
of the profile around the ages of 8 to 11 due to critical periods of language acquisition
or health development (Bleakley and Chin (2004); Van den Berg et al. (2014)). Our
estimate does show a dip in income between age 8 and 14, consistent with a critical
period e↵ect, but we cannot statistically detect a break in the slope. We also do not
detect a steeper slope for ages under five, which may be surprising given the large returns
to improved childhood environment during very young ages Almond et al. (2017); yet this
may reflect the countervailing e↵ects of a lower quality health environment in the United
States relative to Europe.
Not only did arriving at an older age cause the native-immigrant gap to be more
negative, but it also caused immigrants to enter lower skilled occupations relative to
natives.24 Table 2.3 shows that arriving at an older age increased the likelihood of entering
an unskilled job and lowered the likelihood of holding a white-collar job. To provide a
summary measure of the e↵ect of age at arrival on occupation, the last two columns
estimate the e↵ect on occupational score and show that the native-immigrant gap for 16-
year-old arrivals was five to 12 log points more negative than for infant arrivals.25 Since
24The occupational categories are split by occ1950 codes such that professionals (codes starting with
0), managers (1), salesmen (3), and clerical workers (4) are white-collars. Farm owners, tenants, and
managers (1) are farmers. Craftsmen (5) are skilled workers. Operatives (6), low-skilled service workers
(7), farm laborers (8), and laborers (9) are unskilled workers.
25We show results based on a created occupational score that reflects mean earnings by occupation and
source country in the 1940 Census. Creation of this score is discussed in Appendix A.4 and is largely based
on Collins and Wanamaker (2017). We also show the age-at-arrival e↵ect for the 1950 IPUMS variable
occscore, the main one presented by Abramitzky et al. (2014). Results across scores di↵er because the
1940 score reflects a less compressed wage distribution and more adequately reflects immigrant earnings
by occupation.
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the magnitude of the e↵ect on occupation score is less than the magnitude of the e↵ect
on income (17 log points), this suggests that age at arrival a↵ected both occupation and
income within occupation. Given these e↵ects of age at arrival on income and occupation,
it may be that age at arrival also a↵ected other dimensions such as labour supply, but
as shown in Appendix Table A.3, we find no e↵ect of age at arrival on labour force
participation or weeks worked.26
Table 2.3: E↵ect of age at arrival on occupations
Age at White-Col. Skilled Farmer Unskilled Log (Occ. Score)
arrival 1940 1950
2 to 3 –0.0198 0.00332 –0.0155** 0.0320 –0.0275** –0.0103
(0.0174) (0.0170) (0.00679) (0.0196) (0.0118) (0.0137)
4 to 5 –0.00308 2.55e-05 –0.0176** 0.0206 –0.0478*** –0.0108
(0.0175) (0.0167) (0.00697) (0.0196) (0.0120) (0.0139)
6 to 7 –0.00276 –0.00804 –0.0317*** 0.0425** –0.0681*** –0.0140
(0.0180) (0.0174) (0.00726) (0.0203) (0.0123) (0.0142)
8 to 9 –0.0220 0.00812 –0.0332*** 0.0472** –0.0790*** –0.0175
(0.0181) (0.0175) (0.00740) (0.0203) (0.0123) (0.0144)
10 to 11 –0.0339* –0.00117 –0.0379*** 0.0730*** –0.0895*** –0.0288*
(0.0190) (0.0184) (0.00776) (0.0215) (0.0131) (0.0151)
12 to 13 –0.0332 0.000934 –0.0430*** 0.0754*** –0.112*** –0.0383**
(0.0211) (0.0207) (0.00873) (0.0242) (0.0144) (0.0168)
14 to 15 –0.0720*** 0.0184 –0.0428*** 0.0963*** –0.113*** –0.0453***
(0.0216) (0.0213) (0.00930) (0.0246) (0.0146) (0.0173)
16 to 17 –0.0558** 0.00519 –0.0597*** 0.110*** –0.122*** –0.0470**
(0.0227) (0.0227) (0.00976) (0.0260) (0.0154) (0.0183)
18 to 20 –0.0590** 0.0164 –0.0542*** 0.0968*** –0.118*** –0.0437**
(0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0112) (0.0279) (0.0167) (0.0199)
N 49,904 49,904 49,904 49,904 49,904 49,904
R2 0.545 0.511 0.603 0.550 0.700 0.557
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
The occupational score in the second to last column is the logged occupation based
on mean wages in the 1940 Census (see Appendix A.4). The last column is the log
occupational score based on the variable occscore in IPUMS. The excluded group
is arrivals aged zero and one. Brothers fixed e↵ects are included are clustered by
household.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
We check the robustness of the age-at-arrival profile when controlling for observed
birth order. Recall that observed birth order may not reflect the true birth order since we
26We also show in Appendix Table A.4 that age at arrival has no qualitative e↵ect on home ownership
and a small positive e↵ect on living in a more urbanised location. Migrants were more likely to live in
an urban environment, hence being consistently less likely to be engaged in farming.
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do not observe family members left behind in the source country. In each specification,
the age-at-arrival profile is unchanged, and the birth order e↵ects are statistically insignif-
icant. Another concern is that including immigrants who arrived aged older than 16 may
bias results since older arrivals may have decided on their own to immigrate while younger
arrivals had less choice. To account for this, we re-estimate the age-at-arrival e↵ect when
dropping those who arrived older than age 15, and find no di↵erence in the estimated
income profile. Finally, we test for the robustness of our linking process to the Amer-
icanisation process by relinking our data without Americanising names. The estimated
e↵ects without the Americanisation process have less precision (see Appendix Table A.7)
but rea rm the negative e↵ect of age at arrival on adult labour market outcomes. These
robustness checks are shown in Appendix Tables A.5–A.7.
2.6 Potential Mechanisms For The Age-at-arrival Ef-
fect
Arriving at an older age negatively a↵ected labour market outcomes later in life, but
through which channels? The potential mechanisms are numerous, but to name a few:
the system of education changed across countries; parental resources may have improved
after the move and thus investment into the child also improved; and younger arrivals may
have socially adapted at a quicker rate. In this section, we estimate how age at arrival
was related to these potential mechanisms.
2.6.1 Total Years of Education
First, we test whether age at arrival a↵ected the total years of educational attainment.
When we run the same age-at-arrival regression with native-immigrant gap in education
as the dependent variable, we find that the gap for older arrivals was larger than the
gap for younger arrivals by one year (see Figure 2.4). The education profile looks similar
to the income profile in that they are both negatively sloped, suggesting that education
could be a primary channel for the age-at-arrival e↵ect on income. However, in contrast
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with the income profile, the education profile becomes flat after age 15. The flattening of
the education profile reflects that most immigrants left school prior to age 16 whether in
the United States or in the source country.
Figure 2.4: The negative e↵ect of age at arrival on the native-immigrant gap in years of
education in 1940
Notes: The dependent variable is the age-adjusted gap in years of education between
immigrants and natives. The figure shows the estimated fixed e↵ects for age at arrival
with age at arrival of zero and one being the excluded group. The shaded area is the
95 percent confidence interval with sibling e↵ects. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
The e↵ect of age at arrival on educational attainment may not have been the same
across all source countries. Many Europeans arrived from countries with relatively robust
education systems; for example, Germany had compulsory schooling laws dating back
to 1717 and one of the best educational systems in Europe (Lindert, 2004). On the
other hand, many Southern and European sources had less robust education systems; for
instance, Italy and Greece had lower enrolment rates for five to 14 year olds compared
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with the enrolment rates in Norway, Ireland, and the Netherlands (Bandiera et al. (2016),
Figure 1). A reasonable hypothesis is that the e↵ect of age at arrival on education is
smaller for higher income countries in Northern and Western Europe compared with
lower income countries in Southern and Eastern Europe.27
The profiles for income and education separated by New and Old sources are shown
in Figure 2.5. On the one hand, the income profiles are similar across sources, where the
negative e↵ect of age at arrival is statistically indistinguishable across the two regions.
At the same time, the education profiles were quite distinct: New sources had a steep
profile where older arrivals received 1.7 fewer years of education. On the other hand,
the education profile is completely flat for Old sources, showing no penalty for arriving
at an older age. The flat education profile is consistent with the relatively high-quality
educational institutions in Northern and Western Europe.
The di↵erence in education and income profiles across sources reveal a puzzle: why
did older arrivals from Northern and Western Europe earn less despite receiving the same
total years of education? One reason may be that foreign education did not yield a
high return in the U.S. labour market, and thus extra schooling acquired in the source
country at older ages did not boost wages. Besides education, older arrivals also had more
potential labour market experience in the foreign source country, and foreign experience
may not have had a high value in the United States. On the other hand, it may be that
the age-at-arrival e↵ect operated through channels other than education or experience,
such as social assimilation. We now turn to other possible explanations for the e↵ect of
age at arrival.
27We define ‘Old Source’ countries, or those from Northern and Western Europe, to be Denmark,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, England, Scotland, Ireland, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Germany. We define ‘New Source’ countries, or those from Southern and Eastern Europe, to be Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, and
Russia.
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Figure 2.5: The age-at-arrival profiles were di↵erently sloped across new and old sources
Notes: The dependent variable is the age-adjusted gap in log wage income between immi-
grants and natives. Self-employed workers are dropped. The figure shows the estimated
fixed e↵ects for age at arrival with age at arrival of zero and one being the excluded group.
The shaded area is the 95 per cent confidence interval when using sibling fixed e↵ects.
Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Sources: Sample of brothers linked from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
2.6.2 Return to Education and Experience Separated into Do-
mestic and Foreign Component
Since we observe age of arrival and completed years of education in our dataset, we
can test—after making a few assumptions—whether foreign education and experience
yielded a small return in the United States. Following Friedberg (2000), we assume that
individuals entered school at age six, and then allocate the total amount of schooling to the
United States or source country based on the age of arrival.28 Given this assumption, it is
28Let Total Education = Foreign Education + U.S. Education and Experience = Foreign Experience
+ U.S. Experience. Further assume that Total Experience = Age – Education – six. To separate total
education and total experience into United States and foreign components, we assume that individuals
attended schooling continuously. That is, let Foreign Education = Zero if Age at Arrival is less than six,
and min(Age at Arrival – six, Education) if greater than or equal to six. Also let Foreign Experience =
Zero if Age at Arrival is less than six, and max(Age at Arrival – Foreign Education – six, zero) if greater
than or equal to six.
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straightforward to further separate potential experience into foreign or U.S. components.
See the descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 for how foreign education and experience increase
at higher ages of arrival, while years of U.S. education decreases.
To measure the wage return to education and experience, we use an augmented Mincer
equation and regress log income on years of U.S. education, years of foreign education,
potential years of U.S. experience, and potential years of foreign experience:29
yih =  0 +  1ForEducih +  2USEducih + fForExpih + gUSExpih +  h +  ih.
We are interested in whether the return to foreign education was less than the return
to U.S. education, that is if  1 <  2. We are also interested in whether the return to
experience gained abroad yielded a di↵erent return from experience gained in the United
States; we model experience as a quadratic. Note that we always include household fixed
e↵ects, eliminating household-invariant unobservables that are correlated with years of
education, experience, and income.
The results are presented in Table 2.4. When pooling New and Old source countries
together, the return to being educated in the United States is estimated at 5.3 per cent,
which is less than the return for native-born workers (6.5–7.9 per cent). A di↵erent
return to U.S. education for foreign-born workers relative to native workers has been
found elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Chiswick (1978); Baker and Benjamin (1994)),
and may reflect discrimination against foreign-born workers or the quality of “years” of
education. The return to education earned in the foreign country was even lower at 4.4
per cent, although the 0.9 percentage point di↵erence from the return to U.S. education
is not statistically significant.
While there is not strong evidence that the location of schooling mattered, there is
evidence that where one gained labour market experience mattered. Table 2.4 shows
that the return to potential foreign experience was not statistically distinguishable from
zero, although this is not very precisely estimated, whereas U.S. experience was positively
29There are potential endogeneity issues here as unobserved variables such as unmeasured or inherent
ability, or motivational factors, may a↵ect both income and schooling.
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Table 2.4: The return to education and experience separated by U.S. and foreign compo-
nent
Sample: Full Sample Only NW Only SE Full Sample
Europe Europe
U.S. education 0.0528*** 0.0645*** 0.0415*** 0.0645***
(0.00692) (0.00917) (0.0105) (0.00957)
U.S. educ. –0.0233*
⇥SE Europe (0.0138)
Foreign education 0.0439*** 0.0583*** 0.0347*** 0.0583***
(0.00535) (0.00758) (0.00772) (0.00793)
Foreign educ. –0.0236**
⇥SE Europe (0.0108)
Foreign experience 0.00534 0.0109 –0.000811 0.0107
(0.0125) (0.0208) (0.0164) (0.0218)
Foreign exp. –0.0113
⇥SE Europe (0.0269)
(Foreign experience /10)2 –0.0130 –0.0712 0.00117 –0.0710
(0.124) (0.261) (0.154) (0.274)
(Foreign exp./10)2 0.0690
⇥SE Europe (0.311)
U.S. experience 0.0686*** 0.0796*** 0.0564*** 0.0795***
(0.00889) (0.0107) (0.0150) (0.0112)
U.S. experience -0.0232
⇥SE Europe (0.0181)
(U.S. experience /10)2 –0.117*** –0.143*** –0.0956*** –0.143***
(0.0152) (0.0192) (0.0245) (0.0201)
(U.S. exp./10)2 0.0469
⇥SE Europe (0.0309)
Observations 35,229 15,881 19,348 35,229
R-squared 0.678 0.663 0.675 0.679
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
The dependent variable is log wage income. We assume that individuals enter school
at age six and stay in school continuously in order to separate totals years of
education and potential experience into foreign and U.S. components. Brothers fixed
e↵ects are included in each column.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
rewarded. A small return for foreign experience may reflect that immigrants entered
di↵erent industries and occupations after the move to the United States. Immigrants often
came from more agrarian countries in Southern and Eastern Europe, and their European
experience appears to have had little value in the United States (Hatton and Williamson
(1998), Chapter 2). However, this is part speculation, unfortunately we cannot observe
the job history of migrants to determine the value of the type of foreign experience. Data
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that does observe young arrivals’ occupations show that most teenagers reported holding
either no job or an unskilled job.30 If skills learned in these jobs in the source country did
not transfer to the U.S. labour market, then older arrivals would be penalised for staying
longer in the source country.
The return to human capital may have di↵ered between sources closer in development
to the United States and sources further behind. We test for this in Columns 2 and 3 after
splitting the sample into New and Old sources. The results show that the return to foreign
education was indeed higher for Old sources at 6.5 per cent than for New sources at 4.1
per cent—a statistically significant di↵erence, as shown in the fully interacted model in the
last column. This result implies that education acquired in Northern and Western Europe
more easily transferred to the United States, perhaps because it was of higher quality or
the economies were closer in industrial structure. Yet at the same time, immigrants from
Northern and Western Europe did not earn much return to foreign experience, and the
return to foreign experience was similar across regions in Europe.
The results from these wage regressions point to foreign experience and its lack of
return as a potential mechanism for a downward sloping age-at-arrival and income pro-
file. For example, 16–20 year old arrivals had on average 5.7 years of potential foreign
experience (see Table 2.2), but this human capital yielded little return in the U.S. labour
market. This result may partially explain the result in Figure 2.5 that Old source immi-
grants had a negative age-at-arrival e↵ect on income despite a lack of e↵ect on education;
however, other channels, such as the extent of social assimilation, may have also been
important.
2.6.3 Social Assimilation: Intermarriage and Geography
Besides the traditional measures of human capital such as education and experience, age at
arrival may have a↵ected adult earnings through a di↵erent channel: social assimilation.
This could be due to higher levels of English fluency for younger arrivals or because
30We can observe occupations using data from a random sample of ship arrivals to Ellis Island between
1917 and 1924, where the sample is limited to 12–17 year old males (Ward, 2017). According to this
data, most arrivals reported having no occupation (40.6 per cent), with labourer (26.9 per cent), farm
labourer (7.6 per cent), and farmer (3.4 per cent) being the top three reported occupations.
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younger arrivals appeared more “American” and thus experienced less discrimination.
We measure the e↵ect of age at arrival on social assimilation by changing the dependent
variable to outcomes related to residential segregation and marriage; specifically, the
likelihood of living near native-born households and the likelihood of marrying a native-
born spouse.31 English fluency is not observed in the 1940 Census, but we discuss the
potential e↵ect of English fluency in the next section.
Age at arrival had a strong e↵ect on intermarriage, as shown in Table 2.5. A 16-year-
old arrival was 37.2 percentage points less likely to marry a native-born spouse than a
one-year-old arrival, a very large e↵ect given that 69 per cent of infant arrivals married
a native-born spouse. Although we do not estimate the return to intermarriage, others
have shown with late-twentieth century data that intermarriage is associated with higher
earnings (e.g., Meng and Gregory (2005)); therefore, it may be a mechanism for the
downward sloping age-at-arrival income profile.
While there is a large e↵ect of age at arrival on intermarriage, there is little evidence
that younger arrivals were more spatially integrated with native-born household heads.
Table 2.5 also shows the e↵ect of age at arrival on the fraction of native-born household
heads in the county of residence. Note that we use fraction of native-born household
heads rather than fraction of all individuals in the county to ensure that native-born
second-generation children in the home do not influence the estimate (i.e., “childrearing”
bias). We find that age at arrival had no e↵ect on living in a county with more native-
born household heads. However, this county-level measure may mask segregation within a
county. Given that we have the entire 1940 Census, we can further narrow the geography
from county to the immediate neighbourhood, as proxied by the fraction of native-born
household heads on the same census page (Logan and Parman, 2017). However, even
using this measure suggests that age at arrival had little impact on spatial assimilation
for our dataset of brothers.
31When estimating these equations, we do not do the two-step process of predicting residuals for
immigrants based on the native life-cycle profile and then regressing these residuals on age at arrival.
This is because there may not be a well-defined relationship between native’s age and marrying a native-
born spouse or having a native-born neighbour. Therefore, we present results based on the simple
age-at-arrival e↵ects on the levels of having a native-born spouse or native-born neighbour. However, the
results are qualitatively the same if we use the residuals after predicting the lifecycle profile with natives.
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Table 2.5: E↵ect of age at arrival on social outcomes
Intermarriage Spatial Assimilation
Native Spouse Spouse from Fraction of Fraction of
Di↵erent Source County page
Native HH Native HH
Age at arrival:
2 to 3 –0.0505* –0.0501** –0.00411 –0.00382
(0.0272) (0.0254) (0.00436) (0.00817)
4 to 5 –0.0953*** –0.0760*** –0.00366 –0.00937
(0.0274) (0.0254) (0.00449) (0.00826)
6 to 7 –0.107*** –0.0974*** –0.00286 –0.00480
(0.0280) (0.0262) (0.00464) (0.00872)
8 to 9 –0.172*** –0.161*** 0.000386 –0.00620
(0.0280) (0.0262) (0.00463) (0.00861)
10 to 11 –0.238*** –0.225*** –0.00308 –0.0109
(0.0288) (0.0269) (0.00488) (0.00901)
12 to 13 –0.274*** –0.261*** –0.00160 –0.00186
(0.0321) (0.0304) (0.00556) (0.0105)
14 to 15 –0.320*** –0.304*** 0.00411 –0.0185*
(0.0323) (0.0307) (0.00558) (0.0105)
16 to 17 –0.368*** –0.341*** 0.00331 –0.00895
(0.0339) (0.0323) (0.00593) (0.0111)
18 to 20 –0.419*** –0.408*** 0.0111* –0.0151
(0.0360) (0.0348) (0.00662) (0.0121)
Observations 38,803 38,803 53,129 53,129
R-squared 0.661 0.673 0.600 0.578
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
For the first two columns, we only include people who are married. The first column
regresses whether the spouse is native-born on age at arrival, and the second column
regresses whether the spouse is from a di↵erent source country on age at arrival. The
fraction of page that are native household heads is the census page, which reflects
immediate neighbours. Brothers fixed e↵ects are included in each column.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
2.6.4 Other Unobserved but Potential Channels: English Flu-
ency and Parental Investment
An important indicator of social assimilation and human capital that is not included in
the 1940 Census is English proficiency. It is certain that English proficiency was lower
for older arrivals from non-English-speaking countries, given the robust evidence for the
critical period of language acquisition from Bleakley and Chin (2004) and Bleakley and
Chin (2010). An indirect way to uncover the e↵ect of English skills on adult outcomes is
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to test whether the age-at-arrival income profile steepens at older ages for non-English-
speaking sources relative to English-speaking sources (see Bleakley and Chin (2004) for a
further discussion). However, we do not find that the age-at-arrival income profile for non-
English-speaking sources steepens relative to the profile for English-speaking sources after
the critical period of language acquisition ends, which is consistent with the argument
that acquiring English fluency was relatively unimportant for improving one’s occupation
in the early twentieth century compared with the late twentieth century (Ward, 2018).
Yet standard errors are wide when splitting the sample into English-speaking and non-
English-speaking sources (see Figure A.1). Therefore, while a lower level of English fluency
for older arrivals may have contributed to the negatively sloped age-at-arrival and income
profile, this mechanism cannot be conclusively confirmed.
Finally, it is also possible that family real wages increased during the move; if so, then
younger arrivals may have benefitted by receiving more parental inputs during critical
stages of development. An increase to family income almost certainly occurred after
migration: Abramitzky et al. (2012) estimate the return to immigration at 70 per cent
from Norway to the United States, and the return was probably even larger for immigrants
from Southern and Eastern European sources. Williamson (1995) estimates that U.S. real
wages were 67 per cent higher than in Great Britain in 1905, and more than three times
higher than real wages in Italy. Therefore, an additional mechanism for the age-at-arrival
profile is likely that household investment into children increased and the e↵ectiveness
of this investment was higher at younger ages, but we do not observe the change in real
income before and after the move.
Overall, we interpret the age-at-arrival e↵ect as the e↵ect of changing various environ-
mental attributes at critical stages of childhood development. On average, older arrivals
were penalised relative to younger arrivals because they had fewer total years of educa-
tion, less valuable labour market experience, and were less socially assimilated. While we
cannot precisely show which mechanism was most important, we do show that the e↵ect
of age at arrival was large enough to erase the negative native-immigrant wage gap that
older arrivals experienced.
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2.7 Conclusion
Using a new dataset of brothers linked from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census,
we show that there was a large wage and educational return to arriving at a younger
age in the United States. Spending one’s childhood in the United States rather than in
Europe significantly improved immigrants’ long-run economic outcomes. The variation in
immigrant outcomes based on their age at arrival complements prior research that finds
that occupational-based earning di↵erentials between migrants and natives were fixed
throughout the life cycle. The di↵erence in results suggests that while human capital
acquired during childhood led to a large occupational return, the human capital acquired
during adulthood after arrival did not (Abramitzky et al. (2014); Ward (2018)).
While the results suggest that the U.S. childhood environment was advantageous rela-
tive to that of Europe, the results are limited by the lack of data on childhood location in
the United States. In particular, one question that is left unanswered is the e↵ect of child-
hood environment when living in or outside an ethnic enclave. Given the intergenerational
literature’s result that the source country’s position in the occupational distribution per-
sists across generations of immigrants despite our result of childhood environment having
a large e↵ect, persistence of skill levels across generations must be due to other factors
such as immigrants sorting into di↵erent quality childhood environments in the United
States (Abramitzky et al. (2014); Borjas (1994)).
Finally, the results show that immigrants’ position in the skill distribution was not
fixed by inherited or genetic factors, as many nativists at the time claimed. For example,
Francis Walker, one-time president of the American Economic Association, charged that
New source immigrants had “none of the inherited instincts and tendencies which made
it comparatively easy to deal with the immigration of the olden time. They are beaten
men from beaten races; representing the worst failures in the struggle for existences.
Centuries are against them” (Walker, 1896). This pessimistic view of immigrants has
been reprised throughout time, right up to today’s wave of nativism against Muslims and
Hispanics (Higham (1955); Huntington (2004)). Our research shows that these “beaten
men from beaten races” in the past did remarkably well with a change to their location at
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young ages, rea rming the paramount importance of childhood environment for long-run
outcomes.
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Chapter 3
The Making of a Nation: Who Voted
for Australian Federation?
3.1 Introduction
An influential literature has analysed the size of nations and the economic and social foun-
dations of their formation and dissolution. The political integration and disintegration of
nations is seen as endogenously determined by the interaction between agents or coalitions
pursuing objectives subject to constraints. This literature has emphasised the trade-o↵
between the economic benefits of greater size and the economic costs of increasing diver-
sity (Alesina and Spolaore, 2003). The benefits of merger or integration include spreading
the cost of public goods over a larger tax base, and may also include (depending on the
external trade regime) economies of scale in production and the gains from trade (Alesina
et al., 2000). The costs of integration arise from increased bureaucracy or congestion but
most importantly from greater diversity. While diversity may be a source of gains from
complementarity or specialisation, it may also be a cost if preferences that di↵er between
groups lead to distributional struggles or are otherwise di cult or costly to accommodate
in a single set of laws or regulations (for a useful survey, see Spolaore (2016)).
As more than fifty new nations have emerged since 1946, most of the focus has been
on dissolutions. And while the underlying theory, based on interest group preferences,
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focuses on e ciency gains and redistribution, secessions often involve wars and external
geopolitical forces (Bolton and Roland, 1997). The evidence suggests that civil wars
and irredentist movements or secessions are related to ethnic polarisation and cultural
heterogeneity (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005); Desmet et al. (2011)). In contrast
there are few studies within this framework of how and why mergers take place peacefully
to form new nations through a democratic process.
In this paper we study one key example: the federation of six quasi-independent
British colonies to form the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. After at least a decade
of debate over whether to unite (Brown, 2004), and under what terms, in 1898 four
of the then colonies conducted referendums. The other two, Queensland and Western
Australia, failed even to agree on having a referendum. The legislatures of New South
Wales, Victoria and Tasmania imposed a minimum number of a rmative votes required
to pass the respective bills into law. It failed to pass only in New South Wales, which
set the highest bar. After further negotiation a second round of referendums took place
in 1899/1900. In this second round of voting, federating was approved in all six colonies
and the Commonwealth of Australia, in which the former colonies became states, came
into e↵ect on 1 January 1901.
The historical literature on Australian Federation has focused on a range of influences.
Possible gains from increased scale include establishing a combined defence force and
gaining better terms for infrastructure loans from the London capital market. But as
the new Commonwealth of Australia remained closely tied to Britain such advantages
would be marginal. A more important motive may have been to create a customs union,
where previously each colony had a di↵erent tari↵ regime, which applied both externally
and between colonies. A related issue was to enhance commerce through integration
of transport infrastructure. On the cost side, ethnic diversity was hardly an issue in a
setting where the overwhelming majority of the (white) population had British or Irish
ancestry. But there were some lower-level cleavages by religion, gender and age, as well
as di↵erences in attitude between those that had moved into the colony and those that
were born there. Geographical location was also potentially important, particularly at the
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borders between colonies, where fiscal and administrative barriers would be more evident,
and in areas remote from the metropolitan centres.
In this paper we analyse the patterns of voting in the referendums to tease out some of
the possible reasons to vote for federating. We relate the share of support for federating
to the characteristics of districts as observed in the 1901 Colonial Censuses. This is made
di cult because of the mismatch between electoral districts and census districts. In order
to overcome this problem, we have obtained the votes for each polling station, which we
have geocoded and then re-aggregated into census districts.
The results of estimating across districts indicate that economic interests, represented
by broad economic sectors, are not correlated with support for federating in the manner
predicted. Religion and age structure also do not seem to be correlated. The strongest
associations with a rmative votes are the share of immigrants (international or inter-
provincial), the distance from the metropolitan centres, and the share of females in a
district. To economists it may seem surprising that economic interests do not influence
support for federating in the way that the theory of customs unions would suggest; per-
haps voters have other motivations. On the other hand, it is consistent with the finding
that there is little evidence for ex-post trade creation (Irwin, 2006). One caution with
our results is that they are associations, not causal, and it is important to recognise that
there is a di↵erence between the timing of our dependent variables (1898, 1899, and in
one case 1900), compared with our explanatory variables, which are mostly as at 1901.
3.2 Background to Federation
European settlement of Australia began in 1788 with the arrival of the First Fleet bring-
ing convicts from Britain. By the 1830s free settlers were arriving to take advantage of
the opportunities in the colony of New South Wales, which by 1827 embraced the eastern
two-thirds of the continent of Australia plus what is now New Zealand. In the ensuing
decades parts of this vast area were detached to form separate colonies under the British
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Crown.1 From the 1850s when legislatures were first established these colonies evolved
distinct identities and divergent policies, although, as British colonies, their administra-
tive structures retained much in common.2 As separate colonies, they adopted di↵erent
railway gauges, they evolved di↵erent fiscal arrangements and they developed di↵erent
tari↵ policies, both for external and inter-colonial trade.
From mid-century onwards there were periodic discussions and proposals for reuniting
the colonies as one Dominion embracing the whole continent.3 1885 saw the establishment
of a Federal Council at which representatives of the colonies met every two years to
discuss issues of common interest. But it had no executive power and it was a forum
for cooperation rather than a step towards federating. The movement for federating that
would be successful was launched by Sir Henry Parkes (often referred to as the Father of
Federation) in a speech at Tenterfield (NSW) in 1889. Although defence was the initial
focus,4 subsequent speeches by Parkes and other politicians, included issues such as the
control of non-white immigration, the benefits (and costs) of inter-colonial free trade and
external tari↵ reduction, as well as the unification of the railways and the regulation of
water rights. Parkes initiated a conference of colonial Premiers in Melbourne in 1890 and
one in Sydney, but little progress was made.
Meanwhile several federation leagues became active, and those in the border districts
of New South Wales and Victoria convened a conference at Corowa (NSW) in 1893.
The Corowa conference included 74 delegates from associations representing a range of
social strata. Under the leadership of Dr John Quick, it unanimously proposed that
another constitutional convention be organised with delegates elected by the people. It
further proposed that the constitution drafted at this convention be put to the people
1In 1827 Van Diemen’s Land was proclaimed as a separate colony, renamed Tasmania in 1856, and in
1829 the western third of the continent became the Swan River Colony, renamed Western Australia in
1832. This was followed by the creation of other colonies from parts of New South Wales: South Australia
in 1836, Victoria in 1851 and Queensland in 1859. New Zealand, loosely attached to New South Wales,
became a separate colony in 1841.
2Queensland gained self-government in 1867 and Western Australia not until 1890.
3For contemporary commentaries on the political debates and negotiations leading up to federating,
see Quick and Garran (1901), Wise (1913), and Deakin (1944).
4The original pretext was a report by British Major General Bevan Edwards, written in the wake of
incursions by France in New Caledonia and by Germany in New Guinea, which stated that the separate
colonial defence forces were inadequate.
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in a referendum. This idea was approved by the colonial premiers who, at a meeting
in Hobart in 1895, produced a Draft Enabling Bill based on the Corowa proposals and
consisting of 39 sections. Among the issues current at that time were trade, tari↵s and the
financing of a federal government. Some of these were discussed at a people’s conference
in Bathurst (NSW) in 1896, in particular the redistribution to states of federal customs
revenue. This was followed a constitutional convention which met three times in 1897–8,
which was attended by representatives from each colony and which debated and refined
a Bill to place before the electorate for approval.5
The first round of referendums took place in four colonies in early June 1898. These
were organised on the same electoral districts as for elections to the lower houses of the
colonial legislatures.6 But the issue was decided by an overall majority of all votes in
the colony. However, New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania also imposed a minimum
number of a rmative votes required to pass the Bill. This was highest in New South
Wales, which laid down a minimum of 80,000 votes in the a rmative in order to pass
the Bill. The minimum in Victoria was 50,000 and in Tasmania 6,000. The franchise
was similar to that for parliamentary elections but it di↵ered between colonies.7 In South
Australia it was all adults aged 21 and over (women having been enfranchised in 1894),
but in New South Wales and Victoria, it was restricted to adult males and in Tasmania
there was an additional property qualification. As Table 3.1 shows, in the four colonies
that voted in the referendums of 1898, the total number on the electoral roll was 727,438,
or 23.8 per cent of their total population.
The turnout in the 1898 referendums was less than half in each of colonies that voted,
and it amounted to 45.5 per cent overall. Of those that did vote, the overall percentage of
support for federating was close to two-thirds. In Victoria it was 81.3 per cent, in Tasmania
79.9 per cent and in South Australia 66.5 per cent. But in New South Wales only 51.2
5The meetings took place in Adelaide in March 1897, in Sydney in August 1897 and in Melbourne in
January 1898. They were attended by ten elected delegates from each colony except Queensland, which
did not participate.
6In New South Wales and Western Australia there were single member constituencies while the other
colonies had multi-member constituencies, which were therefore somewhat larger on average.
7In Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania there was a property qualification for
voting in the parliamentary elections (Rhodes, 2002, p. 10).
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Table 3.1: Electors and voting at the 1898 and 1899-1900 referendums.
NSW Vic QLD WA SA Tas
Referendums in 1898
Vote date 1898-06-03 1898-06-03 – – 1898-06-04 1898-06-03
Population 1,346,240 1,175,463 498,523 168,128 362,897 177,340
Electoral roll 306,878 252,560 – – 136,387 31,613
Votes cast 138,657 123,627 – – 53,836 14,697
Turnout (%) 45.2 48.9 – – 39.5 46.5
Yes votes 71,595 100,520 – – 35,800 11,746
No votes 66,228 22,099 – – 17,320 2,689
Yes majority 5,367 78,421 – – 18,480 9,057
Referendums in 1899-1900
Vote date 1899-06-20 1899-07-27 1899-09-02 1900-07-31 1899-04-29 1899-07-27
Population 1,357,050 1,176,854 512,541 179,022 365,755 182,508
Electoral roll 307,473 287,331 107,133 89,593 152,554 34,528
Votes cast 191,327 163,783 69,832 65,030 93,952 14,342
Turnout (%) 62.2 57.0 65.2 72.6 61.6 41.5
Yes votes 107,420 152,653 38,488 44,800 65,990 13,437
No votes 82,741 9,805 30,996 19,691 17,053 791
Majority 24,679 142,848 7,492 25,109 48,937 12,646
Source: Rhodes (2002, pp. 12, 14 and 16).
per cent voted in favour and the total number of supportive votes fell short of the 80,000
threshold. Thus the first round of referendums failed to provide unanimous support for
federating and the other three colonies that voted were not prepared to proceed without
New South Wales. Queensland failed to have a referendum in 1898 partly because of
changes in leadership and partly because of di↵erences of opinion over whether the colony
should be divided into three electorates (north central and south), and require majorities
in all three in order to approve the draft constitution. In light of the result in New South
Wales, Western Australia, where opinion was also deeply divided, decided not to proceed
with a referendum (de Garis, 1999, p. 303).8 So the federation process ground to a halt.
Following the failure to reach the minimum yes vote, the New South Wales Premier
(George Reid) met with the other premiers to discuss amendments to the draft constitu-
tion and upon agreement to propose another round of referendums. These amendments
included the requirement of a two-thirds majority for a joint sitting of both Houses fol-
lowing a double dissolution and the provision that the Federal Capital be in New South
8In any case the Enabling Acts of Queensland and Western Australia contained provisions that they
would not join a federation that did not include New South Wales (Rhodes, 2002, p. 10).
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Wales (but at least 100 miles from Sydney). They also included placing a time limit
of ten years on the scheme for redistributing revenue among the states and variations
to the process for altering the constitution. Once these amendments were agreed New
South Wales resolved that the referendum would be decided on a simple majority, with
no minimum threshold. The agreement on the second round of referendums also included
the rider that New South Wales would vote first and that the other colonies would follow
in the light of that result.
In the event South Australia voted first (because of slow progress in New South Wales),
and the other colonies except Western Australia held their referendums within a few
months of New South Wales. Western Australia, where the politicians were more divided,
delayed introducing an enabling bill for a referendum until all the other colonies had
voted.9 In the second round of referendums turnout was considerably higher in three of
the colonies that had voted in the first round but lower in Tasmania. The overall turnout
of 61.1 per cent reflected the increased public salience of the federation debate, especially
among the middle class.10 In the two more reluctant colonies, turnout was particularly
high but the majority in favour was smaller in Queensland than in Western Australia.
Among the nearly 600,000 votes cast, 70.7 per cent were in favour of federating. But
there were sharp di↵erences, with Victoria and Tasmania recording over 90 per cent in
favour while in New South Wales and Queensland the percentages were 56.1 per cent and
55.1 per cent respectively. Nevertheless, the a rmative vote in New South Wales easily
exceeded the discarded threshold of 80,000. In Queensland and Western Australia, where
politicians wrestled extensively over federating, the a rmative vote exceeded two thirds.
Following the 1899 referendums a deputation of representatives from each of the
colonies travelled to London to lobby the British government (in particular the Colo-
nial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain) to approve the Commonwealth Constitution Bill.
After reaching a compromise over appeals to the Privy Council the Bill passed through
9One thing that brought Western Australia’s dithering over the referendum to a head was the threat
of the eastern goldfields areas to secede from the colony in order to join the Commonwealth (de Garis,
1999, p. 311).
10Analysing turnout at the individual level for Bendigo (Victoria) in 1899, Fowler (2013) finds that
property owners were ten percentage points more likely to vote than non-owners.
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the Westminster parliament and received royal assent on 9 July 1900. Western Australia,
which had delayed for further concessions had not yet voted although a date had been
set. Three weeks after the approval in London, Western Australia voted in favour of
joining on a franchise that, for the first time, included women. On 1 January 1901 the
Commonwealth of Australia came into e↵ect as a federal system, including all six former
colonies as states and encompassing the whole continent.
3.3 Debates and hypotheses
Our paper aims to provide a better understanding of who voted for the Australian Feder-
ation and why. The theory of customs unions suggests that areas dominated by economic
sectors that would benefit from trade, such as agriculture, would be more supportive. The
historical debate initiated by Parker (1949) and Blainey (1950) focused on the possible
economic imperatives. But later contributions shifted towards politics and popular cul-
ture as the key influences. And they focused more on regional and local developments,
drifting away from the bigger picture. With a few partial exceptions there has been no
comprehensive quantitative analysis of voting patterns in the referendums leading up to
federating.11
In terms of the gains from greater economic scale, one might expect the most popu-
lous colony, New South Wales, to be the least favourable to federating, as proved to be
the case, but Victoria, which was almost as large, was strongly in favour. Defence and
immigration policy, often mentioned as issues early in the campaign, rapidly faded from
the debate, except in Queensland and to a lesser extent Western Australia, although it
remained discussed in newspapers, for instance Alien Immigration (1898).12 One reason
is that a united Australia would remain firmly in the British empire and would look to
Britain for both leadership and in foreign policy and material assistance in defence.13
11These exceptions are Rhodes (1988) who explored correlations between yes votes and the positions of
local politicians and newspapers, and Coleman (2017) who estimates the relationship between yes votes
and a range of socioeconomic variables for South Australia.
12The impression that (non-European) immigration was an issue is supported by the fact that one of
the first pieces of legislation passed by the federal parliament was the Immigration Restriction Act 1901,
which inaugurated the so-called White Australia Policy.
13Full independence from Britain was never an issue, except among a few radicals (Eddy, 1978a). It is
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Perhaps a more important background factor was the severe recession of the 1890s, when
high unemployment, bank failures and the drying up of British loans in 1894 concentrated
minds on economic issues.14 This helped to build support among politicians from across
the political spectrum in favour of federating, some of whom thought that a united Aus-
tralia would make it easier to borrow in London. This could help to explain why Victoria,
the worst a↵ected colony, would be overwhelmingly in favour of federating. Set against
this were concerns that an additional layer of government would lead to higher taxes,
either direct or indirect.
Initiating a now famous debate, Parker (1949) argued that the degree of support for
federating depended on which economic sector dominated a particular region and whether
or not its interests would be advanced by reduced barriers to trade within Australia as well
as by the expected external tari↵ regime of a united Australia. He also pointed to higher
levels of support in areas close to the borders between colonies, notably the Riverina
districts on the border between NSW and Victoria. In his riposte to Parker, Blainey
(1950) criticised the broad regional approach, suggesting instead that a wide range of
social and political influences were at work and that their e↵ects varied both within and
between electoral districts, a point echoed by (Bastin, 1951, p. 205).1516 Nevertheless,
Norris (1978, p. 192) concluded that “[b]y and large, attitudes to federation owed less to
political persuasion than to expectation of economic gain or loss.” The economic gains
and losses would be those arising from a common external tari↵, the abolition of inter-
colonial customs duties, the implications of federal control over revenue, and the unified
management of railways and water resources.
Tari↵ unification was an important issue because pre-federating tari↵s, which applied
both to external and inter-colonial trade, varied widely between colonies. As illustrated
notable that even a century later (in 1999) a referendum on moving to a republic failed to gain a majority
(see McAllister (2001) for an outline of long term trends and an analysis of the referendum).
14Merrett (2013) discusses the banking crisis noting that colonial governments had very little capacity
to assist banks in distress, noting also that Federation passed legal power over banking and finance to
the Commonwealth.
15In his reply to Blainey, Parker (1950) largely conceded this point.
16Much of the subsequent literature focused on the debates within colonies and electorates. These
include Hewett (1969) and Irving (1999), on New South Wales, Norris (1969), Pettman (1969) and
Bannon (1999) on South Australia, and Hillman (1978) and de Garis (1999) on Western Australia.
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Table 3.2: Estimates of Average Import Duties in 1900
Per cent of imports Per cent ad-valorem
on duty-free list rate of duty
On dutiable Excluding “narcotics
merchandise imports and stimulants”
NSW 87.6 10.3 1.3
Vic 53.4 36.2 17.0
QLD 36.0 20.5 13.1
SA 35.7 21.8 14.0
WA 37.1 14.8 9.3
Tas 9.0 24.2 22.0
Source: (Irwin, 2006, p. 317).
in Table 3.2, tari↵s were highest in Victoria (and covered a wider range of imports,
particularly manufactured goods) and lowest in New South Wales. The other colonies
had smaller percentages on the duty-free list and average tari↵ rates somewhere between
New South Wales and Victoria. All of the colonies levied high tari↵ rates on alcohol
and tobacco (classified as narcotics and stimulants) largely for revenue raising purposes.17
When these items are excluded the average tari↵ rates on the remaining dutiable items are
substantially lower, as illustrated in the last column of Table 3.2. In the more protectionist
colonies the goods subject to duty were mainly manufactured and semi-manufactured
goods, with rates of duty that varied widely across goods and between colonies (Lloyd,
2015, p. 170).18
Which sectoral interests would benefit from tari↵ reform would depend on expectations
about the post-federating tari↵ structure. It seems reasonable at first sight to suppose
that voters would have expected the unified tari↵ to resemble the Victorian tari↵, which
is roughly what emerged (Forster, 1977). One reason is that the tari↵ would be the main
source of revenue for the federal government.19 As the so-called Braddon clause provided
that three-quarters of tari↵ revenue would be returned to the states, the room for a lower
17There were also excise taxes on these commodities but the rates were generally much lower than the
tari↵ (Lloyd, 2017, p. 54).
18In the more protectionist colonies, most of the goods on the duty free list were intermediate inputs,
raw materials and foodstu↵s, but in the smaller colonies there were also substantial tari↵s on imported
foodstu↵s such as wheat, oats, flour, eggs, meat and fruit (Lloyd, 2015, p. 171).
19Tari↵s were an important part of colonial government revenue. In 1898 customs duties accounted for
the following percentages of tax revenue and total revenue respectively: New South Wales: 63.7, 16.5;
Queensland: 84.9, 35.2; South Australia: 68.2, 23.3; Tasmania: 79.1, 47.1; Victoria: 78.2, 30.6; Western
Australia: 90.6, 36.4 (Barnard, 1985).
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tari↵ was limited.20 This clause, originated by Edward Braddon, Premier of Tasmania,
was agreed in the Melbourne session of the constitutional convention in 1898, to resolve
the contentious issue of revenue sharing. It was widely opposed in New South Wales where
it became known as the ‘Braddon Blot’. After the first round of referendums the Braddon
Clause was time-limited to the first ten years. On the assumption of a high post-federating
tari↵, voters in manufacturing districts in New South Wales might be expected to support
federating, although consumers would su↵er from potential higher prices (trade diversion).
In Victoria and the other colonies manufacturing districts might also be expected to
support federating, not least because they could sell into the newly protected market
of New South Wales (trade creation). In contrast, districts that specialised in export-
oriented primary commodities would likely be opposed to federating. That all said, it
is di cult to know what information the average voter possessed. While it is certainly
the case that the federation issue was being covered in newspapers, there was a variety
of opinions. For instance, one may think that Tasmania, as a poorer colony would have
been supportive of federating, however at least amongst some there was a feeling that
the colony was turning the financial situation around and that federating could make the
situation worse (Federation and Taxation, 1899).
There was little ethnic diversity in Australia at the time of the referendums as the vast
bulk of the (white) population had UK ancestry.21 But interests could di↵er along other
lines, one of which was religion. The 1901 censuses reported 39.7 per cent of the population
as Anglican and 22.7 per cent as Catholic. While Catholics inspired by Irish republicanism
might have supported federating as a step towards autonomy from Britain, some saw it
as strengthening the Anglican ascendency (Cahill, 2001). Another possible fault line is
gender. Women’s associations generally supported federating, especially those seeking to
gain female su↵rage (Irving, 1999, Ch. 10). But women were entitled to vote only in South
Australia and Western Australia and the draft constitution did not explicitly provide for
20Total tari↵ revenue would also shrink due to the loss of inter-colonial tari↵ revenue. This was
a particular concern in Western Australia, which in 1900 negotiated that its tari↵ (inter-colonial and
external) would remain unchanged for the first five years after Federation.
21Aborigines, who accounted for 2.4 per cent of the total Australian population in 1901, did not have
the right to vote in the referendums, except in South Australia, and did not gain the federal franchise
until 1962.
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universal female su↵rage although it may have been implied.22 There was also potential
for di↵erences by education. Some writers point to a utopian vision of a united Australia
as a growing element in the support for federating (Birrell (1995); Irving (1999); Martin
(2001); cf. Atkinson (2013)). The Australian Natives Association, which was founded in
Victoria, campaigned vigorously for federating (Blackton (1958); Pettman (1969)). It was
led by a younger generation of politicians and, to the extent that its progressive ideals
di↵used into the general population, one might have expected them to have found greatest
resonance among the younger and more educated voters.
Inter-colonial migration was also potentially important. Those living in the colony in
which they were born might have a loyalty to their particular colony and a resistance to
change that would not be shared by those born elsewhere. The most well-known example
is the migrants from other colonies living in Western Australia (so called ‘t’othersiders),
many of whom migrated in the 1890s gold rush and may have had a substantial influence
in that colony (Bastin (1951); Hillman (1978)). Immigrants from overseas (mainly from
Britain) may also have supported federating, as did the UK government.
Geographical di↵erences are likely to have been more influential on voting on federat-
ing. Lack of unified management of railways and waterways often meant additional costs
of portage or longer and more expensive routes to and from markets would have been felt
most on the borders between colonies. One impediment was that lack of integration of the
railways, where the colonies operated three di↵erent railway gauges.23 Also, water trans-
port was especially important in the Riverina districts on the border between New South
Wales and Victoria. Interestingly this was where some of the most active campaigning for
federating took place. Another hypothesis related to geography is that federating would
favour places farthest from the metropolis in each colony. But voters in districts remote
from the existing seats of government might support or oppose federation for other reasons
22The Constitution (Chapter I, Part IV) provided only that the franchise in federal elections would be
the same as that already existing in each state, and it seems likely that having partial female su↵rage
would have been untenable. In any event, the franchise for federal elections was extended to all women
aged 21 and over in the Commonwealth Franchise Act, 1902. For state elections, women were enfranchised
in New South Wales in 1902, Tasmania in 1903, Queensland in 1905 and Victoria in 1908.
23There were three di↵erent railway gauges in common use. New South Wales was on standard gauge,
4 ft 8.5 in, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia adopted narrow gauge, 3 ft 6 in, Victoria chose
broad gauge, 5 ft 3 in, and South Australia operated a combination of broad gauge and narrow gauge.
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too. For instance, it is possible that those in the north of Queensland had no respect for
colonial boundaries or loyalty to the colonial administration in Brisbane (Bolton, 1963,
pp. 209–10).
Across districts, some of the influences identified in the literature (or proxies for them)
can be captured with variables from the census but others cannot. Perhaps the most
prominent omissions relate to politics and persuasion which came to the fore as the refer-
endum campaigns intensified. The political strength of labour had grown with increasing
representation in colonial legislatures, despite the decline in trade unionism since the wave
of strikes and unrest of the early 1890s. The labour movement, which was barely repre-
sented at the constitutional convention, o↵ered little support for federating as it was seen
as serving conservative and middle class interests (Eddy, 1978b). In New South Wales
labour opposed federating partly on the grounds that it would further weaken trade union
bargaining power. Yet certain issues of interest to labour, such as federal control of pen-
sions and the arbitration system were incorporated into the final draft as ‘specific powers’
of the Commonwealth (Martin, 2001).24
While politics and persuasion have been prominent in the literature, voting did not
simply follow party lines. For instance, at the three meetings of the constitutional con-
vention, voting was often divided across political a liations and across representatives
of di↵erent colonies (Loveday, 1972). In the 1898 referendum, in one-third of electoral
districts the majority voted in the opposite direction to the position of their elected rep-
resentatives (Rhodes, 1988). Indeed, among Labor members of the New South Wales
Parliament 17 out of 19 were opposed yet 15 of their constituencies approved it. And
in Tasmania where the Hobart newspapers were strongly anti-federation, the vote was
overwhelmingly in favour (Warden, 1999, pp. 212–213).
24Another issue of interest to labour was to ban non-white immigration, something that came about
in the one of the first acts of the Federal Parliament, the Immigration Restriction Act, 1901.
49
3.4 Data
In order to analyse voting patterns at the district level within each colony we need to
match the data on voting patterns with explanatory variables from the census. Voting
took place within electoral districts, which varied in size and were based on constituencies
in the colonial legislatures. Unfortunately, for four of the six colonies these di↵er from the
districts on which most variables are reported in the census. Rhodes (2002) produced a
compendium of voting by electoral district, based on contemporary sources. These were
compiled from data by polling station and we have obtained the underlying data on the
votes cast, for and against, at each individual polling station. This means that we can
reorganise the data on voting to match the geography of the census.
For our explanatory variables we use district-level variables from the 1901 censuses.
Because there is very little surviving unit record data from the Australian censuses we
have to rely on the published volumes. One concern is that almost all of the explanatory
variables post-date the dependent variable. However, unless there were major changes in
the population in just two or three years, using the 1901 censuses should be appropriate.
We use the 1901 censuses rather than 1891 censuses because the latter predates the deep
recession of the mid-1890s and, more importantly because we have maps of the relevant
census district boundaries only for 1901. The districts for which most of our variables are
reported di↵er between colonies. These are counties in New South Wales and Victoria,
census districts in Queensland, magisterial districts in Western Australia and electoral
districts in South Australia and Tasmania. In order to match the polling station results
with the census units we first locate and geo-code all the individual polling stations within
the electoral districts by identifying the locality or the specific place (such as a post o ce,
hotel or homestead).25 We then geo-code the boundaries of all the census districts using
maps of the borders provided by Camm et al. (1983). Finally, we re-aggregate the polling
station data into these districts.
To illustrate the outcomes, Figure 3.1 shows the share of yes votes by county for New
25These places were located in the first instance using the Google Maps API, and then supplemented
using the websites LatLong.net and Bonzle.com to find the ones where there were alternatives with the
same name or where the name is no longer used.
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South Wales, which is the most populous colony, in the 1898 vote. Although 52 per cent
of all formal votes were supportive, there was wide variation across districts. The yes
vote was strongest in the districts to the south and west, particularly in the Riverina
region, and it was weakest in some of the districts around Sydney, notably the Southern
Highlands.
Figure 3.1: Share of ‘yes’ votes of all formal votes cast in NSW in 1898
Sources: Data from Rhodes (2002) and maps from Camm et al. (1983).
New South Wales had two votes. The first vote was on 3 March 1898, and the second
vote was on 20 June 1899 (apart from the area of St Leonards, which is a suburb of
Sydney, where it was held 10 days later on 30 June 1899). There were 137,738 formal
votes cast in 1898, and this increased by around 37 per cent to 188,621 in 1899. Much of
that increase was due to supporters of federating. ‘Yes’ votes increased by about 50 per
cent, while ‘No’ votes only increased by about 25 per cent. In 1898 the census area that
was least-supportive of federating was Baradine at 20 per cent, followed by Cook with 28
per cent, and Parry with 29 per cent. In 1898, the most-supportive districts were Tara,
Thoulcanna, Werunda, and Woore, all four of which had every formal vote supportive
of federating. However, those four areas had a low number of votes. Wakool was the
most supportive of the districts with a significant population, at 99 per cent support.
In 1899 support for federating in Baradine decreased to 15 per cent, but the next least
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics
Variable NSW QLD SA
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Proportion of male adults 0.60 0.08 0.60 0.08 0.52 0.08
Proportion adults aged 21–29 0.29 0.04 0.29 0.05 0.29 0.03
Proportion born in colony 0.67 0.19 0.53 0.13 0.75 0.13
Proportion primary industries 0.57 0.13 0.47 0.20 0.41 0.22
Proportion manufacturing 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.09
Proportion Catholic 0.29 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.14 0.06
Proportion literate 0.90 0.04 0.85 0.13 0.93 0.05
Proportion border areas 0.25 0.43 0.17 0.38 0.26 0.45
Average distance to capital (km) 469 227 675 598 171 286
Number of districts 136 63 27
TAS VIC WA
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Proportion of male adults 0.52 0.04 0.54 0.03 0.69 0.12
Proportion adults aged 21–29 0.30 0.04 0.29 0.02 0.32 0.06
Proportion born in colony 0.82 0.07 0.76 0.05 0.30 0.21
Proportion primary industries 0.39 0.16 0.44 0.15 0.51 0.16
Proportion manufacturing 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.05
Proportion Catholic 0.17 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.05
Proportion literate 0.90 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.88 0.14
Proportion border areas 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.44 0.16 0.37
Average distance to capital (km) 130 79 184 88 675 619
Number of districts 30 35 37
Source: 1901 Colonial Censuses, as available from the Australian Data Archive.
supportive were King with 34 per cent and Gowen with 36 per cent. Parry increased to
36 per cent and Cook increased to 41 per cent. In 1899 there were fewer districts with 100
per cent support—only Thoulcanna and Yantara, but again those districts had few votes.
There were nine districts with support for federating over 95 per cent, including Perry,
Wakool, Cadell, Nicholson and Boyd all of which had substantial populations. There
are 35 districts where support for federating decreased, it was the same in one, and it
increased in the remaining 100. There were increases of more than 25 per cent in Culgoa,
Yungnulgra, Mootwingee, and Yancowinna. The number of votes supportive of federating
increased in 126 districts, and the number of votes against federating increased in 93
districts. Net support (the di↵erence of yes and no) increased in 110 districts. Similarly,
turnout increased in almost all districts and it more than doubled in 14 districts.
The means for the key district-level variables in 1901 are reported by colony in Table
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3.3. The proportion of males, which is always more than half, is highest in Western Aus-
tralia. The proportion of adults aged 21–29 is fairly similar across the colonies, however
slightly higher in Western Australia. There is more variation across states in the share
of native-born (those born within the colony), with a particularly low share in Western
Australia. New South Wales is the colony with the highest share in primary industries,
which includes agriculture and mining, with manufacturing being especially high in Vic-
toria and South Australia. The proportion Catholic varies a little around the average,
being lowest in South Australia, followed by Tasmania. Among adults, the proportion
literate (able to read and write) is around 90 per cent; higher in Victoria and lower in
Queensland and Western Australia. Around a quarter of the districts border with other
states, except for Tasmania which is an island. And with the exception of South Australia,
the average distance from the state capitals largely reflect the di↵erences in overall size.26
Our analysis is conducted on a district basis, and so the number of districts determines
the number of observations in any particular year-colony combination.
3.5 Analysis
3.5.1 Model
We are interested in examining the demographic, economic, and geographic factors that
were associated with support for federation. Our regression model is:
support =state + year + male + native + young + primary industry + manufacturing+
catholic + literacy + turnout + border + ln(distance).
Where support is the proportion of voters in a district that were supportive of federating;
state is a colony-specific fixed e↵ect with possible values: QLD, NSW, VIC, TAS, SA,
and WA; year is year-specific fixed e↵ect with possible values 1898, 1899, and 1900; male
26In South Australia electoral districts are used and these reflect population size. As a consequence,
the vast and largely empty regions of the northern territory and the north and west of the southern
territory carry little weight. Thus most of the districts are clustered in the south eastern corner, with
seven of the 27 districts less than 10km from the centre of Adelaide.
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is the proportion of males in the district; native is the proportion of those that were born
in that colony; young is the proportion of voting age adults in the district that are aged
21 to 29; primary industry is the proportion of those in the district that are employed
in primary industries; manufacturing is the proportion of those in the district that are
employed in manufacturing; catholic is the proportion of those in the district that are
catholic; literacy is the proportion of those in the district that are able to read and write;
turnout is the proportion of eligible voters in that district who actually voted; border is a
dummy variable that is one if the district is on a border and zero otherwise; and finally,
distance is a the number of kilometres between the district and the capital of the colony.
There are various aspect to be aware of including: that only Western Australia voted in
1900 and that the vote was after Federation had been agreed to; and that the number of
kilometres for the district that is the capital of the colony itself was set at one.
3.5.2 Regression results and discussion
Table 3.4 reports the results of OLS estimation of the proportion of yes votes in a district.
It is important to caution that these are associations and not necessarily causal e↵ects.
Our intention is to explore the strength and size of the associations over range of di↵erent
variables rather than to try and estimate a causal relationship for one specific variable
or channel of influence. As the dependent variable is a proportion, strictly speaking, it
would be more appropriate to use beta regression, however these results can be more
di cult to interpret. The results of beta regression are provided in Table 3.5, however
the significance and signs of the coe cients are essentially unchanged and the magnitude
of the e↵ects are similar. To aid interpretability, the coe cients in Table 3.5 have been
converted to marginal e↵ects
The baseline results are estimated with all colonies and years, using fixed e↵ects for
colony and year as needed. There are no within-district dependent or explanatory vari-
ables, and the colony-level fixed e↵ects should go some way to accounting for correlations
within each colony, as such, following Abadie et al. (2017) our standard errors are unclus-
tered. The other regressions examine specific colonies, or groups of colonies, to examine
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Table 3.4: Results using OLS
Dependent variable: Proportion support for Federation
All QLD only NSW only VIC only TAS/SA/WA
QLD  0.142⇤⇤⇤
(0.021)
SA 0.260⇤⇤⇤
(0.024)
TAS 0.406⇤⇤⇤ 0.182⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.032)
VIC 0.335⇤⇤⇤
(0.019)
WA  0.190⇤⇤⇤  0.393⇤⇤⇤
(0.034) (0.063)
Is 1899 0.072⇤⇤⇤ 0.028 0.083⇤⇤⇤ 0.131⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023)
Male  0.481⇤⇤⇤ 0.421  0.536⇤⇤⇤  0.610⇤⇤  0.536⇤⇤
(0.131) (0.661) (0.175) (0.290) (0.270)
Aged 21 to 29  0.169  0.203  1.036⇤⇤⇤ 0.169 0.193
(0.144) (0.409) (0.252) (0.315) (0.255)
Born in colony  0.747⇤⇤⇤  0.484  0.489⇤⇤⇤  0.565⇤⇤⇤  0.954⇤⇤⇤
(0.055) (0.409) (0.078) (0.156) (0.122)
Primary industries 0.055  0.357 0.101  0.075 0.189
(0.068) (0.265) (0.101) (0.061) (0.117)
Manufacturing  0.065  0.657  0.514 0.210
(0.197) (0.748) (0.331) (0.311)
Catholic 0.084  0.176 0.089  0.029  0.283
(0.081) (0.339) (0.109) (0.122) (0.178)
Literacy 0.076  0.019 0.826⇤⇤⇤ 0.270⇤
(0.088) (0.261) (0.200) (0.161)
Turnout 0.081 0.223 0.230⇤⇤ 0.197  0.123
(0.062) (0.300) (0.089) (0.133) (0.103)
Is border 0.006 0.025 0.065⇤⇤⇤  0.022 0.025
(0.014) (0.052) (0.019) (0.018) (0.041)
Distance 0.063⇤⇤⇤ 0.089⇤⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤⇤⇤ 0.050⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.023) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011)
Constant 0.931⇤⇤⇤ 0.347 0.318 1.287⇤⇤⇤ 1.164⇤⇤⇤
(0.156) (0.564) (0.275) (0.249) (0.312)
Observations 556 63 272 70 151
R2 0.656 0.761 0.613 0.664 0.684
Adjusted R2 0.646 0.715 0.597 0.613 0.654
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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Table 3.5: Results using beta regression
Dependent variable: Proportion support for Federation
All QLD only NSW only VIC only TAS/SA/WA
QLD  0.172⇤⇤⇤
(0.103)
SA 0.198⇤⇤⇤
(0.120)
TAS 0.293⇤⇤⇤
(0.125)
VIC 0.257⇤⇤⇤
(0.106)
WA  0.301⇤⇤⇤  0.515⇤⇤⇤
(0.157) (0.369)
Is 1899 0.068⇤⇤⇤ 0.024 0.079⇤⇤⇤ 0.094⇤⇤⇤
(0.069) (0.092) (0.135) (0.139)
Male  0.52⇤⇤⇤ 0.669  0.673⇤⇤⇤  0.633⇤⇤⇤  0.203
(0.726) (2.878) (0.960) (2.371) (1.604)
Aged 21 to 29  0.048  0.281  0.835⇤⇤⇤ 0.257  0.071
(0.789) (1.956) (1.403) (2.447) (1.666)
Born in colony  0.80⇤⇤⇤  0.479  0.646⇤⇤⇤  0.64⇤⇤⇤  0.787⇤⇤⇤
(0.307) (1.797) (0.437) (1.332) (0.755)
Primary industries 0.112⇤⇤⇤  0.371⇤ 0.167⇤  0.059  0.077
(0.234) (1.148) (0.509) (0.470) (0.604)
Manufacturing 0.092⇤  0.610  0.491  0.426⇤
(0.310) (3.125) (1.720) (1.561)
Catholic 0.023  0.118 0.070  0.075 0.004
(0.387) (1.400) (0.519) (0.957) (0.975)
Literacy 0.052  0.209 0.772⇤⇤⇤ 0.080
(0.483) (1.215) (1.014) (1.039)
Turnout 0.044 0.339 0.173⇤ 0.203⇤⇤  0.162⇤
(0.327) (1.400) (0.469) (1.045) (0.608)
Is border 0.010 0.041 0.059⇤⇤⇤  0.026⇤⇤  0.089⇤⇤⇤
(0.075) (0.233) (0.101) (0.136) (0.216)
Distance 0.002⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.000⇤⇤⇤ 0.001⇤⇤⇤ 0.005⇤⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.094) (0.075) (0.093) (0.059)
Constant 2.758⇤⇤⇤  0.338 0.323 7.048⇤⇤⇤ 5.257⇤⇤⇤
(0.827) (2.377) (1.414) (1.964) (1.969)
Observations 556 63 272 70 151
R2 0.665 0.779 0.601 0.766 0.562
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
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whether these baseline results are being driven by specific colonies. Tasmania, South
Australia and Western Australia are grouped together for this regression because of the
small number of districts in each.
The baseline results are estimated relative to NSW in 1898, so we find that Queens-
land and Western Australia were less supportive than New South Wales, while the other
colonies—South Australia, Tasmania, and Victoria—were more supportive. The coe -
cient for 1899 is positive, reflecting the increased support for federating in the later vote.
There is no separate value for 1900 as Western Australia was the only colony to vote in
that year. The second round of referendums is perhaps less interesting because the results
for the previous round were known and the likely outcomes in the second round were more
of a foregone conclusion. But it is worth seeing if the associations were similar between
the first and second rounds and also whether those for Queensland and Western Australia,
which did not vote in the first round, resembled those of the other colonies. It is also of
value because the 1901 censuses were conducted closer to the 1899 and 1900 votes. As
these results are similar, it may provide some reassurance around the reasonableness of
using explanatory variables from 1901 for 1898 as well. The main di↵erence is a general
upward shift in the proportion of support for federating.
An increasing proportion of males in a district is negatively correlated with support
for Federation, which is a surprising result given that women were not uniformly able
to vote. This suggests that women may have exerted a positive influence on support for
federation, even where they did not have the vote. This may be related to the push for
women’s su↵rage in Australia, which was active at this time. Each colony extended the
vote to women at a di↵erent time and the Commonwealth granted voting rights to women
at a federal level in 1902, which meant that the Commonwealth actually extended the
right ahead of several colonies. Specifically, women received the right to vote in South
Australia and Western Australia in 1895 and 1899, respectively; New South Wales and
Tasmania quickly followed Federation, in 1902 and 1903, respectively; and Queensland and
Victoria were the final states at 1905 and 1908, respectively. Sawer (2001) describes how
‘South Australian delegates to the Constitutional Convention insisted on a clause in the
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Constitution (s41) that would prevent South Australian women voters being denied the
Commonwealth franchise’. Sawer argues this made it ‘inevitable’ that Federation would
lead to women’s su↵rage Australia-wide; hence to a certain extent, supporting federating
was supporting women’s su↵rage. However this coe cient is not uniformly negative, for
instance we find that it is positive for the Queensland-only regression, and we do not
know the extent to which this factor was front of voters’ mind. Additionally, although a
petition was lodged (Womanhood Su↵rage, 1897), it is di cult to find evidence of how
concerted a campaign there was at the time associating women’s su↵rage with federating.
It may be expected that younger voters would be more likely to be supportive of
federating, however we find a negative coe cient in many cases. The exceptions are
Victoria and the group of three colonies.
The proportion of adults that were born in the colony is negatively correlated with
support for federating. This may be surprising and suggests that support for federating
was stronger among those who were either born in another of the Australian colonies or
overseas. It may be that those voters were more geographically mobile, had less sense of
‘colony-identity’, or that those from outside the colony were less committed to colonial
autonomy and more willing to see the benefits of integration. In any event, legislation to
restrict non-European migration passed the federal parliament in its first year of existence,
although we are unable to tell the extent to which this was a decisive issue at the time.
The key variables representing the sectoral interests is the share of the labour force
in manufacturing and the share in primary industries. If federating implied greater pro-
tection for manufacturing, then the coe cient should be positive, but it is not. The
negative coe cient indicates that districts that were relatively industrial did not favour
federation. As noted earlier, this could be because even though manufacturers expected a
lower post-federation tari↵, labour organisations feared that merging with other colonies
could undermine union bargaining strength. It may also simply be that the sector was
fairly small in comparison to the total labour force. In the main regression, the coe cient
on primary industries is positive, but neither variable is significant. Even independent
of tari↵s, areas that were more reliant on primary industries would have been expected
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to be more supportive of federating for the possibility of better infrastructure and water
management. It may be that this variable is not disaggregated enough to appropriately
capture the di↵erence between, say, mining and farming. Similarly, it may have been that
given the di↵erent tari↵s imposed by each colony that the baseline estimation averages
out an e↵ect, but there is no e↵ect in either of the regressions that are specific to Victoria
or New South Wales. Tari↵s may be either trade diverting or trade creating, however, as
discussed by Irwin (2006), essentially the only barrier to inter-colony trade was the tari↵;
and it may be that the free flow of capital and labour was su cient so that the changed
tari↵s were not expected to have a significant e↵ect.
The coe cient on the proportion of Catholics is small and insignificant but the sig-
nificant positive coe cient on literacy is consistent with the idea that those with more
education and better information were more likely to favour federating. The coe cient
on turnout is generally positive, however is negative in the case of the regression focused
on the three colonies grouped together.
Finally, it seems that voting for federating also had an important geographic compo-
nent. The dummy for the districts of New South Wales that bordered on other colonies
takes a positive coe cient that is significant at the 1 per cent level. So long as the census
variables were reasonably constant this would be consistent with the view that a lack
of transport integration and other administrative barriers were a costly irritation that
federating could overcome (Pringle, 1978, p. 235). By contrast the border dummy takes a
negative coe cient in Victoria, which is opposite to that of New South Wales. This hardly
seems consistent with the prospect of gains from interaction across the borders but could
be consistent with the implied reduction of the reduction in tari↵ protection for Victoria
at the border with New South Wales. For the remaining colonies the border dummy is
insignificant. This is not surprising as most of the border districts are in relatively arid
areas and much of the commerce with other colonies was conducted by coastal shipping.
The influence of geographical location was not simply an issue at the border. The
coe cient on the log of distance from the respective colonial capital city is positive and
significant, suggesting that support for federating increased with remoteness from the seat
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of colonial power. Of particular note is the strongly significant positive coe cient on log
distance from the colonial capital Brisbane. While this has sometimes been associated
with tensions between the mining districts (particularly gold mining) and the populations
further south, the coe cient is larger than those for the other colonies, where discord
between mining and other interests was much less marked. Although the e↵ect of distance
is remarkably strong, this has received little attention in the literature on the referendums
and underlying reasons for it remain unclear.
3.6 Conclusion
Our analysis of spatial voting patterns in the referendums that lead to Federation yields
four key findings. The first is that, under the assumption that the uniform tari↵ would
look more like that in Victoria than in New South Wales, the association between votes
and the sectoral composition seems not to support the predictions of customs union
theory. Second, there is a strong correlation between the proportion of migrants in a
district and support for federating, something that has not been emphasised in most of
the literature. Thus support for federating seems to be related more to migration than to
trade. Third, distance from the metropolitan centre of each colony is strongly correlated
with support for federating, a finding has also been overlooked in the literature and is
open to interpretation. Finally, for New South Wales, support for federating is positively
correlated with the proportion of females in the district and the proportion literate.
It is worth emphasising two final points in relation to the historical literature on
the referendums. The first is that those studies that have examined the distribution of
support for federating have focused on the varying e↵ects of economic structure, politics
and persuasion. But the key associations identified here, the shares of migrants and
females, as well as distance from the capital have received little attention. It would be
useful to gain a deeper understanding of these apparently strong relationships. Second,
some of the more recent contributions raise the question of the timing of Federation,
specifically why it occurred at the end of the 1890s rather than a decade or two earlier
(or later). Our results suggest that perhaps societal changes in attitudes and aspirations
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were more important than di↵erences in economic or political structure.
Future work should look further into the relationship between support for federating
and the women’s su↵rage movement, especially in New South Wales. Future work could
also make more of a di↵erence between migrants born in an Australian colony and those
born overseas, as at the moment they are both treated as having not been born in the
colony. Finally, if it were possible to overlay banking or incomes data then a variety of
additional questions could be examined.
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Chapter 4
A Surname-Based Analysis of
Tasmanian Social Mobility
4.1 Introduction
Surname analysis suggests a low level of social mobility in Tasmania, Australia. By way of
background, social mobility considers how a person’s social status is related to the status
of their ancestors. If one’s ancestors play a large role in determining one’s outcomes, then
the level of mobility may be low. This would have implications for the type of economic
policies that are appropriate. For instance, to counteract this public education funding
may need to be higher, and tax and transfer settings may need to be more progressive. It
also has implications for the type of economic policies that are implemented, because it
may be that policies are made by those with entrenched interests in maintaining existing
power structures. In terms of time since European-settlement Australia is younger than
many of the other countries whose social mobility has been analysed using surnames, and
in some ways, nineteenth century Tasmania could be considered a frontier economy. As
such, it is of interest whether the low levels of social mobility observed in older, more
established, economies is also found in Tasmania.
The nineteenth century part of this paper focuses on individuals born in Tasmania be-
tween 1820 and 1899, as before 1820 births were sporadic and relatively rare in Tasmania.
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Social status can be assigned to these individuals using data sources such as parliamentary
service or attendance at an exclusive school. By comparing the surnames of high-status
groups then, with the surnames of high-status groups in the late twentieth century, an
estimate can be made of the degree of social mobility in Tasmania.
Our main finding is that over a four-generation period high-status in one generation
had a persistence of 0.8 with high-status in the next generation. We examine the meaning
of this result to find that it is not unexpected although it is higher than estimates of
intergenerational elasticity in Australia, such as Deutscher and Mazumder (2019). That
is, our finding, is that these days the proportion of certain surnames in high-status groups
is fairly similar to the proportion in the nineteenth century. This is similar to the results
of Clark (2014), who find similar results focusing mostly on the U.S. and the U.K. but
also consider other countries. Our results are much the same as the estimates of Clark
et al. (2017) who applied this method in Australia with datasets focused on university
education and doctors.
4.2 Pre-Federation Tasmania
Social mobility is especially important in Tasmania because of its history as a penal colony.
Tasmania is an island state of Australia that was inhabited by Indigenous peoples at least
35,000 years before European settlement. The Dutch were the first known Europeans
to name the island, and by 1777, when it was sighted by the British Captain James
Cook, it was called Van Diemen’s Land. It is estimated that before British settlement the
Indigenous population of Tasmania was between 5,000 and 10,000 persons (ABS, 1996).
In terms of land area, Tasmania is of similar size to West Virginia in the USA, or Ireland
in Europe.
British colonisation began in the south-east of Tasmania in 1803 with a settlement at
Risdon Cove, followed in 1804 by Sullivans Cove, around which the present-day capital,
Hobart, formed (ABS, 1996). Most of the initial European population of Tasmania were
either convicts or guards, and their settlement decimated the Indigenous Tasmanian pop-
ulation. Few Indigenous peoples survived beyond 1830, and none by 1876 (ABS, 2002).
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The Gold Rush in Victoria, beginning in 1851, saw many people leave Tasmania. Convict
transportation to Tasmania ceased soon after, in 1853, possibly due to a change of gov-
ernment in Britain (McLean, 2013), and in 1856, the name of the colony was changed to
Tasmania when it became self-governing. On 1 January 1901 Tasmania joined with five
other colonies to form Australia.
Records from the 1842 Tasmanian Census suggest that of the 57,420 persons recorded
as being in the colony, only 27,216 persons are recorded as being ‘Born in the Colony’ or
‘Arrived Free’.1 Convicts not only provided labour, but were also consumers (Meredith
and Oxley, 2014, p. 113). Moyle (2015) describes the nineteenth century Tasmanian econ-
omy as ‘predominantly agricultural’ in its early days, while by ‘the end of the 1860s. . . wool
accounted for around half of Tasmania’s export income’
4.2.1 Population data
A dataset of Tasmanian births for the nineteenth century is available from LINC, a col-
laboration of Tasmanian libraries and archives, via data.gov.au. Aspects of this dataset
have been used as a component of the ‘Founders and Survivors Project’ that traces the
histories of individuals and families in Australia (Bradley et al., 2010). An example of
a birth entry is shown in Figure 4.1. The first entry is for a child born on 19 November
1834, named Christiana Susanna.
There are 211,604 entries in the dataset recorded as being born between 1820 and
1899 (Figure 4.2).2 Figure 4.2 shows the substantial impact of the Gold Rush in Victoria,
which began in 1851. The decline beginning in the late 1890s may be due to responsibility
for the birth registers being taken over by the Commonwealth.
Other authors, such as Moyle (2015) have used datasets of Tasmanian births to analyse
Tasmanian fertility rates for this period. For instance, Moyle (2015) finds that fertility
began declining in the late 1880s. This paper estimates social mobility and following the
1To reconstruct this number, obtain the data from ‘Historical Census and Colonial Data Archive’
at http://hccda.ada.edu.au/pages/TAS-1842-census-01_1. In the ‘Civil Condition’ columns sum
‘Males’ and ‘Females’ for both ‘Born in the Colony’ and ‘Arrived Free’.
2There are 2,127 birth records for years before 1820, however the population was small at this time
and there are few of the other records that would be needed to analyse social mobility for these births.
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Figure 4.1: Example of church baptism record
Figure 4.2: Annual birth counts, 1820 – 1899
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method of Clark (2014) focuses on the surnames in the dataset. The 35-most-common
surnames based on births data between 1820 and 1899 are summarised in Table 4.1.
Smith is the most common surname in the dataset over the 1820 to 1899 period,
accounting for around 2 per cent of all births. The next most popular surnames are
Williams, Jones, Brown, and Wilson. There are 14,645 di↵erent surnames over this period,
of which 5,974 appear only once and 9,781 appear five or fewer times. The distribution
of the surnames appears similar to a Pareto distribution. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show the
rank of the surname in terms of commonality on the horizontal axis and the number of
births with that surname on the vertical axis. Figure 4.3a includes all names, while Figure
4.3b only includes the 100-most-common, less Smith. The frequency of such surnames
may be artificially decreased by misspellings and transcription errors. For instance, both
Whitefield and Whitefeld appear twice, although it is not clear whether this is accurate.
The most common surnames are reasonably stable over the period 1820 to 1899. One
way to see this is to examine the rank of the overall 20-most-common surnames in four
twenty-year periods: 1820–1839, 1840–1859, 1860–1879, 1880–1899 (Figure 4.4). Note
that these groupings are just for illustrative purposes. If a surname is equally common
in each twenty-year period, as measured by ranking, then the line corresponding to that
surname in Figure 4.4 will be horizontal. It can be seen that most of the lines are either
entirely, or close to, horizontal.
One concern with using this dataset is the extent of the share of Tasmanian births that
it does not contain. Nineteenth century civil registration datasets are rarely complete,
and Tasmania is unlikely to be an exception, especially in the first half of the century. As
in the UK, Tasmania’s early civil registration data were recorded by clergy and kept in
parish registers. This made them susceptible to the idiosyncrasies of the clergy, as well
as local events such as loss, fire, and flood.
An act of the British Parliament in 1836 established a central o ce to keep copies of
the parish registers in the UK. Kippen (2002a) analyses civil registration in nineteenth
century Tasmania, and describes how, following this, in 1838 Tasmania became the first
Australian colony to similarly establish a central o ce. Tasmania was divided into seven
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Table 4.1: 35-most-common birth and death surnames, 1820 – 1899
Births Deaths
Surname Frequency Percentage Surname Frequency Percentage
Smith 3,760 1.8 Smith 1,698 1.8
Williams 1,828 0.87 Williams 841 0.89
Jones 1,773 0.85 Jones 803 0.85
Brown 1,637 0.78 Brown 778 0.83
Wilson 1,010 0.48 Wilson 503 0.53
Taylor 907 0.43 Taylor 492 0.52
Johnson 887 0.42 Johnson 428 0.45
White 835 0.4 White 386 0.41
Davis 752 0.36 Davis 376 0.4
Walker 745 0.36 Thompson 362 0.38
Clark 729 0.35 Wright 310 0.33
Moore 728 0.35 King 300 0.32
Turner 718 0.34 Martin 300 0.32
Harris 670 0.32 Turner 299 0.32
King 661 0.32 Harris 294 0.31
Wright 657 0.31 Thomas 285 0.3
Hall 623 0.3 Hill 282 0.3
Scott 606 0.29 Miller 282 0.3
Hill 597 0.29 Moore 282 0.3
Martin 582 0.28 Green 279 0.3
Edwards 570 0.27 Clarke 276 0.29
Miller 570 0.27 Walker 276 0.29
Evans 561 0.27 Lewis 260 0.28
Thompson 559 0.27 Robinson 258 0.27
Young 553 0.26 Clark 254 0.27
Green 546 0.26 Evans 248 0.26
Anderson 545 0.26 Anderson 245 0.26
Lewis 543 0.26 Edwards 242 0.26
Johnston 532 0.25 Roberts 242 0.26
Thomas 531 0.25 Watson 241 0.26
Cox 529 0.25 Hall 240 0.25
Clarke 528 0.25 Young 239 0.25
Cooper 524 0.25 Murphy 236 0.25
Watson 500 0.24 Jackson 221 0.23
Collins 488 0.23 Kelly 218 0.23
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Figure 4.3: Tasmanian births surname distributions
(a) All surnames
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(b) 100-most-common surnames, less Smith
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registration districts, each run by a Deputy Registrar who was responsible for recording
the details of births, deaths, and marriages amongst the free population. Convict records
were kept in separate registers.
Parents were responsible for registering newborn babies, and householders were respon-
sible for registering deaths in their homes. The clergy were required to notify the Deputy
Registrar of any burials that occurred without registration. The maximum penalty for
non-compliance was £10, at a time when the average annual wage, with board and lodg-
ing, for a milkman was £20 and for a stone-cutter was £40 (Emigration from the United
Kingdom, 1838, p. 162).
Kippen (2002a) describes compliance with the Act as ‘an ongoing problem’, and finan-
cial incentives were established in 1843 that encouraged Deputy Registrars to accurately
carry-out their work. As at 1853, the Registrar ‘believed (the) death registration was
complete’, however births were considered under-reported, for instance in ‘1847, there
were 2,041 baptisms, and only 1,531 registered births’ (Kippen, 2002a, p. 49)
One way to help allay concerns around bias in the dataset is to compare it with other
records, such as censuses. There are records for eight nineteenth century censuses available
at the Historical Census and Colonial Data Archive (HCCDA).3 These are for the years
1842, 1848, 1851, 1857, 1861, 1870, 1881, and 1891. Although not every census specifies
the number of births in the preceding year, estimates can be made (Table 4.2).4
The 1861 and 1870 censuses do not provide the ‘Born in the Colony’ number that is
in the four earlier censuses. However, they do contain the number of children less than
one-year-old, by sex. This suggests there were 3,117 births in the year to the date of the
census in 1861, and 2,887 births in the year to the date of the census in 1870.5 As with
3The HCCDA is a sub-archive of the Australian Data Archive and is available at http://hccda.ada.
edu.au/.
4The first four censuses (1842, 1848, 1851, 1857) describe the number of people ‘Born in the Colony’,
by sex. Comparing this number between the four censuses provides an estimate of the number of births
each year. It will be an underestimate because it will be net of those who died, left Tasmania, or were
otherwise not included in the census, and will also su↵er from being a linear interpolation. Nonetheless,
the censuses imply 945 births annually between 1842 and 1848; 1,066 births annually between 1848 and
1851; and 1,428 births annually between 1851 and 1857. By way of comparison, the dataset used in this
paper contains 1,443 births in 1842, 1,713 births in 1847, 2,243 births in 1851 and 3,409 births in 1857.
5To reconstruct these numbers go to http://hccda.ada.edu.au/pages/TAS-1861-census-01_1 or
http://hccda.ada.edu.au/pages/TAS-1870-census-01_1, then the ‘Totals’ row, and sum the ‘Under
six months’ and ‘Under one year’ columns (for the 1870 Census only the ‘Under One Year’ number is
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the earlier censuses, these figures are net of deaths and departures and so will be likely an
underestimate of the number of births. Nonetheless, the dataset used in this paper has
3,287 recorded births in 1861 and 3,099 in 1870.
There is more detail available for the 1881 and 1891 censuses. In the Introductory
Report to the 1881 Census the Superintendent of the Census writes ‘[b]etween the Census
of 1870 and that of 1881, 36,126 births were registered’. Although it is not possible to
exactly match the births in the dataset with the date of the census within a year, adding
half of the births in 1870 and 1881 as well as those in the intervening years provides a
count of 43,670. And in the Introductory Report of the 1891 Census, there are 4,588
infants under one year, which is similar to the 5,001 found in the dataset used in this
paper.
Another way to help lessen concerns around bias in the dataset is to compare births
with another measure. For instance, a dataset of deaths is available from the same source.
The deaths dataset has 94,603 entries in the period 1820 to 1899. The 35-most-common
surnames based on deaths data between 1820 and 1899 are summarised in Table 4.1.
Almost all of the most-common surnames are present, at similar rates, in both datasets.
Surnames that are bold do not appear in both lists. They are concentrated toward the
end of Table 4.1 because the overlap is only evaluated on the names in Table 4.1.
The main concern in terms of the completeness of the Tasmanian nineteenth century
deaths dataset is infant deaths, as they may not be registered. Although the dataset
is subject to this, the impact of it should not be substantial because the estimate of
infant mortality in Tasmania at this time is 21–25 deaths per 1,000 live births (de Looper
(2014, p. 63) and Kippen (2002b)). Additionally, the sex ratio of births does not seem
overly selective (Figure 4.5), despite the considerable skew in the sex ratio of the broader
population.
To summarise, the dataset of Tasmanian births contains 211,604 birth records over the
period 1820 to 1899. The quality of the dataset, particularly in the second half of the nine-
teenth century seems likely to be comparable to other records from that time. There will
needed) for both ‘Males’ and ‘Females’.
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Figure 4.4: Annual count of available birth records, 1820 – 1899
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Table 4.2: Annual number of births, based on census
Census Type Number Births dataset
1842 – 1848 Linear interpolation 945 1,443
1848 – 1851 Linear interpolation 1,066 1,713
1851 – 1857 Linear interpolation 1,428 2,243
1861 Census value 3,117 3,287
1870 Census value 2,887 3,099
1881 Linear interpolation 3,612 4,045
1891 Census value 4,588 5,001
71
be under-recording, particularly due to neo-natal mortality, however the dataset is being
used to understand the share of particular surnames in the population and appropriate
for this purpose.
4.2.2 Identifying status
A traditional analysis of social mobility would focus on income. For instance, Solon (1992)
estimates intergenerational income mobility in the USA using the PSID dataset; Leigh
(2007) compares the wages of fathers and sons in Australia using the HILDA dataset;
and Deutscher and Mazumder (2019) use Australian tax data. However, as datasets with
longer time frames become available there has been more work on multi-generational mo-
bility, summarised by Solon (2015). Often these datasets lack information on incomes
or wealth at an individual level and instead analysis focuses on identifiable high-status
groups. For instance, Lindahl et al. (2015) use surnames to find more persistence when
considering more than two generations than only two generations, in contrast to a ‘Bud-
denbrooks phenomenon’. And analysis of longer time frames using surnames allows ex-
amination of the impact of grandparents, for instance, Olivetti et al. (2018). This paper
follows those and Clark (2014) in focusing on the surnames of high-status groups.
By examining the surnames that high-status groups are composed of over time, a
measure of social mobility can be constructed. For instance, attending an exclusive school
or working as a parliamentarian would be considered high-status for the purpose of this
paper, given the fees charged by exclusive schools relative to the average income at the
time, and the types of people who tended to become parliamentarians.
The key aspect of this analysis, following Clark (2014), is the relative representation of
a surname, or group of surnames. That is, the share of that surname/s in the high-status
group, compared with the share of that surname/s in the general population. In Tables
4.3 and 4.4, this is the ‘Ratio’ column. These are not measures of statistical significance,
but are instead descriptive and a value greater than one implies that the surname is
over-represented in high-status surnames, compared with the population. Almost all the
political surnames are over-represented, with the exception of ‘Smith’ which is underrep-
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resented. Similarly, students at the Hutchins School tend to have a di↵erent composition
to the population.
The composition of a high-status group is subjective as it is meant to include more
than just income or wealth, and it is contingent on the data availability. Additional
subjectivity is introduced when a decision is made about what constitutes a distinctive
surname. For instance, Clark (2014) considers various cut-o↵s such as fewer than 100
persons holding the surname and also fewer than 500 persons. There is further discussion
of this issue later in the paper, but briefly, distinctive surnames are needed to link high-
status groups over time, but the decision as to which surnames are distinctive may be
influential.
4.2.2.1 Parliamentary service
Tasmania has a bicameral parliament made up of the Legislative Council (Upper House)
and the House of Assembly (Lower House). The Upper House is unusual in that members
are typically independent, rather than party-a liated.
Tasmania was initially a territory of New South Wales and only became a separate
colony in 1825. After this, what became the Legislative Council met. As described by
Korobacz (1971) the members of the Council were typically appointed to one- to three-
year terms that were able to be reappointed, from its establishment until 1851. Between
1851 and 1856, two-thirds of the members were elected and one-third were appointed. And
from 1856, Tasmania was created as its own colony and all Members of the Legislative
Council, as well as the newly established House of Assembly, were elected.
Parliamentary service generally tends to be associated with high-status. For instance,
Reynolds (1969, p. 1) argues that ‘[t]he families that received land grants prior to 1831
continued to play an important role in the economic and political life of the colony until
the concluding years of the century’. A record of, and some biographical information
about, those who have served in the Tasmanian Parliament is available on a disaggregated
basis on the Tasmanian Parliament’s website. For the members of parliaments before
1856 the records are from Korobacz (1971) which are made available on the Parliament’s
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website. For members of parliaments since 1856 the disaggregated information available
on the Parliament’s website was combined with an aggregated dataset supplied by the
Parliamentary Research Service from the Tasmanian Parliamentary Library’s Members
of Parliament Database.
There are 371 Tasmanian parliamentarians born before 1899 (Figure 4.6). The 35-
most-common surnames of politicians born before 1900 are summarised in Table 4.3.
Archer, with 12 politicians, is the most common surname, and is much more common in
the dataset of politicians, than in the births dataset. The Shoobridge family is another
prominent political family. For instance, Louis Manton Shoobridge, who was born in
1851 in Tasmania was the son of Ebenezer, the brother of William, the father of Rupert,
and the grandfather of Louis, all of whom were members of a Tasmanian parliament at
some stage. The Shoobridge family are additionally related by marriage to at least one
other politician, Philip Fysh, although Fysh is not a common surname in its own right.
To be clear, two people in the same generation with the same surname who are clearly
closely related, for instance brothers, are not treated di↵erently to two people in the same
generation with the same surname who are not clearly closely related. So there may be
some bias present from changing family size.
4.2.2.2 The Hutchins School
The Hutchins School is a school in Hobart whose first cohort entered in 1846. It is one
of the oldest continuously run schools in Australia. Hutchins School student records are
available via the ‘Roll of Scholars’ published in two editions, 1993 and 1996.6
From the school records for classes that entered between 1846 and 1899 there are
records of 1,558 students. This corresponds to years of birth between 1829 and 1895
(Figure 4.7).
Attendance at the Hutchins School can be considered a signal of being part of a
high-status family because of the financial cost and the role played by the parents of the
6Digitised records were provided for classes entering up to 1900. The digitisation process is not
completed for classes who entered after 1900, and even if it were complete there may be privacy issues
that would not make it appropriate to use the dataset.
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Figure 4.5: Annual births sex ratio, 1820 – 1899
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Figure 4.6: Annual count of parliamentarians by birth year
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Table 4.3: 35 most-common politician surnames, 1820 – 1899
Politicians All births
Surname Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Ratio
Archer 12 2.64 329 0.16 16.8
Smith 6 1.32 3,760 1.8 0.74
Chapman 5 1.1 216 0.1 10.66
Gibson 5 1.1 199 0.1 11.58
Murdoch 5 1.1 78 0.04 29.53
Shoobridge 5 1.1 53 0.03 43.46
Brown 4 0.88 1,637 0.78 1.13
Butler 4 0.88 316 0.15 5.83
Cameron 4 0.88 191 0.09 9.65
Gellibrand 4 0.88 23 0.01 80.12
Lord 4 0.88 159 0.08 11.59
Von Stieglitz 4 0.88 2 0 921.38
Bisdee 3 0.66 32 0.02 43.19
Burbury 3 0.66 58 0.03 23.83
Davies 3 0.66 247 0.12 5.6
Dobson 3 0.66 154 0.07 8.97
Douglas 3 0.66 186 0.09 7.43
Fenton 3 0.66 109 0.05 12.68
Field 3 0.66 111 0.05 12.45
Foster 3 0.66 281 0.13 4.92
Giblin 3 0.66 78 0.04 17.72
Grant 3 0.66 194 0.09 7.12
Gunn 3 0.66 76 0.04 18.19
Lewis 3 0.66 543 0.26 2.55
Shaw 3 0.66 256 0.12 5.4
Walker 3 0.66 745 0.36 1.86
Aikenhead 2 0.44 16 0.01 57.59
Anstey 2 0.44 3 0 307.13
Atkins 2 0.44 191 0.09 4.82
Barnes 2 0.44 238 0.11 3.87
Bedford 2 0.44 49 0.02 18.8
Best 2 0.44 204 0.1 4.52
Burgess 2 0.44 337 0.16 2.73
Calvert 2 0.44 70 0.03 13.16
Champ 2 0.44 29 0.01 31.77
Total 122 11,179
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Figure 4.7: Annual count of implied birth year of Hutchins students, 1820 – 1899
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Scholars. The fee to attend the Hutchins School in 1846 was £45 School Fees (1846).
This was a considerable amount given the average annual wage at the time, discussed
earlier, which for a milkman was £20 and for a stone-cutter was £40, and the estimated
Tasmania GDP in 1840 was £2,062,000 (Butlin, 1985).
The 35-most-common surnames based on the School Roll for births between 1820
and 1899 are summarised in Table 4.4. As with parliamentarians, many of the 35-most-
common surnames of Hutchins students occur in di↵erent frequencies in the broader pop-
ulation, as measured by births. For instance, Giblin occurs 13 times in the Hutchins
dataset, which is almost 1 per cent of the dataset, while only occurring 78 times in the
broader population. Other names that have especially di↵erent representations in the
Hutchins dataset compared with the births dataset are Westbrook, Perkins, Nicholas,
Maxwell, Murdoch, Barclay, Bedford, and Bisdee, all of which are at least ten times as
common in the Hutchins dataset than in the broader population.
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Table 4.4: 35-most-common Hutchins student surnames, 1820 – 1899
Hutchins All births
Surname Frequency Proportion Frequency Proportion Ratio
Fisher 20 0.0130 420 0.0020 6.4758
Smith 19 0.0124 3,760 0.0180 0.6872
Butler 18 0.0117 316 0.0015 7.7463
Jones 14 0.0091 1,773 0.0085 1.0738
Giblin 13 0.0085 78 0.0004 22.6651
Westbrook 13 0.0085 112 0.0005 15.7847
Perkins 12 0.0078 142 0.0007 11.4922
Dobson 10 0.0065 154 0.0007 8.8306
Douglas 10 0.0065 186 0.0009 7.3113
Nicholas 10 0.0065 82 0.0004 16.5843
Evans 9 0.0059 561 0.0027 2.1817
Harris 9 0.0059 670 0.0032 1.8267
Mason 9 0.0059 362 0.0017 3.3810
Maxwell 9 0.0059 63 0.0003 19.4273
Murdoch 9 0.0059 78 0.0004 15.6913
Reid 9 0.0059 383 0.0018 3.1956
Webster 9 0.0059 217 0.0010 5.6402
Wilkinson 9 0.0059 197 0.0009 6.2128
Abbott 8 0.0052 157 0.0008 6.9295
Clarke 8 0.0052 528 0.0025 2.0605
Murphy 8 0.0052 292 0.0014 3.7258
Walker 8 0.0052 745 0.0036 1.4603
Adams 7 0.0046 343 0.0016 2.7753
Barclay 7 0.0046 34 0.0002 27.9981
Bedford 7 0.0046 49 0.0002 19.4273
Bisdee 7 0.0046 32 0.0002 29.7480
Fitzgerald 7 0.0046 122 0.0006 7.8028
Fleming 7 0.0046 167 0.0008 5.7002
Martin 7 0.0046 582 0.0028 1.6356
Reynolds 7 0.0046 277 0.0013 3.4366
Roberts 7 0.0046 478 0.0023 1.9915
Young 7 0.0046 553 0.0026 1.7214
Allen 6 0.0039 382 0.0018 2.1360
Chapman 6 0.0039 216 0.0010 3.7775
Clark 6 0.0039 729 0.0035 1.1193
Total 331 15,240
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4.3 Late twentieth century Tasmania
The second aspect to the method of social mobility estimation used by Clark (2014) is
the distribution of surnames in the late twentieth century. If those surnames that were
over-represented in nineteenth century high-status groups are still over-represented today,
then it may be that social mobility is low.
4.3.1 Population data
Population data for late twentieth century Tasmania are di cult to obtain. For instance,
complete datasets of late twentieth century birth or death records do not appear to be
available online.
The most recent Tasmanian electoral roll that is available online is the 1980 via
Ancestry.com. That electoral roll cannot be downloaded, and can only be queried on a
name-by-name basis. The up-to-date electoral roll is only able to be viewed in person at
an Australian Electoral Commission o ce and electronic copying is not allowed. As men-
tioned by Clark (2014) the Intellectual Property Agency of the Australian Government
has made the electoral roll able to be searched, by surname, however the results are for
the whole of Australia and cannot be restricted to a particular state. The White Pages,
Australia’s phone book, is also available to be queried on a name-by-name basis, however
they can be restricted to only include Tasmania. Many other countries retain individual
census records, and names data can be obtained from that, however in Australia these
are destroyed after the responses are obtained and those data are not available.
There are extensive problems with using the electoral roll and the White Pages and
neither source is representative of the population. For instance, to be on the electoral roll
requires being at least a certain age and having registered. Similarly, the White Pages,
requires a fixed address, and a landline.7 Nonetheless, we use the White Pages here due
7The di↵erent population measures used for late twentieth century Tasmania, compared with those
used for nineteenth century Tasmania, could introduce inaccuracy. For instance, the births dataset is
created by aggregating annual flows of surnames. It has not been adjusted for arrivals, deaths and
departures, and is necessarily focused on newborn children. Electoral roll or White Pages data, on the
other hand, represent counts as at a particular time. Neither the electoral roll or the White Pages
should contain many children. Future work should improve on this population measure. As a first step,
expanding this work to consider the whole of Australia would at least allow the up-to-date electoral roll
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to data availability.
4.3.2 Identifying status
As with the population measure, and with the exception of parliamentarians, the iden-
tifiers of status that were used for nineteenth century Tasmania are not available for
present-day Tasmania. Examples of signals of status that are publicly available for late
twentieth century Tasmania include: service as a parliamentarian, being appointed to the
Order of Australia, and working in the legal profession.
4.3.2.1 Order of Australia
Data on those who have been appointed to the Order of Australia are available from its
website.8 The database appears to document almost all recipients of Australian Honours.
The focus of this analysis is on the Order of Australia, which began in 1975. It is
divided into the Civil or General Division, and the Military Division, and comprises five
levels, in decreasing selectivity: Knight/Dame of the Order (AK/AD); Companion of the
Order (AC); O cer of the Order (AO); Member of the Order (AM); and Medal of the
Order (OAM).
The Knight/Dame level of the Order has several exceptions. Firstly, it is not applicable
in the Military Division. And, secondly, there has only been provision for it in the General
Division between 1976 and 1986, as well as between 2014 and 2015. However, there have
only been 19 appointments to this level, two of whom are members of the British Royal
Family.
As of 2015 there have been 1,308 people appointed to the Order of Australia who
listed their location as Tasmania at the time of the appointment (Table 4.5).
As with the births dataset for nineteenth century Tasmania, the most common sur-
name for those living in Tasmania is Smith, with around 2 per cent of the appointments.
Other popular surnames are Green, Wilson, Harris, Scott, and Davis (Table 4.6).
look-up tool to be used. While that analysis would not be free of bias, it would be reduced, compared
with the level here. Additionally there is a potential for partnerships with the Australian Taxation O ce,
in a similar manner to Barone and Mocetti (2016) or Deutscher and Mazumder (2019).
8https://www.itsanhonour.gov.au/honours/honour_roll
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Table 4.5: Order of Australia appointments, by level
Level Australia-wide Tasmania only
Dame/Knight of the Order of Australia 19 1
Companion of the Order of Australia 398 9
O cer of the Order of Australia 2,682 69
Member of the Order of Australia 9,488 328
Medal of the Order of Australia 21,746 901
One concern with the Order of Australia dataset is that the lowest level, Medal of
the Order of Australia, may not be indicative of status. This level is often awarded for
community service, such as running a local sports club. Although this is important, and
arguably what the awards should be used to recognise, it is not clear that it is a signal of
status. As such, Table 4.6 also shows the surname analysis excluding Medal of the Order
of Australia recipients.
4.3.2.2 Legal professionals
Legal professionals are used by Clark (2014) as indicative of status. A similar collection for
present-day Tasmania can be constructed because the Law Society of Tasmania publishes
a list of its members. The Law Society of Tasmania is a professional association for
Tasmanian legal professionals and is part of the Law Council of Australia. Although
membership is not compulsory, many Tasmanians connected to the legal profession are
members.
A list of current members is available via the Society’s website.9 This indicates there
are 622 members of the Society. Analysis of this dataset indicates the most popular
surname is Smith, followed by Walker, Brown, and Jones (Table 4.7).
4.3.2.3 Parliament
The dataset of parliamentarians used as an indicator of high-status for the nineteenth
century datasets is also available as an indicator of present-day high-status. There are
311 parliamentarians born after 1905. The most popular surnames are Smith, Brown,
Hodgman, Archer, and Bacon (Table 4.7). Hodgman, Archer, and Bacon are well-known
9https://members.lst.org.au/members/search/people/
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Table 4.6: 35 most-common Order of Australia surnames, for Tasmanians
All awardees Without OAM awardees
Surname Frequency Percentage Surname Frequency Percentage
Smith 24 1.83 Green 5 1.23
Green 10 0.76 Smith 5 1.23
Wilson 9 0.69 Brown 4 0.98
Harris 8 0.61 Walker 4 0.98
Scott 8 0.61 Butler 3 0.74
Davis 7 0.53 James 3 0.74
Brown 6 0.46 Underwood 3 0.74
Burns 6 0.46 Wilkinson 3 0.74
Byrne 6 0.46 Banks 2 0.49
Clark 6 0.46 Barnard 2 0.49
Walker 6 0.46 Benjamin 2 0.49
Bennett 5 0.38 Braithwaite 2 0.49
Butler 5 0.38 Bugg 2 0.49
Davies 5 0.38 Burgess 2 0.49
French 5 0.38 Burns 2 0.49
Osborne 5 0.38 Cameron 2 0.49
Burgess 4 0.31 Canning 2 0.49
Clarke 4 0.31 Colville 2 0.49
Cooper 4 0.31 Cox 2 0.49
Cunningham 4 0.31 Davies 2 0.49
Fisher 4 0.31 Edwards 2 0.49
Foster 4 0.31 Fenton 2 0.49
Jones 4 0.31 Fitzgerald 2 0.49
Kearney 4 0.31 French 2 0.49
King 4 0.31 Gibson 2 0.49
Matthews 4 0.31 Gray 2 0.49
Mitchell 4 0.31 Hughes 2 0.49
Reid 4 0.31 Kearney 2 0.49
Roberts 4 0.31 Knight 2 0.49
Shaw 4 0.31 Melick 2 0.49
Valentine 4 0.31 Miller 2 0.49
Viney 4 0.31 Mitchell 2 0.49
Wilkinson 4 0.31 Morris 2 0.49
Williams 4 0.31 Newell 2 0.49
Banks 3 0.23 Norris 2 0.49
Total 196 84
82
Table 4.7: 35 most-common legal profession and political surnames
Legal profession Politicians
Surname Frequency Proportion Surname Frequency Proportion
Smith 6 0.0096 Smith 5 0.0161
Walker 6 0.0096 Brown 4 0.0129
Brown 5 0.0080 Hodgman 4 0.0129
Jones 4 0.0064 Archer 3 0.0096
Bartlett 3 0.0048 Bacon 3 0.0096
Chan 3 0.0048 Barnard 3 0.0096
Davies 3 0.0048 Batt 3 0.0096
Dixon 3 0.0048 Gibson 3 0.0096
Edwards 3 0.0048 Green 3 0.0096
Green 3 0.0048 Groom 3 0.0096
Groom 3 0.0048 Hiscutt 3 0.0096
Johnson 3 0.0048 Marriott 3 0.0096
Mitchell 3 0.0048 O’Byrne 3 0.0096
Tan 3 0.0048 Armstrong 2 0.0064
Topfer 3 0.0048 Barker 2 0.0064
White 3 0.0048 Barnett 2 0.0064
Williams 3 0.0048 Beattie 2 0.0064
Wood 3 0.0048 Bessell 2 0.0064
Zeeman 3 0.0048 Best 2 0.0064
Ayli↵e 2 0.0032 Braid 2 0.0064
Browne 2 0.0032 Butler 2 0.0064
Cooper 2 0.0032 Coates 2 0.0064
Davis 2 0.0032 Cole 2 0.0064
Eddington 2 0.0032 Davies 2 0.0064
Foon 2 0.0032 Davis 2 0.0064
Foster 2 0.0032 Fry 2 0.0064
Grant 2 0.0032 Harriss 2 0.0064
Gri ts 2 0.0032 Hope 2 0.0064
Gunadasa 2 0.0032 Jackson 2 0.0064
Gunson 2 0.0032 Lyons 2 0.0064
Higgins 2 0.0032 Martin 2 0.0064
Howroyd 2 0.0032 Mckay 2 0.0064
Hudson 2 0.0032 Miller 2 0.0064
Hughes 2 0.0032 Newman 2 0.0064
Johnston 2 0.0032 Pearsall 2 0.0064
Total 98 87
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political families.
4.4 Implied Social Mobility Rates
Following Clark (2014), the method of estimating a social mobility rate in this paper is
to assume that some group has some prevalence in generation t, xt, and to see how that
prevalence adjusts in generation t+ 1:
xt+1 = bxt + et. (4.1)
To construct the implied social mobility rates by this method, relative representations
for a group of surnames need to be constructed. As specific genealogical data are not
available, unusual surnames are used to establish the link between generations.
The collection of the unusual surnames drawn from the births dataset will be identified
in the Hutchins School and parliament database and their relative representation deter-
mined when they exist. As the datasets for the late twentieth century are dated between
1980 and 2016, on average four 30-year periods, which will be used as the definition of a
generation for this paper, will have elapsed before the present-day datasets. The relative
representation of that collection can then be determined in the present-day datasets.
The first step to construct relative representations is to combine the counts of nine-
teenth century surnames for the various high-status groups. As the datasets are over
time it is important to try to not double-count, for instance if a Hutchins School stu-
dent later sat in parliament. To lessen concerns about this, the lists were compared and
double-counting removed where it was identified.
The basis for inclusion in the rare-names, high-status, group is for there to be fewer
than 100 counts of a particular surname in the births dataset, and three or more entries in
the nineteenth century high-status group. On this basis there are 117 di↵erent surnames.
Ten examples of these are: Giblin, Buscombe, Bisdee, Jeanneret, Bedford, Shoobridge,
Finlayson, Crosby, Crowther, and Rockett. Of these 117 surnames, 22, or around 19 per
cent, are also found in late twentieth century Tasmanian high-status surnames.
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The relative representation of that group of 117 di↵erent surnames in the nineteenth
century dataset is 11.89. As the relative representation is close to 12 this implies that
group of surnames is about 12 times more represented in the high-status surnames than
in the births dataset.
Keeping that same group of 117 di↵erent surnames, there are 26 of them in the present-
day high-status group, which itself is of size 1,340. The broader population estimate is
less well-established than it would be in comparable countries. The White Pages lists
571 households that had one of these 117 surnames, and there were 196,100 households
in Tasmania in 2010. On the basis of this, the relative representation of this group in
present-day Tasmania is 6.66.
If there are four generations between the present-day and nineteenth century datasets,
then the implied estimate of b is 0.82. This estimate measures how similar the relative
representation of names is in one generation compared with another, or the persistence
of prevalence. Our estimate corresponds to both Clark (2014), who typically finds an
estimate ‘in the region 0.7–0.8’ (p. 212) in various countries, and Clark and Cummins
(2013) who find an estimate in the range of 0.73–0.9 in the U.K. over a longer time
period. It is also similar to that of Clark et al. (2017) who applied this method in
Australia with di↵erent data. More specifically, for instance, Clark et al. (2017) find a
relative representation of rare surnames at universities of around 12 in 1900–1929, but a
lower relative representation for doctors, where they find a value of around 2–3 in a similar
time period. However, in both the cases of universities and doctors, the persistence that
they find over time by comparing how these relative representations change is similar to
our estimates. The advantage of our dataset compared with Clark et al. (2017) is that
it covers a longer time period, however the disadvantage is that we are unable to use
the electoral roll. Olivetti and Paserman (2015) finds a slightly lower income elasticity of
around 0.3–0.5 in the U.S. between 1850 and 1930, using a slightly di↵erent method that
is based on given names, rather than surnames.
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4.4.1 Interpretation
Understanding what the 0.82 estimate (or Clark’s usual 0.7–0.8 estimate) means can be
di cult. The estimate is constrained to be positive, and if it were almost 0 then that
would mean that few of the surnames that were prevalent in the previous generation were
prevalent in the current one. If it were 1, then there would be essentially the same relative
prevalence, and if it were, say, 2 then that would mean the relative prevalence of those
surnames had increased. In that context, it is di cult to know whether a result of around
0.7–0.8 over the course of four generations should be concerning.
The main issue is the lack of a counterfactual. Although not a perfect approach, one
way of going some way to address this is to randomly generate samples and compare
the results in that context.10 There are a variety of ways to use sampling to construct a
counterfactual, but one way is to assume: there is some group of rare surnames of interest,
S, (for instance, Giblin, Buscombe, . . . ); at the first generation there are N1 people in
the total population; n1 people with a surname in S; H1 people in the high-status group;
and h1 people in the high-status group with a surname in S.
In this set-up the observed proportion of surnames of interest in the total population
is: n1N1 = p1,N and the observed proportion of surnames of interest in the high-status group
is: h1H1 = p1,H . So the relative prevalence is:
p1,H
p1,N
.
Using the same notation for the fourth generation means that the estimate of b solves:
p1,H
p1,N
⇥ b3 = p4,H
p4,N
.
Assume sampling with replacement for simplicity, then the number of people in the
10Thanks to Monica Alexander, Bruce Chapman, and participants at the UC Berkeley History Lunch,
especially Martha Olney, who all independently suggested this approach, which is also similar to that of
Olivetti and Paserman (2015).
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high-status group with a surname in S is a draw from a binomial distribution:
h1 ⇠ Binomial(H1, p⇤).
The true value of the p⇤ parameter is unknown, but the best estimate is p1,H . Of in-
terest for the purpose of constructing a counterfactual is the question of what if p⇤ was
something else? In that situation, and with appropriate manipulation of p⇤ to account for
generations, how likely is the number of observed surnames of interest in the high-status
group after four generations, h4?
Figure 4.8 shows the results of 10,000 draws from binomial distributions with di↵erent
values of persistence. This is the implied number of those in the high-status group with
a surname of interest after four generations if there were 1,000 people in the high-status
group and 10,000 people in the population.
In this example, as can be seen in Figure 4.8, the true number of people in the high-
status group with a surname of interest should be about 55 when persistence is 0.82, and
the probability of obtaining a value between 50 and 60, inclusive, is a little over 0.55.
When persistence decreases to 0.64, we expect a far fewer number of those in the high-
status group with a surname of interest. And when persistence increases to 1, we expect
far more of those in the high-status group with a surname of interest. However in both
cases the probability of obtaining a value between 50 and 60 is essentially zero. The e↵ect
on the shape of the distribution is notable – as the number of people in the high-status
group with a surname of interest must not be negative, the shape of the distribution
becomes more bunched as persistence reduces.
In order for it to be likely to observe low values of persistence in this set-up, say less
than 0.5, the number of individuals in the high-status group with a surname of interest
would need to be less than around 25, as can be seen from Figure 4.8. At such low values,
the distribution would be quite bunched, and a small change in the number of individuals
would have an outsized e↵ect on the persistence estimate. Additionally, when conducting
these studies using real data, for privacy reasons or out of concern for drawing inference
based on data errors, researchers may be hesitant to use an especially small number of
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Figure 4.8: Impact of di↵erent persistence levels
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individuals. But unless the number of individuals in the high-status group is substantially
larger than 1,000, then for any reasonable number of individuals with a surname of interest
the estimated persistence is likely to be in 0.7–0.8 range.
4.4.2 Robustness
The main driver of the estimated social mobility is the relative representation of the
nineteenth century high-status group. One concern may be that this is an artefact of
an aspect of the births dataset instead of underlying social mobility. To help lessen the
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concern that the estimate of social mobility is due to a feature of the births dataset, the
preceding analysis can be redone using the nineteenth century deaths dataset instead of
the nineteenth century births dataset.
There are 94,603 deaths in the dataset. The same hurdle for inclusion can be used
for the deaths dataset as was used for the births dataset, specifically, being so unusual as
for there to be fewer than 100 counts of that surname in the entire deaths dataset, and
that there is three or more entries of that surname in the nineteenth century high-status
group. There are 169 di↵erent surnames that satisfy these criteria. All of the ten example
surnames from before are also found here, apart from Jeanneret.
The relative representation of that group of 169 surnames in the nineteenth century
dataset is 7.28. That is to say, those surnames in that group of high-status surnames are
seven times as likely to be found in the high-status group than in the deaths dataset.
Of those 169 surnames, there are 95 instances of one of those surnames being in the late
twentieth century Tasmanian high-status surname group. There are 1,340 surnames in the
present-day Tasmanian high-status surname group. As such the relative representation of
those surnames is 4.49. The implied social mobility rate is 0.91, which is slightly higher
than that implied by the births dataset but not dissimilar.
Our main results were also robust to a sensitivity test in which we randomly removed
50 per cent of the surnames at a time and then re-ran the analysis. Although the specific
relative representations did change, they changed in a way that was consistent over time
and resulted in a similar estimate of persistence.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper is about social mobility, that is, how does the social status of one’s ances-
tors a↵ect one’s own social status. The focus has been on Tasmania, for which relevant
datasets are available for a little over 150 years. Although the datasets are not perfect,
the estimated intergenerational persistence of social status is around 0.8. This is similar
to other countries where the surname method has been used, and similar to other results
in Australia using di↵erent datasets.
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One of the weaknesses of this paper is the type of data used. For instance, a person is
typically only awarded an Order of Australia when they are older, after they have distin-
guished themselves. As such, that dataset does not necessarily provide a contemporary
measure of mobility in society. Another weakness in this paper is the patrilineal focus ne-
cessitated by using surnames. Some strategies for mitigating this are being developed, for
instance Olivetti and Paserman (2015) are able to use the distribution of first names which
they find convey information about socioeconomic status. Finally, migration presents a
danger to the appropriateness of this approach. For instance, if the high-status group are
less likely to emigrate from Tasmania, then the findings in this paper may reflect these
di↵erent rates to a certain extent.
The strength of the approach in this paper is that by using the longer time frame
allowed by surname analysis it should be less impacted by randomness. However, this
means the research does not provide many strategies that policymakers could implement
if they want to change the level of social mobility – few of us are in a position to pick our
great-grandparents.
Possible extensions to this paper include improving the informational content of sur-
names, following Gu¨ell et al. (2014); expanding the geographic area of consideration to the
whole of Australia; and improving the late twentieth century data. Although more work
is needed in order to have more confidence in this estimate, the result suggests concern
around economic inequality should remain at the centre of policy for some time to come.
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Appendix A
Age-at-arrival appendices
A.1 Additional tables and graphs
Figure A.1: Age-at-arrival profile for English and non-English sources
Notes: Data is split by England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales versus all other sources.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island to the 1940 Census. Also see the
text of the main document.
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Table A.1: Age at arrival in census, 1899 to 1930 arrivals
Country of birth Age at Percent 0–15 Percent 16–45 Percent 45+
arrival arrivals arrivals arrivals
North and West 22.7 24.6 71.2 4.1
Europe (old source)
South and East 21.1 31.4 65.6 3.0
Europe (new source)
Russia 20.7 33.0 64.0 3.0
Romania 20.8 36.4 59.9 3.7
Portugal 20.8 33.5 63.4 3.1
Italy 21.4 31.9 64.7 3.4
Finland 21.5 19.6 78.8 1.6
Greece 21.6 27.7 69.9 2.4
Hungary 21.7 28.4 69.2 2.4
Netherlands 21.8 33.2 61.9 4.9
Austria 21.9 27.3 70.1 2.5
Norway 21.9 22.7 73.7 3.5
Sweden 22.0 21.0 75.8 3.2
Denmark 22.2 20.8 76.1 3.1
Spain 22.4 23.7 73.7 2.6
France 22.4 28.2 67.2 4.5
Ireland 22.4 19.8 76.5 3.7
Belgium 22.6 25.9 71.8 2.4
Scotland 23.1 27.2 67.3 5.5
Germany 23.5 24.1 70.9 5.0
England 23.6 27.6 66.4 6.0
Switzerland 23.7 19.7 76.3 4.0
Notes: Data is from the 1900 to 1930 United States Censuses, keeping only
1899 to 1930 arrivals. We keep these years to match with the years of arrival
in Figure 2.1.
Source: See the text of the main document.
A.2 Further details on data creation
Information about Ellis Island arrivals was downloaded from http://www.jewishgen.
org/databases/EIDB/ellisgold.html. The data collection focused on single males,
aged 0–20, who arrived at Ellis Island between 1892 and 1924. The data fields that were
collected were: first and last name; city and country of last residence; arrival day, month,
and year; age at arrival; departure port; ship name; passenger id; and ethnicity. Sex
and marital status were also collected, but just to restrict the sample to male and single.
Passenger id is a unique identifier for each entry into Ellis Island and is numbered such
that those next to each other on the ship manifest are next to each other for passenger
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Table A.2: Robustness to higher quality links
Income Education
Sample: Main High Alternative Main High Alternative
quality match scores quality match scores
Age at arrival
2 to 3 –0.0157 –0.0110 –0.0126 0.0229 0.0667 0.0325
(0.0385) (0.0523) (0.0544) (0.109) (0.141) (0.149)
4 to 5 –0.0421 –0.0234 –0.0392 –0.158 –0.165 –0.0794
(0.0391) (0.0520) (0.0547) (0.110) (0.145) (0.152)
6 to 7 –0.0680 –0.0889 –0.0659 –0.285 –0.325 –0.222
(0.0407) (0.0548) (0.0566) (0.115) (0.151) (0.160)
8 to 9 –0.0976 –0.114 –0.0907 –0.413 –0.407 –0.358
(0.0406) (0.0539) (0.0578) (0.116) (0.151) (0.162)
10 to 11 –0.0924 –0.102 –0.0874 –0.663 –0.602 –0.743
(0.0429) (0.0561) (0.0621) (0.123) (0.159) (0.173)
12 to 13 –0.159 –0.199 –0.121 –0.888 –0.802 –0.940
(0.0487) (0.0642) (0.0692) (0.143) (0.185) (0.209)
14 to 15 –0.150 –0.161 –0.158 –1.003 –0.909 –1.097
(0.0502) (0.0662) (0.0728) (0.145) (0.187) (0.210)
16 to 17 –0.168 –0.190 –0.177 –0.843 –0.744 –0.944
(0.0536) (0.0689) (0.0787) (0.153) (0.198) (0.227)
18 to 20 –0.204 –0.219 –0.117 –0.795 –0.675 –0.854
(0.0587) (0.0763) (0.0946) (0.167) (0.220) (0.263)
Observations 35,978 16,955 14,968 51,591 24,057 21,443
R-squared 0.659 0.634 0.694 0.632 0.628 0.668
Notes: Data is a sample of brothers linked from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
High-quality links are determined to be in the better 50 percent of scores for our linked
dataset, as determined by the sum of Jaro-Winkler distance in first name, Jaro-Winkler
distance in last name, and absolute di↵erence in year of birth. The excluded group is
arrivals at age zero and one. Brothers fixed e↵ects are included in each column. Standard
errors are clustered by household.
Source: See the text of the main document.
id. Since families are listed together in ship manifests, we can identify brothers as those
listed next to each other who have the same surname, after sorting by ship name and
passenger id. Since we do not collect females, we still capture brothers even if brothers
were not immediately next to each other on the original manifests because the brothers
appear next to each other in our data of only males. This leaves us with 447,540 potential
brothers.
Next, we clean the residence field. From that field we needed a city and a country
of origin; however, the initial origin field needs a significant amount of cleaning. For
instance, the field contains abbreviations, inconsistent spelling, and di↵ering amounts of
information (for instance, just the city name, or the city name and the state, or the city
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Table A.3: E↵ect of age at arrival on labour supply, weekly wages, and self-employment
Age at LFP Weeks Log Self Self em. and
arrival: of work (Weekly Wage) employed not farmer
2 to 3 –0.00181 0.188 –0.0130 –0.0312** –0.0170
(0.00918) (0.641) (0.0291) (0.0151) (0.0140)
4 to 5 –0.00434 –0.552 –0.0201 –0.0118 0.00648
(0.00910) (0.647) (0.0291) (0.0152) (0.0141)
6 to 7 0.000293 –0.388 –0.0385 –0.0304* 0.00122
(0.00946) (0.670) (0.0304) (0.0159) (0.0148)
8 to 9 –0.00386 –0.668 –0.0614** –0.0302* 0.00279
(0.00949) (0.684) (0.0307) (0.0159) (0.0149)
10 to 11 –0.00164 –0.481 –0.0739** –0.0392** –0.00152
(0.00998) (0.714) (0.0328) (0.0169) (0.0156)
12 to 13 0.0132 0.00527 –0.107*** –0.0367* 0.00714
(0.0110) (0.805) (0.0375) (0.0194) (0.0181)
14 to 15 0.00231 –0.891 –0.0965** –0.0372* 0.00590
(0.0117) (0.836) (0.0382) (0.0199) (0.0185)
16 to 17 –0.0106 –1.178 –0.138*** –0.0538** 0.00782
(0.0125) (0.885) (0.0405) (0.0211) (0.0198)
18 to 20 –0.00472 –1.297 –0.158*** –0.0481** 0.0131
(0.0140) (0.959) (0.0454) (0.0235) (0.0219)
Observations 53,129 53,129 35,663 47,901 47,901
R-squared 0.480 0.489 0.655 0.559 0.546
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Data is a sample of brothers linked from
Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census. The number of observations changes across
columns because only wage workers are included in the third column, and those who
have missing information from the self-employed category are dropped in the fourth
column. The excluded group is arrivals at age zero and one. Brothers fixed e↵ects
are included in each column. Standard errors are clustered by household.
Source: See the text of the main document.
name, state, and country). We clean the country of birth variable for origins that have ten
or more observations, or 319,510 of our initial sample of 447,540 brothers.1 For records
that do not identify the country of birth, we assume the country of birth based on the
reported ethnicity. This is mostly straightforward, but we cannot match for ethnicities
such as Jewish, Arabian, or Black. Most of the time there is a second ethnicity listed for
these sources, but if not, then we dropped those (12,620 observations) from our dataset.
Next, we also wish to link on year of birth, but the Ellis Island records only have age
and date of arrival rather than year of birth. Therefore, we need to back out year of birth,
1Of the approximately 320,000 observations that have more than 10 entries, about 0.5 percent of
countries of origin could not be identified. We assume that the country of origin matches one’s ethnicity.
95
Table A.4: E↵ect of age at arrival on home ownership and location
Age at arrival: Own house Log(value of house) Urban Urban population
2 to 3 0.00106 –0.00147 –0.00870 281.8
(0.0179) (0.117) (0.0130) (318.3)
4 to 5 0.0102 0.00106 –0.0102 568.7*
(0.0182) (0.120) (0.0131) (322.0)
6 to 7 0.0116 –0.0261 0.00170 459.4
(0.0188) (0.126) (0.0137) (334.9)
8 to 9 0.0190 –0.0525 –0.00727 427.7
(0.0189) (0.125) (0.0138) (337.0)
10 to 11 0.0236 –0.0796 –0.0114 622.2*
(0.0199) (0.128) (0.0145) (353.9)
12 to 13 –0.00468 0.0291 –0.00791 549.8
(0.0227) (0.141) (0.0164) (400.9)
14 to 15 0.0217 –0.0639 0.00208 478.7
(0.0230) (0.142) (0.0167) (411.4)
16 to 17 0.0207 –0.0379 –0.00851 937.5**
(0.0242) (0.153) (0.0176) (430.9)
18 to 20 0.0208 –0.0772 –0.00479 769.8
(0.0265) (0.168) (0.0193) (469.2)
Observations 51,616 20,746 53,129 53,129
R-squared 0.521 0.788 0.572 0.581
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Data is a sample of brothers linked
from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census. The number of observations
changes across columns because missing information is dropped, and only those
who own a house are in the second column. The excluded group is arrivals aged
zero and one. Brothers fixed e↵ects are included in each column. Standard errors
are clustered by household.
Source: See the text of the main document.
which is typically done with the formula: Year of Observation-Age. However, this implies
that an arrival who listed their age as 10 and arrived on 1 January 1910 would be born
in 1900, but this arrival instead was likely born in 1899. Therefore, we back out the year
of birth as Year of Arrival - Age for those who arrived in the second half of the year, and
Year of Arrival-Age-1 for those who arrived in the first half of the year.
Third, we drop those who have missing letters in their first or last names, which is
identified by strings such as “. . . ” or “?,” which drops 4,653 individuals.
Fourth, if an individual lists an initial as the first name, but then a longer second
name, then we keep the second name as the main name; however, we drop those who only
report an initial for the first name and give no second name.
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Table A.5: Robustness when controlling for birth order
Age at arrival: Income Income Income Education Education Education
2 to 3 –0.0157 –0.0215 –0.0202 0.0229 0.0488 0.0511
(0.0385) (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.109) (0.113) (0.113)
4 to 5 –0.0421 –0.0539 –0.0523 –0.158 –0.107 –0.105
(0.0391) (0.0437) (0.0437) (0.110) (0.124) (0.124)
6 to 7 –0.0680* –0.0845* –0.0831* –0.285** –0.214 –0.213
(0.0407) (0.0491) (0.0491) (0.115) (0.139) (0.139)
8 to 9 –0.0976** –0.119** –0.118** –0.413*** –0.322** –0.320**
(0.0406) (0.0536) (0.0536) (0.116) (0.154) (0.154)
10 to 11 –0.0924** –0.119* –0.118* –0.663*** –0.550*** –0.547***
(0.0429) (0.0613) (0.0613) (0.123) (0.175) (0.175)
12 to 13 –0.159*** –0.189*** –0.188*** –0.888*** –0.758*** –0.756***
(0.0487) (0.0695) (0.0694) (0.143) (0.202) (0.203)
14 to 15 –0.150*** –0.185** –0.184** –1.003*** –0.854*** –0.849***
(0.0502) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.145) (0.217) (0.217)
16 to 17 –0.168*** –0.207** –0.205** –0.843*** –0.675*** –0.665***
(0.0536) (0.0838) (0.0837) (0.153) (0.238) (0.238)
18 to 20 –0.204*** –0.252*** –0.248** –0.795*** –0.589** –0.559**
(0.0587) (0.0967) (0.0967) (0.167) (0.279) (0.280)
Birth order linear:
Birth order –0.0121 0.0522
(0.0195) (0.0558)
Birth order
dummies:
Second born –0.00879 0.0902
(0.0213) (0.0613)
Third born –0.0429 0.0898
(0.0453) (0.130)
Fourth born –0.00381 –0.138
(0.0786) (0.221)
Observations 35,976 35,976 35,976 51,591 51,591 51,591
R-squared 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.632 0.632 0.632
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Data is from a sample of brothers linked from Ellis
Island records to the 1940 Census. All regressions control for sibling fixed e↵ects. The
excluded group is arrivals at age zero and one. Brothers fixed e↵ects are included in each
column. Standard errors are clustered by household.
Source: See the text of the main document.
Fifth, we Americanise the names. The first names found in the data were anglicized to
increase the likelihood of matching. For instance “Giuseppe” was changed to “Joseph.”
Each name was run through behindthename.com to provide a list of related names. To
anglicize a name required at most a many-to-one relationship between the original name
and the anglicized one. The issue was that this was found to be a many-to-many mapping;
for instance, Joseph maps to both Joe and Guiseppe, but both of those also map back to
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Table A.6: Robustness to dropping arrivals 16 years and older
Age at arrival Income Income Education Education
2 to 3 –0.0157 –0.0155 0.0229 0.0250
(0.0385) (0.0396) (0.109) (0.113)
4 to 5 –0.0421 –0.0419 –0.158 –0.159
(0.0391) (0.0401) (0.110) (0.115)
6 to 7 –0.0680* –0.0667 –0.285** –0.297**
(0.0407) (0.0419) (0.115) (0.120)
8 to 9 –0.0976** –0.0992** –0.413*** –0.415***
(0.0406) (0.0419) (0.116) (0.122)
10 to 11 –0.0924** –0.0968** –0.663*** –0.667***
(0.0429) (0.0446) (0.123) (0.129)
12 to 13 –0.159*** –0.164*** –0.888*** –0.933***
(0.0487) (0.0516) (0.143) (0.154)
14 to 15 –0.150*** –0.157*** –1.003*** –1.066***
(0.0502) (0.0547) (0.145) (0.161)
16 to 17 –0.168*** –0.843***
(0.0536) (0.153)
18 to 20 –0.204*** –0.795***
(0.0587) (0.167)
Observations 35,976 28,982 51,591 40,837
R-squared 0.659 0.675 0.632 0.657
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Data is from a sample
of brothers linked from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census.
All regressions control for sibling fixed e↵ects. The excluded group
is arrivals at age zero and one. Brothers fixed e↵ects are included
in each column. Standard errors are clustered by household. Columns
2 and 4 drop those who arrived older than age 16.
Source: See the text of the main document.
Joseph. This meant that the mapping was circular and would depend on the order that
the names were processed. Additionally, it was not clear from behindthename.com which
name was best considered the anglicized version—should Joseph be changed to Guiseppe
or vice versa?
To address these issues the database of first names at birth from U.S. censuses that
occurred before 1930 were obtained and combined to give a ranking of the popularity of
each first name, as defined by the number of U.S. born children with that name. For each
mapping, grouped by the initial name, say Guiseppe to Guisep and Guiseppe to Joseph,
the script provided a preferred choice, based on which of the possible names is the most
popular in the U.S. census dataset. With this, we created a data file that included two
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Table A.7: Age-at-arrival profiles are robust to Americanisation process
Income Education
Linking: Main Non-Americanised Main Non-Americanised
Age at arrival:
2 to 3 –0.0157 –0.0419 0.0229 –0.131
(0.0385) (0.0536) (0.109) (0.147)
4 to 5 –0.0421 –0.0254 –0.158 –0.280*
(0.0391) (0.0529) (0.110) (0.152)
6 to 7 –0.0680* –0.0511 –0.285** –0.360**
(0.0407) (0.0566) (0.115) (0.158)
8 to 9 –0.0976** –0.102* –0.413*** –0.670***
(0.0406) (0.0552) (0.116) (0.157)
10 to 11 –0.0924** –0.0364 –0.663*** –0.774***
(0.0429) (0.0600) (0.123) (0.169)
12 to 13 –0.159*** –0.131* –0.888*** –1.178***
(0.0487) (0.0693) (0.143) (0.197)
14 to 15 –0.150*** –0.169** –1.003*** –1.326***
(0.0502) (0.0746) (0.145) (0.199)
16 to 17 –0.168*** –0.168** –0.843*** –1.012***
(0.0536) (0.0769) (0.153) (0.215)
18 to 20 –0.204*** –0.201** –0.795*** –1.062***
(0.0587) (0.0836) (0.167) (0.235)
Observations 35,977 18,052 51,591 25,712
R-squared 0.659 0.678 0.632 0.662
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Data is from a sample of brothers
linked from Ellis Island Records to the 1940 Census. This table tests the
robustness of results when not Americanising names in our dataset. See
Appendix C for more detail. All regressions control for sibling fixed e↵ects.
The excluded group is arrivals at age zero and one. Brothers fixed e↵ects
are included in each column. Standard errors are clustered by household.
Source: See the text of the main document.
primary variables: the first name string as observed in the Ellis Island name, and the
Americanised name. We then merged our Ellis Island dataset with this file to attach the
Americanised name to our dataset.
Finally, we drop potential brothers who are next to each other and are more than
ten years apart. We do this in case those with the same surname that are more than ten
years apart are not truly brothers, but represent a father-son relationship or uncle-nephew
relationship. Note that this does not drop sets of brothers where the oldest and youngest
are more than ten years apart. For example, if there are a 14, five, and one year-old
who are identified as potential brothers, we keep them since none are more than ten years
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apart; but if there is a 20 year old, five, and one year-old, we drop the 20 year old from the
dataset. Keeping those more than ten years apart does not lead to a qualitative change
in results. Ultimately, we are left with 397,137 potential brothers to link.
A.3 Linking methodology
We link our cleaned dataset of 397,137 brothers to white males in the 1940 U.S. Census
by searching for the best match among the potential set of matches on Americanised first
name, last name, year of birth (within a range of three years), and country of birth. Our
process follows the same idea as others in the literature (Abramitzky et al., 2014) with a
few modifications. The main di↵erence in our methodology is that we first Americanise
all foreign-born names in the 1940 Census in case an immigrant changed his name from,
for example, Jo¨rg to George. Another di↵erence is that we rate the quality of potential
matches by determining the di↵erences in string similarity via the Jaro-Winkler algorithm.
The steps to our linking process are as follows:
• “Americanise” the first names of Ellis Island and census records with a list of 28,000
name variants from behindthename.com. Names that do not have an American
equivalent are unchanged.
• Standardise the first name resulting from step one and the last name with the
NYSIIS algorithm. Drop observations that have the same Americanised first name
string, last name string, year of birth, and country of birth in both the Ellis Island
records and 1940 Census.
• Find all possible matches on NYSIIS Americanised first name, NYSIIS last name,
country of birth, and exact year of birth. Repeat this step, but expand the window
for di↵erence in year of birth to allow up to a three-year di↵erence.
• Calculate a match score for each potential match, which is the sum of the Jaro-
Winkler distance in Americanised first name string, Jaro-Winkler distance in last
name string, and di↵erence in year of birth (zero for exact year of birth match).
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Note that this method does not actually treat all NYSIIS names equally, but only
uses the NYSIIS algorithm to find potential matches.
• Keep the minimum match score for each observation in the Ellis Island records, and
then keep the minimum match score for each observation in the 1940 Census.
This process leads to linking 103,005 individuals from the set of 397,137 brothers in
the Ellis Island records, a match rate of 25.9 percent, a reasonable rate for a single match.
Since the empirical strategy requires the use of siblings, we drop individuals who do not
have another matched sibling, which leads to our final sample of 53,129 brothers used in
the main text.
In Table A.8, we show di↵erences between our entire linked sample and the sample
of brothers we use in the main text. The primary di↵erence between samples is that
people in the brothers’ sample are 12 percentage points less likely to be from Southern
and Eastern Europe, which is unsurprising since these sources had lower linking rates and
thus there are fewer sets of two brothers linked than single individuals linked. This also
leads our brothers sample to be slightly higher skilled than the overall linked sample by
0.2 years of education and by earning 2.9 percent more wage income.
While it is well known that linking may bias the representativeness of the sample, we
cannot directly test the representativeness because the 1940 Census does not include year
of arrival, and thus we cannot compare our sample to those from the same arrival cohort
and those with the same arrival age. However, we can show how our linked dataset of
brothers has di↵erent attributes than the European migrant stock with the same years of
birth in the 1940 Census. The di↵erence is shown in Columns III and IV in Table A.8;
note that di↵erences between our linked sample of brothers and the 1940 migrant stock
may result from biases in the linking process, because we have a specific migrant cohort,
or because we only keep those who arrived at young ages. As expected, our linked sample
of brothers is higher skilled and earns more income than the 1940 Census as a whole,
partially because we have younger arrivals and younger arrivals have higher earnings later
in life.
One way in which our sample may be unrepresentative is because we Americanise
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Table A.8: Characteristics of our linked sample of brothers in the 1940 census
I II III IV (III–II) (III–VI)
Sample: Linked Non- Brothers 1940 Di↵erence Di↵erence
sample brothers Stock
Age 40.88 40.84 40.91 48.04 0.0677 –7.123
(9.040) (8.913) (9.152) (11.56) (0.0571) (0.0654)
Education 7.171 7.051 7.277 6.860 0.227 0.417
(3.705) (3.762) (3.650) (3.951) (0.0238) (0.0241)
Log occ. 6.902 6.879 6.924 6.910 0.0451 0.0137
score (0.335) (0.327) (0.341) (0.330) (0.00218) (0.00223)
Self-employed 0.201 0.210 0.193 0.233 –0.0170 -0.0393
(0.401) (0.408) (0.395) (0.422) (0.00267) (0.00273)
Log income 6.951 6.936 6.965 6.887 0.0295 0.0778
wage (0.709) (0.711) (0.707) (0.777) (0.00547) (0.00581)
South and 0.642 0.712 0.580 0.617 –0.132 –0.0372
East Europe (0.479) (0.453) (0.494) (0.486) (0.00300) (0.00309)
Age arrival 2.332 0 4.412
Di↵. in family (3.194) (0) (3.181)
N 100,476 47,353 53,123 47,667
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of: the linked sample; the linked
sample split into brothers and non-brothers; and then the 1940 Census. Note that
not all individuals have observed wage income, years of education, or self-employment
status.
Source: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to 1940 Census, and also
1940 Census (Ruggles et al., 2017).
names and this introduces a bias in our linking process. In our dataset, 36 percent of
matches are matched due to the Americanisation process. Given that about 30 percent of
immigrants switched their first names at the naturalization stage according to data from
New York, and that arrival records had more foreign-sounding names than census records,
we believe that 36 percent is a reasonable number (Biavaschi et al. (2017); Carneiro et al.
(2015)). In Table A.9, we list the top 25 names that were Americanised in our dataset of
linked brothers. At the top of the list are primarily Italian names such as Giuseppe, the
alternative (and misspelled) Guiseppe, Giovanni, and Antonio. There are also non-Italian
names that are Americanised, such as Josef, Johann, and Wilhelm.
Americanising names is a not a standard process when linking individuals and therefore
may somehow drive our results. We perform a robustness check in which we link the arrival
records with the 1940 U.S. Census without Americanising any of the names in the Ellis
Island records or the 1940 Census. Not Americanising names leads to a smaller set of
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Table A.9: Top 25 Americanisations in linked dataset of brothers
Rank First Name: Arrival First Name: 1940 N
1 Giuseppe Joseph 2,227
2 Giovanni John 1,567
3 Antonio Anthony 1,362
4 Luigi Louis 860
5 Vincenzo Vincent 858
6 Guiseppe Joseph 835
7 Pietro Peter 715
8 Michele Michael 585
9 Josef Joseph 545
10 Domenico Dominick 453
11 Jan John 439
12 Nicola Nicholas 299
13 Paolo Paul 257
14 Johann John 240
15 Carlo Charles 185
16 Johan John 183
17 Wilhelm William 178
18 Johannes John 164
19 Jose Joseph 162
20 Heinrich Henry 159
21 Andrea Andrew 155
22 Janos John 151
23 Georg George 142
24 Filippo Philip 141
25 Tommaso Thomas 128
Notes: This table lists the top 25 Americanisations in our
linked dataset of brothers, where the arrival name is the
one listed in the Ellis Island records, while the 1940 name
is the one listed in the 1940 U.S. Census.
Source: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records
to 1940 Census.
linked individuals of 67,427, a drop of about 30 percent. This leads to an even smaller set
of two successfully linked brothers of 26,412, which is unsurprising since we do not link
those who changed their name. The smaller set of observations leads to noisier estimates,
but our qualitative results hold when using the non-Americanised dataset, suggesting that
the Americanisation process does not drive the results in the main text. Table A7 shows
the results for log wage income and years of education when not Americanising our data
compared with our main results.
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A.4 Creation of immigrant-specific occupational score
In this section, we provide further details on the creation of the immigrant-specific occu-
pational score used in text. We create this score to improve on the standard occupational
scores used in the literature, such as the 1950 occscore from IPUMS and the 1901 Cost of
Living Survey score. There are important limitations when using these commonly used
scores; for example, the 1901 Cost of Living Score is only representative for married urban
families and therefore does not provide an accurate estimate for rural or single workers.
The 1950 occupational score reflects earnings after WWII, and therefore understates wage
gaps for data prior to WWII (Goldin and Margo, 1992). Moreover, neither score reflects
earnings that are specific to immigrants and thus they understate any di↵erence between
immigrants and natives, a key interest for this paper.
We create an alternative occupational score that is based on income reported in the
full-count 1940 U.S. Census. Our approach follows Collins and Wanamaker (2014) and
Collins and Wanamaker (2017) in that we impute income separately by group; but instead
of groups separated by race and region as in Collins and Wanamaker (2017), we impute
income separately by country of birth. Therefore, the occupation score is essentially the
average earnings in each occupation/country of birth cell. We provide further details on
how we create the score below, but we follow Appendix I.b of Collins and Wanamaker
(2017) to fix for self-employed earnings and non-monetary compensation for farm laborers
and farmers.
First, we take the full-count 1940 U.S. Census and top-code income to $5,000 for wage
workers. For self-employed workers, we ignore their reported wage income since this is
not consistently reported, but we instead impute their income. To do this, we follow
the strategy laid out by Collins and Wanamaker (2017) where we take the ratio of self-
employed earnings to wage-worker earnings by occupation in the 1960 census, assume this
ratio from 1960 is a good proxy for the ratio in 1940, and multiply the ratio with the
mean wage income by occupation and country of birth. This leads to an imputed income
for each self-employed person that varies by occupation and country of birth. Then we
collapse the 1940 data by detailed occupation code and country of birth to get an average
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income for each occupation, which forms the occupational score for the large majority of
our data.
We do not take the above approach for farm laborers and farmers because they may
receive compensation in kind which is not recorded in the income data. We take a few
extra steps to estimate their incomes. Starting with farm laborers and once again following
Collins and Wanamaker (2017), we increase farm laborers’ mean wage income in the 1940
Census by 26 percent to reflect in-kind compensation, which is based on the 1957 USDA
report Major Statistical Series of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The next step
is to estimate income for farmers. First, we assume that the perquisite rate of farmers
in the 1960 Census is 35 percent (also based on the USDA report), and we scale up
their reported (wage and business) income by this factor. To create the final estimate
for farmer income in 1940, we assume that the ratio between farm laborers and farmer
income (inclusive of perquisites) in 1960 is the same as in 1940. Therefore, we need to
estimate farm laborers’ income in 1960, which we boost their income by 19 percent to
reflect in-kind compensation.
A.5 Robustness of results to a linking approach re-
lated to Feigenbaum (2016)
A.5.1 An alternative approach to linking
In this section, we discuss an alternative method of linking immigrants from Ellis Island
records to the 1940 Census that is related to Feigenbaum (2016). In the main text, our
method of picking the best link is based on Massey (2017) where we rate matches by
summing the di↵erence in year of birth, Jaro-Winkler distance in first name, and Jaro-
Winkler distance in last name. Rather than rating matches based on these values, we
could instead use training data to estimate the penalty for having deviations in year of
birth, first name and last name, as well as other variables. Feigenbaum (2016) uses this
approach when linking children from the 1915 Iowa Census to the 1940 U.S. Census.
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Related to our study on immigrants, Ward (2018) applies the Feigenbaum (2016)
method to immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration in his study of English fluency
in the 1910 to 1930 Censuses. Concerned that the penalty for deviations in name may
vary by the source of immigrants, Ward (2018) draws random samples of 2,000 from 16
di↵erent ethnicities in 1920 (e.g., Polish, Italian, German, etc.), hand-links them to the
1930 U.S. Census, and estimates a model to predict a match score for each immigrant.2
We use Ward (2018) hand-linked data on immigrants between the 1920 and 1930 Censuses
as “training data” for our sample of Ellis Island arrivals linked to the 1940 Census. While
linking Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census is di↵erent than linking the 1920 Census
to 1930 Census, it will serve as a good quality check on our main results in sample. We
do not use the data created from this linking process as our main sample because the
“training data” is not specific to our linked data between Ellis Island arrival records and
the 1940 Census; however, qualitative results from this dataset are consistent with results
in the main paper.
We cannot directly use the estimated probit coe cients from Ward (2018) since he
predicts scores based on year of arrival, a variable that is unavailable in the 1940 Census;
therefore, we re-estimate a probit for each of the 16 ethnicities after removing the year of
arrival variables from the model. The results for each probit model are shown in Tables
A.10–A.13, and show generally that having smaller deviations in Jaro-Winkler distance
and year of birth predicts a match. We can then use the coe cients from this model to
predict the probability that each potential link would be a match. Potential links between
the Ellis Island data and the 1940 Census are chosen such that they have a Jaro-Winkler
distance in first name of less than 0.20, Jaro-Winkler distance in last name of less than
0.25, a year of birth distance of less than 3, an exact match on country of birth, the same
first letter of the first name, and the same first letter of the last name.
At this point, we have predicted match probabilities for each potential link; now we
2Ward (2018) discusses linking 15 di↵erent ethnicities (these are described as ethnicities in the original
Ellis Island datasource, however they are arguably nationalities): German, Jewish, Dutch, Swedish,
Danish, Norwegian, Italian, French, Romanian, Greek, Russian, Czech/Slovak, Polish, Finnish, and
Hungarian. Ward (2018) additionally links immigrants from English-speaking sources (that is, England,
Ireland, and Scotland), but does not report this since his study is on the acquisition of English skills for
immigrants from non-English-speaking sources.
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have to determine parameters for who is included in the dataset. We choose the meta-
parameters shown in Table A.14 following the conservative strategy of Ward (2018) such
that the PPV (predictive positive value, or estimated share of true positives to overall
positives) is 0.90.3 This method of being conservative to increase the number of true
positives (or reduce the number of false positives) leads to a significantly lower linking
rate than the training sample and compared to our main method of linking immigrants.
This linking process leads to a smaller sample of brothers of 21,994 compared with our
main sample of 53,129. This is partially because it is di cult to predict the best link from
observable variables in hand-linked data; it also may be because the data we use to predict
links is not specific to the Ellis Island records matched to the 1940 Census. Being more
restrictive about who is kept in the sample may also lead to biases in representativeness,
but once again this is di cult to determine given the lack of census or representative
sample that observes immigrant outcomes in 1940 in addition to year/age of arrival. We
follow the same weighting process in the main section and weight to ensure that our
sample is representative on country of birth.
A.5.2 All results qualitatively hold with alternative linked sam-
ple
We recreate all tables and figures from the main text with this linked sample (see Tables
A.15–A.17; Figures A.2–A.4). We show that all results are qualitatively the same as in
the main text: the age-at-arrival and income profile are similarly sloped with or without
brothers fixed e↵ects, older arrivals experienced a larger native-immigrant wage gap than
younger arrivals, older arrivals acquired fewer years of education than younger arrivals,
and older arrivals were less likely to marry a native-born spouse.
3The meta-parameters are the cut-o↵ of predicted probability for keeping an immigrant in the sample,
and the minimum ratio between highest match score and second-highest match score (to drop close second
matches).
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Table A.10: Probit coe cients, Part 1
English German Yiddish, Jewish Dutch
Year of birth di↵erence = 1 –0.728*** –0.454*** –0.738*** –0.782***
(0.0825) (0.0865) (0.0743) (0.103)
Year of birth di↵erence = 2 –1.104*** –0.705*** –0.974*** –1.201***
(0.0962) (0.0986) (0.0842) (0.135)
Year of birth di↵erence = 3 –1.163*** –1.025*** –1.180*** –1.395***
(0.104) (0.116) (0.0986) (0.146)
Jaro-Winkler distance in first name string –6.630** –2.495 –3.574 1.330
(2.892) (2.366) (2.611) (2.029)
Jaro-Winkler distance in last name string –9.190*** –9.705*** –8.584*** –12.13***
(0.848) (0.723) (0.756) (0.925)
Exact first name match (NYSIIS) -0.204 0.102 0.0417 0.601*
(0.404) (0.313) (0.347) (0.314)
Exact first and last name match (NYSIIS) –0.342*** –0.401*** –0.280*** –0.533***
(0.105) (0.120) (0.0926) (0.173)
Total number of hits –0.171*** –0.202*** –0.165*** –0.266***
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0220) (0.0246)
Total number of hits squared 0.00413*** 0.00521*** 0.00347*** 0.00653***
(0.000655) (0.000673) (0.000717) (0.000916)
First letter of last name match 0.230 -0.116 0.121 –0.487***
(0.173) (0.119) (0.153) (0.167)
First letter of first name match 0.171 0.557*** 1.596*** 0.385
(0.291) (0.181) (0.528) (0.262)
More than two hits have NYSIIS last name match 0.533*** 0.535*** 0.636*** –1.041***
(0.129) (0.165) (0.116) (0.266)
One hit has NYSIIS last name match 1.223*** 0.848*** 1.383*** 1.958***
(0.126) (0.163) (0.119) (0.253)
Jaro-Winkler distance in NYSIIS first name –1.548** –3.213*** –2.540*** –5.875***
(0.758) (0.637) (0.719) (0.949)
Jaro-Winkler distance in NYSIIS last name –1.255** –0.308 –0.0312 –0.534*
(0.584) (0.257) (0.122) (0.319)
Middle initial match, if have one 1.116*** 1.624*** 0.414 1.011***
(0.126) (0.318) (0.727) (0.315)
Constant 0.837 1.133*** –0.625 2.500***
(0.530) (0.408) (0.672) (0.474)
Observations 12,975 11,227 25,691 6,651
Source: Ward (2018).
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Table A.11: Probit coe cients, Part 2
Swedish Danish Norwegian Italian
Year of birth di↵erence = 1 –0.824*** –0.722*** –0.685*** –0.445***
(0.0693) (0.0733) (0.0822) (0.0652)
Year of birth di↵erence = 2 –1.060*** –1.140*** –1.161*** –0.822***
(0.0803) (0.0916) (0.105) (0.0808)
Year of birth di↵erence = 3 –1.342*** –1.446*** –1.459*** –1.212***
(0.0973) (0.114) (0.123) (0.107)
Jaro-Winkler distance in first name string –4.822*** –4.209*** –2.601* 0.906
(1.466) (1.552) (1.512) (1.243)
Jaro-Winkler distance in last name string –6.467*** –5.573*** –7.379*** –10.49***
(0.828) (0.889) (0.793) (0.592)
Exact first name match (NYSIIS) 0.228 0.268 0.403* 0.462**
(0.226) (0.217) (0.222) (0.188)
Exact first and last name match (NYSIIS) –0.0560 –0.0728 –0.361*** 0.00105
(0.0954) (0.0947) (0.107) (0.0932)
Total number of hits –0.175*** –0.218*** –0.215*** –0.0654***
(0.0182) (0.0200) (0.0194) (0.0246)
Total number of hits squared 0.00366*** 0.00485*** 0.00472*** 0.000384
(0.000608) (0.000670) (0.000684) (0.000787)
First letter of last name match 0.217 0.464** 0.354** –0.00628
(0.133) (0.182) (0.150) (0.143)
First letter of first name match 0.446*** 0.956*** 0.740*** 0.151
(0.158) (0.198) (0.187) (0.107)
More than two hits have NYSIIS last name match 0.690*** 0.0203 –0.0275 0.686***
(0.121) (0.153) (0.156) (0.118)
One hit has NYSIIS last name match 1.229*** 1.389*** 1.547*** 0.713***
(0.128) (0.157) (0.153) (0.123)
Jaro-Winkler distance in NYSIIS first name –1.651** –1.819** –1.756** –3.688***
(0.738) (0.848) (0.693) (0.593)
Jaro-Winkler distance in NYSIIS last name –0.765*** –0.695*** –0.855*** -0.0696
(0.253) (0.243) (0.272) (0.144)
Middle initial match, if have one 1.275*** 1.661*** 1.042*** –
(0.131) (0.123) (0.226)
Constant 0.109 –0.528 0.0449 0.526
(0.324) (0.378) (0.350) (0.322)
Observations 21,648 18,690 13,893 29,591
Source: Ward (2018).
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Table A.12: Probit coe cients, Part 3
French Romanian Greek Russian
Year of birth di↵erence = 1 –0.641*** –0.265* –0.520*** –0.209*
(0.132) (0.146) (0.0841) (0.110)
Year of birth di↵erence = 2 –1.040*** –0.521*** –0.968*** –0.530***
(0.158) (0.153) (0.103) (0.118)
Year of birth di↵erence = 3 –0.899*** –0.602*** –1.023*** –0.559***
(0.158) (0.161) (0.115) (0.124)
Jaro-Winkler distance in first name string –5.319* –8.447 –0.214 –2.643
(2.841) (5.189) (1.898) (3.739)
Jaro-Winkler distance in last name string –12.31*** –9.571*** –8.833*** –9.095***
(1.081) (0.980) (0.716) (0.785)
Exact First name match (NYSIIS) –0.106 –1.240* 0.228 0.366
(0.358) (0.712) (0.287) (0.558)
Exact first and last name match (NYSIIS) –1.031*** –0.652*** –0.137 –0.887***
(0.200) (0.221) (0.111) (0.151)
Total number of hits –0.349*** –0.240*** –0.209*** –0.223***
(0.0351) (0.0306) (0.0245) (0.0217)
Total number of hits squared 0.0114*** 0.00620*** 0.00486*** 0.00555***
(0.00164) (0.00134) (0.000802) (0.000790)
First letter of last name match 0.185 0.103 0.256 0.161
(0.208) (0.184) (0.198) (0.153)
First letter of first name match 1.283*** 0.943* 0.472** –0.130
(0.414) (0.518) (0.225) (0.280)
More than two hits have NYSIIS last name match –0.852*** –0.534 0.895*** 0.0920
(0.323) (0.362) (0.140) (0.258)
One hit has NYSIIS last name match 1.969*** 1.759*** 0.750*** 1.073***
(0.309) (0.363) (0.147) (0.254)
Jaro-Winkler distance in NYSIIS first name –3.694*** –2.865*** –3.269*** –5.015***
(1.024) (0.846) (0.670) (0.820)
Jaro-Winkler distance in NYSIIS last name 0.0116 –0.0180 –0.558*** –0.239
(0.210) (0.265) (0.208) (0.236)
Middle initial match, if have one 1.179** - 0.864* 2.620**
(0.469) (0.461) (1.041)
Constant 1.273** 1.849** 0.617 1.320**
(0.614) (0.925) (0.456) (0.672)
Observations 3,190 2,899 21,761 10,481
Source: Ward (2018).
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Table A.13: Probit coe cients, Part 4
Czech Polish Finnish Hungarian
Year of birth di↵erence = 1 –0.570*** –0.438*** –0.580*** –0.425***
(0.101) (0.0742) (0.0919) (0.0998)
Year of birth di↵erence = 2 –1.009*** –0.625*** –0.911*** –0.739***
(0.123) (0.0861) (0.109) (0.111)
Year of birth di↵erence = 3 –1.229*** –0.700*** –0.950*** –1.106***
(0.148) (0.0996) (0.111) (0.128)
Jaro-Winkler distance in first name string –6.374** –1.801 1.632 –7.916***
(3.125) (2.694) (1.783) (2.525)
Jaro-Winkler distance in last name string –12.24*** –11.45*** –8.022*** –8.046***
(0.898) (0.645) (0.738) (0.777)
Exact First name match (NYSIIS) –0.827* 0.223 1.030*** –0.593*
(0.432) (0.364) (0.294) (0.356)
Exact first and last name match (NYSIIS) –0.274* –0.582*** –0.673*** –0.460***
(0.162) (0.112) (0.122) (0.132)
Total number of hits –0.227*** –0.115*** –0.279*** –0.236***
(0.0265) (0.0243) (0.0209) (0.0225)
Total number of hits squared 0.00560*** 0.00154* 0.00784*** 0.00572***
(0.000899) (0.000793) (0.000780) (0.000822)
First letter of last name match –0.159 0.237* –0.0230 –0.0458
(0.157) (0.140) (0.135) (0.154)
First letter of first name match 0.450 0.370* 0.244 0.326
(0.300) (0.215) (0.175) (0.318)
More than two hits have NYSIIS last name match 0.264 0.300* 0.106 –0.107
(0.221) (0.162) (0.165) (0.203)
One hit has NYSIIS last name match 1.054*** 1.188*** 1.396*** 1.627***
(0.222) (0.165) (0.159) (0.202)
Jaro-Winkler distance in NYSIIS first name –4.807*** –3.273*** –2.033*** –2.655***
(0.889) (0.617) (0.620) (0.703)
Jaro-Winkler distance in NYSIIS last name –0.465* 0.0369 –1.251*** –0.139
(0.276) (0.236) (0.467) (0.191)
Middle initial match, if have one –0.464 1.537 1.216*** 2.947***
(2.109) (4.076) (0.350) (1.072)
Constant 2.914*** 0.863* 0.304 1.625***
(0.615) (0.482) (0.382) (0.490)
Observations 16,041 27,298 8,006 9,891
Source: Ward (2018).
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Table A.14: Critical values used to keep links
Language Probability Ratio of First-Best Score PPV TPR
Threshold to Second-Best Score PPV TPR
English 0.305 1.4 0.904 0.728
German 0.434 1.2 0.901 0.714
Yiddish, Jewish 0.372 1.7 0.901 0.594
Dutch 0.337 1.1 0.901 0.881
Swedish 0.268 3.4 0.901 0.572
Danish 0.356 1.9 0.901 0.611
Norwegian 0.331 1.5 0.902 0.731
Italian 0.521 1.5 0.901 0.432
French 0.313 1.2 0.903 0.871
Romanian 0.402 1.6 0.905 0.643
Greek 0.527 2.2 0.904 0.285
Russian 0.397 4.3 0.904 0.479
Czech/Slovak 0.325 3.1 0.901 0.622
Polish 0.357 9.1 0.904 0.383
Finnish 0.257 2.4 0.900 0.688
Hungarian 0.38 7.7 0.903 0.518
Notes: This table gives the meta-parameters for inclusion in the linked
sample. The predicted probability for a match must be above the
probability threshold, and the predicted probability must be at least the
multiple (in Column 3) of the second-best score. The PPV, or positive
prediction value, is the ratio of true positives to all positives; a higher
number indicates fewer false positives. The TPR, or the true positive
rate, is the ratio of true positives to all possible links; a lower number
reflects that the probit does not include all matches from the hand
linked data.
Source: Ward (2018)
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Table A.15: Robustness of Table 2.3: E↵ect of age at arrival on occupations
Age at Arrival: White-Col. Skilled Farmer Unskilled Log (Occ. Score)
1940 Census 1950 Occscore
2 to 3 –0.00301 –0.00558 –0.00739 0.0160 –0.0477*** –0.0137
(0.0251) (0.0235) (0.0103) (0.0275) (0.0174) (0.0195)
4 to 5 –0.00722 –0.00405 –0.00397 0.0152 –0.0528*** –0.0160
(0.0255) (0.0236) (0.0106) (0.0280) (0.0184) (0.0203)
6 to 7 –0.0175 –0.00943 –0.0113 0.0382 –0.0930*** –0.0294
(0.0269) (0.0250) (0.0112) (0.0300) (0.0185) (0.0210)
8 to 9 –0.0260 0.0161 –0.0158 0.0258 –0.111*** –0.0254
(0.0271) (0.0250) (0.0112) (0.0297) (0.0188) (0.0213)
10 to 11 –0.0362 0.00340 –0.0143 0.0471 –0.118*** –0.0521**
(0.0280) (0.0265) (0.0123) (0.0314) (0.0201) (0.0227)
12 to 13 –0.0237 0.0111 –0.0203 0.0329 –0.140*** –0.0539**
(0.0323) (0.0306) (0.0134) (0.0362) (0.0226) (0.0258)
14 to 15 –0.0722** 0.0317 –0.0211 0.0616* –0.151*** –0.0730***
(0.0323) (0.0318) (0.0141) (0.0369) (0.0224) (0.0256)
16 to 17 –0.0773** 0.00595 –0.0185 0.0899** –0.156*** –0.0834***
(0.0348) (0.0339) (0.0163) (0.0389) (0.0242) (0.0290)
18 to 20 –0.0703* 0.0328 –0.0303 0.0678 –0.148*** –0.0610*
(0.0394) (0.0379) (0.0195) (0.0441) (0.0276) (0.0316)
N 20,715 20,715 20,715 20,715 20,715 20,715
R2 0.591 0.554 0.677 0.584 0.712 0.624
Notes and Source: This table recreates Table 2.3 from the main text, but with the sample
linked using the Feigenbaum (2016) method.
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Table A.16: Robustness of Table 2.4: The return to education and experience
Full Sample Only NW Europe Only SE Europe Full Sample
US Educ. 0.0611*** 0.0705*** 0.0501*** 0.0705***
(0.0102) (0.0117) (0.0181) (0.0120)
US Educ. ⇥ –0.0203
SE Europe (0.0211)
Foreign Educ. 0.0468*** 0.0614*** 0.0354** 0.0614***
(0.00856) (0.0105) (0.0141) (0.0107)
Foreign Educ. ⇥ –0.0259
SE Europe (0.0173)
Foreign Exp. 0.0289 0.0438 0.0290 0.0438
(0.0235) (0.0490) (0.0318) (0.0501)
Foreign Exp. ⇥ –0.0148
SE Europe (0.0587)
(Foreign Exp./10)2 –0.170 –0.607 –0.206 –0.607
(0.274) (0.820) (0.329) (0.839)
(Foreign Exp./10)2 0.402
⇥ SE Europe (0.897)
US Exp. 0.0792*** 0.0943*** 0.0574** 0.0943***
(0.0123) (0.0138) (0.0232) (0.0141)
US Exp. ⇥ –0.0369
SE Europe (0.0264)
(US Exp./10)2 –0.128*** –0.172*** –0.0751* –0.172***
(0.0232) (0.0259) (0.0419) (0.0265)
(US Exp./10)2 ⇥ 0.0973**
SE Europe (0.0482)
Observations 14,703 8,980 5,723 14,703
R2 0.715 0.705 0.720 0.717
Notes and Source: This table recreates Table 2.4 from the main text, but with the
sample linked using the Feigenbaum (2016) method.
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Table A.17: Robustness of Table 2.5: E↵ect of age at arrival on social outcomes
Intermarriage Spatial Assimilation
Native Spouse from Fraction of county Fraction of census
Age at arrival: spouse Di↵erent source native HH page native HH
2 to 3 –0.0176 –0.0357 0.00321 0.000183
(0.0483) (0.0430) (0.00520) (0.0110)
4 to 5 –0.0649 –0.0583 –0.00333 –0.00929
(0.0502) (0.0447) (0.00552) (0.0113)
6 to 7 –0.0744 –0.0832* –0.00155 0.00463
(0.0518) (0.0470) (0.00584) (0.0123)
8 to 9 –0.142*** –0.156*** 0.00100 0.00411
(0.0512) (0.0458) (0.00576) (0.0119)
10 to 11 –0.178*** –0.192*** 0.00149 0.0107
(0.0539) (0.0481) (0.00617) (0.0127)
12 to 13 –0.244*** –0.249*** 0.00303 0.0172
(0.0620) (0.0571) (0.00703) (0.0152)
14 to 15 –0.307*** –0.308*** 0.00400 –0.00113
(0.0619) (0.0567) (0.00709) (0.0151)
16 to 17 –0.382*** –0.381*** 0.00867 –2.41e-05
(0.0670) (0.0621) (0.00781) (0.0164)
18 to 19 –0.424*** –0.443*** 0.00893 –0.0106
(0.0735) (0.0707) (0.00934) (0.0187)
Observations 12,503 12,503 21,994 21,994
R2 0.732 0.741 0.737 0.658
Notes and Source: This table recreates Table 2.5 from the main text, but with the sample
linked using the Feigenbaum (2016) method.
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Figure A.2: Robustness of Figure 2.3: The negative e↵ect of age at arrival on the native-
immigrant gap in wage income in 1940
Notes: The dependent variable is the age-adjusted gap in log wage income between immi-
grants and natives. Self-employed workers are dropped. The figure shows the estimated
fixed e↵ects for age at arrival with age at arrival of zero and one being the excluded
group. The shaded area is the 95 percent confidence interval when using sibling fixed
e↵ects. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Sources: Sample of brothers linked from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census using
Feigenbaum (2016) method.
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Figure A.3: Robustness of Figure 2.4: The negative e↵ect of age at arrival on the native-
immigrant gap in years of education in 1940
Notes: The dependent variable is the age-adjusted gap in years of education between
immigrants and natives. The figure shows the estimated fixed e↵ects for age at arrival
with age at arrival of zero and one being the excluded group. The shaded area is the 95
percent confidence interval. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census using
Feigenbaum (2016) method.
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Figure A.4: Robustness of Figure 2.5: The age-at-arrival profiles were di↵erently sloped
across new and old sources
Notes: The figure shows the estimated fixed e↵ects for age at arrival with age at arrival
of zero and one being the excluded group. The shaded area is the 95 percent confidence
interval for the New Source group. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
New source countries are in Southern and Western Europe and Old Source countries are
in Northern and Western Europe.
Sources: Linked sample of brothers from Ellis Island records to the 1940 Census using
Feigenbaum (2016)method.
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